


The New Great Trek

The story of South Africa's white exodus

The New Great Trek

THE STORY OF
SOUTH AFRICA'S WHITE EXODUS



Johann van Rooyen

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
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PREFACE

The title of this book is partially derived from a formative event which shaped South African history during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the Great Trek. In response to conditions that were regarded as unbearable, thousands of disaffected early-Afrikaners in the Eastern Cape moved to territories to the north and in the process overcame considerable obstacles in the form of a hostile colonial government, wild animals, disease, virtually impenetrable mountain ranges and antagonistic indigenous tribes. Today, a century and a half later, emigrants participating in the New Great Trek might want to argue that they too are trying to escape from obstacles very similar to those faced by their forbears, albeit in different guises. The title is also an adaptation of the title of the autobiography of the last white South African president, F W de Klerk: *The last trek – A new beginning*.^{*} In his book De Klerk suggested that the transition to democracy in 1994 represented the final trek by Afrikaners and whites away from apartheid to an inclusive democracy. Sadly, however, for the tens of thousands of mainly white South Africans it signalled merely the beginning of yet another trek, and for the many who had left South Africa after 1994 the only 'New Beginning' would be on the shores of Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Britain the USA and elsewhere.



This book is not a guide on how to emigrate, but follows a holistic discussion and analysis of the major aspects of South African emigration, particularly in so far as no book on this topic has yet been published. The idea behind the book was to take the concept of migration and the flow of people across borders and continents, which is a fundamental part of human history and society today, and apply it to South Africa. The reasons that people move around the world are universal and can be summarised broadly as the search for better material conditions and the avoidance of physical danger. The thousands of South Africans participating in the current emigration wave are no different, and their motivation for leaving is founded on the desire to escape from violent crime and to ensure that their quality of life and living standards are not affected by rapidly changing socioeconomic and political conditions.

The author has attempted to discuss these conditions as objectively as possible and to steer away from overly negative or politically subjective views. However, the scourge of violent crime, even when viewed objectively, is South Africa's Achilles'



^{*} F W de Klerk, *The last trek – A new beginning. The autobiography*. London: Macmillan, 1998.


heel – and the author has attempted to expose it in no uncertain terms – not only is crime the principal reason that South Africans are emigrating, but it is damaging the country and destroying lives in a similar fashion to 46 years of apartheid – from this perspective the *New Great Trek* is a discussion of emigration with reference to its main cause, violent crime.



INTRODUCTION

Lengthy lists of Afrikaans-sounding surnames in the telephone directories of Sydney, Toronto, Atlanta and many other major cities all over the industrialised English-speaking world are testimony to the New Great Trek. In 1998 Sydney was the home of 16 families with the surname 'Van Dyk', nine 'Van Niekerks', seven 'Van Rooyens' and 16 'Van Wyks'; the Perth directory has 19 entries under 'Van der Merwe', seven under 'Van der Westhuizen', eight under 'Van Niekerk', and 15 under 'Van Rooyen'. Cities such as Vancouver and Atlanta now have exclusive South African 'Yellow Pages' directories with the names of South African doctors, engineers, butchers, pharmacists and others. They are part of the one to one-and-a-half million predominantly white South Africans who since 1945 have exchanged their homes in Pretoria, Durban, Johannesburg and Cape Town for places such as Perth, Sydney, Toronto and Vancouver, New York and Los Angeles, Auckland and Wellington, London and elsewhere, and have become the New Trekkers.

The New Great Trek is a highly disturbing element of the relatively successful transition to democracy of a country that faced a racial conflagration of frightening proportions during the period up to 1994. Although hundreds of thousands of black and white South Africans left the country under apartheid rule, millions more, including more than four million whites, remained in the country to experience the miracle of liberation from apartheid and the transition to democracy in 1994. However, five years later, many of those who shared in the spirit of reconciliation and supported nation-building feel unable to cope with the aftermath and consequences of this monumental change.



Most South African emigrants love South Africa dearly, but violent crime and the perpetual fear of crime that follows them daily like a shadow has forced them to look at other alternatives. Many emigrants leave South Africa with great reluctance – their main goal is to provide their families with the opportunity to live normal lives unencumbered by endemic crime and violence, and to give them access to quality education and healthcare. However, many never say goodbye to South Africa, and when they are in their adopted countries, cling to their sense of 'South Africanness'. Emigration is not an easy decision and is hardly an easy way out – the wholesale disruption, personal and financial sacrifices, and loss of identity which so many emigrants put up with, together with the emotional trauma of splitting families, are testimony to this.

The departure of thousands of South Africa's brightest and most productive citizens raises many questions, the most pressing being the REASONS that white South Africans are leaving their country of birth in increasing numbers, a country that is held up by the world as an example of racial harmony and reconciliation, and remains one of the most physically beautiful and blessed countries in the world. The author attempts to answer this apparent inconsistency and also addresses questions such as WHO the typical emigrants are, WHERE they settle and HOW they cope within their new environments.


Chapter 1 covers some theoretical insights and definitions of the topic of emigration and its place in the world history, particularly in the twentieth century. Special reference is made to the colonial African experience where close to two million white colonists fled Africa for the safety of their European homelands in the aftermath of liberation wars in countries such as Algeria, Angola, Mozambique, Kenya, Namibia and Zimbabwe. This chapter also provides a brief overview of emigration/immigration in South African history, and examines the related concept of internal or domestic migration in South Africa, which includes migration from the northern part of the country to the southern areas as tens of thousands of mostly white South Africans from Gauteng flee the crime and violence for what they perceive as a safer alternative in the Cape. Similarly, many of those in rightwing circles believe that 'migration' to a white *volkstaat* (homeland) in the Northern Cape is the solution to escaping from South Africa's problems. Other South Africans, having also reached the upper limits of their crime tolerance levels, do not even leave their cities or provinces and opt instead for a localised 'pseudo emigration' towards safer neighbourhoods with high walls and patrolled gates, almost like medieval villages – and this is often accompanied by a psychological withdrawal from South African society and the structures of the new dispensation, its problems and challenges. This chapter concludes with a look at the flow of people *into* the country, both legal and illegal immigrants and emigrants who opt to return after being overseas for a period.

Chapter 2 deals with the scope of South Africa's emigration phenomenon. An estimated one to one and a half million South Africans have left over the past few decades and hundreds of thousands more are contemplating such a move. Official statistics totally underestimate the scope of the emigration phenomenon, as only between one third and one half of people leaving the country indicate their intention to emigrate or relocate on their departure forms. A more accurate account of numbers can be obtained from the embassies of Western countries in Pretoria – in most cases the number of people receiving immigration visas to places such as Australia and Canada is more than double (and likely triple) the number provided by

Statistics South Africa (the latter a record of official departure forms at airports). This chapter also examines other relevant issues such as WHO are leaving and what the profile of the typical emigrant is. Is the stereotyped image of emigrants as predominantly white English-speaking professional people in their mid-thirties or elderly expatriate-British passport holders returning to the UK still relevant? If so, how then does one explain the large number of Afrikaner and smaller number of black emigrants and the many non-professionals who fill the planes to New Zealand and elsewhere? I point out that emigration leads to a massive departure of skills, the so-called brain drain, with 75% of professionals in South Africa having considered emigration. I also examine the growing list of notables and well-known people who have emigrated. The chapter concludes with the phenomenon of company and financial emigration – apart from the multitude of South African companies seeking foreign primary and secondary listings on overseas stock markets, South African individuals can legally let their money do the emigration while they remain behind or follow later.

Chapter 3 deals with the logistics of emigration, in other words what emigration entails. There are numerous obstacles, not least being the psychological trauma of broken families, new and often alien environments, a decline in status and, sometimes, lower financial expectations. It also looks at the multitude of financial, bureaucratic and legal rules, regulations and requirements which stand between a decision to emigrate and final clearance from authorities, both local and foreign, to settle in another country as a landed emigrant.

Chapter 4 examines the reasons that make people become emigrants and focuses on the direct link between emigration and violent crime. Former President Nelson Mandela grudgingly admitted that some South Africans may be leaving the country because of crime – this is possibly the understatement of the post-1994 era. South Africans are collectively brutalised by a wave of crime that borders on anarchy and by one of the highest murder rates in the world. The reality is that emigrants are overwhelmingly leaving South Africa because of crime . . . not only fear of crime, but because most of them have been personally touched by crime – by having had their car stolen or hijacked, their houses broken into, and perhaps family and friends killed in a criminal war waged against innocent people and property. This chapter also examines other issues that motivate people to emigrate, such as falling standards of education, healthcare and in the public service in particular endemic corruption, and what the Democratic Party referred to as the ‘re-racialisation’ of the country – the latter concept referring to the perception that the government adheres to policies that actively discriminate against whites when it comes to employment practices, and that racial quotas guide university entry



requirements, the selection of sports teams and other aspects of society. This chapter concludes with a view of the global village. Thousands of young South Africans are lured abroad to 'see the world' and to earn foreign exchange by taking up temporary employment overseas – unfortunately many view this as the key to a longer-term stay and do not return.

Former President Nelson Mandela stirred up a hornets' nest when he suggested in 1998 that emigrants are not 'real' South Africans and that they are racist because they cannot live with the reality of a black government ruling the country. In chapter 5 this proposition is scrutinised and forms the crux of the debate between those viewing emigration as a basic human right and those viewing it as disloyalty. Ironically, whereas Afrikaner nationalists used to be the harshest critics of English-speaking emigrants in the 1970s and 1980s and were lethal opponents of blacks who fled to join the ANC abroad, of late it has become a status symbol for many Afrikaners to have sons and daughters in Sydney, Toronto and elsewhere. The term 'chicken-run' has taken on a different resonance in the 1990s. English-speakers, Afrikaners and even black emigrants all insist on exercising their right to emigrate and become citizens of the world, but soundly denounce the accusation that they are disloyal, unpatriotic and racist. This chapter attempts to provide a more balanced perspective of both sides of the debate. A crucial part of it is an analysis of the impact of emigration on South Africa and, in particular, the economy. The statistics that are provided here paint a shocking picture of declining long-term economic prospects and growing unemployment because of the departure of the country's most capable job-creators, scientists and other professionals.


Like many other cultures dispersed over the world, enclaves of South Africans can now be found in colonies in the suburbs of most large cities of the English-speaking part of the developed world. In chapter 6 the structure and nature of this diaspora are examined, with the focus on where they found themselves, why they chose a particular country, how they are coping there, what their achievements are, how they found jobs, and how they adapted to new cultures and customs.

While a sizeable proportion of emigrants quickly adopt the new culture, many others cling to their South Africanness with a tenacity that almost defies comprehension – this is evident from their insatiable demand for apparently trivial symbols of South Africa such as foods and wines and other items that they were used to in South Africa and that identify them as being from South Africa – the way they keep on supporting South African sports teams, read South African newspapers, and form expatriate clubs to enable them to continue to socialise in Afrikaans or South African English, and the way they relate to others like themselves who share the sense of isolation

and emotional turmoil of having to search for a new identity in an alien environment.

Chapter 6 also examines the other side of the typical emigrant story, namely that of emigrants gradually assimilating into their new environments and culture, picking up local dialects, changing their surnames to sound more American or Australian, revelling in the freedom from crime, and enjoying the First World standards that were sometimes regarded as luxuries in South Africa. Most South African emigrants comment on the sense of freedom in their adopted countries, of not having to be obsessive about locking up houses and cars, not getting panicky if their wives or children are ten minutes late in returning from an outing, not experiencing the revulsion and anxiety of reading about another child brutally raped and murdered. Economically active skilled white emigrants feel that they are considered for a job on merit and that the taxes they pay come back to them in some way or another in the form of decent free healthcare, good education for their children, a form of social security, and a high level of personal safety because of efficient police forces.

The author attempts to illustrate that emigration cannot be seen in isolation from the wider social forces that are shaping South Africa. Apart from the loss of skills that South Africa can ill afford, that people are leaving the country in large numbers is an indictment of the government's inability to control the social forces that accompany the transformation process, and indeed it questions the viability of the democratic state structure. With South Africa well into the Mbeki era, it is obvious that the forces accompanying transformation are becoming so destructive that they actually threaten the success of transformation, as the hopes and confidence of South Africans are slowly being strangled by an anarchic society with unacceptably high levels of crime and corruption, declining standards of healthcare, education and morality, growing authoritarianism and an obsession with race.




1. HISTORICAL ORIGINS

[Migration] is, as it always has been, the great adventure of human life. [It] helped create humans, drove us to conquer the planet, shaped our societies, and promises to reshape them again.¹

Migration across continents and regions has been a part of human existence for thousands of years as a result of humans exploring or fleeing their enemies or natural disasters. It continued to be a natural occurrence even after the advent of states and political borders in recent centuries as nationalities moved freely from the 'Old' world to the 'New' world, that is from Europe to the Americas, Australasia and even to Africa.

Emigration can be defined as the departure of a person from the country of which he or she has citizenship to another with the intention of acquiring permanent residence abroad and usually, but not always, with the intention of relinquishing the rights and duties of the former home country's citizenship.² A term that has more extreme connotations but can be quite similar in meaning is *exile*, especially in the South African context. While exile in the old Soviet Union authoritarian way of thinking implied forced confinement in an inhospitable place, voluntarily exile is defined as 'a prolonged and perhaps permanent absence from one's country of origin where what is sought is not primarily the advantages of the place to which one goes, but essentially the freedom from whatever disadvantage prevailed at home'.³



In this context 'exile' then refers to people who left their country of birth to escape persecution – examples are Lenin's exile in Switzerland to escape the Tsarist security forces before he returned to foster the Marxist revolution in Russia and Trotsky's exile to Mexico.

The term *refugee* is not unrelated to the previous terms insofar as it refers to the movement of people over political borders, but it differs in that it places emphasis on an en masse and mostly involuntary migration of people to escape persecution. The UN's definition of refugee reads as follows:

... any person ... who owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside of the country of his nationality ... and is unable or unwilling to return to it.⁴

Later in the book I point out that many South Africans abroad are reluctant emigrants and that their prime motivation for emigrating is that social conditions in South Africa, in their view, have become intolerable. These include the second- or third-highest murder rate in the world and the process of restructuring/transformation that, by its nature, implies a legally acceptable form of racial 'discrimination' against whites. In this context and measured against the UN's definition it is not all that improbable that some South African emigrants would view themselves as exiles. Not surprisingly, many desperate would-be emigrants saw a window of opportunity in such a broad definition of the term 'exile' and more than 100 South Africans applied for asylum in the UK in 1999 on grounds of 'unfair discrimination' and affirmative action in South Africa⁵. Also, if one compares these modern-day 'refugees' from violent crime with the thousands of black South Africans who went into exile in the 1970s and 1980s to escape the ravages of apartheid, it can be argued that in life-or-death terms, there is only an academic difference between the goals of those South Africans who fled for their lives from the Botha-era security forces and those who are literally fleeing for their lives from a crime-infested country where 25 000 innocent victims are murdered each year.

Traditionally the term 'diaspora' was used in the biblical context and referred to the scattering of the Jewish people to other lands and to a lesser extent to the Greeks, Armenians and Irish, and to African slaves, but today at least 30 ethnic groups claim to be or are deemed to be in diaspora⁶. The term in essence refers to the dispersal of a people from a homeland, often traumatically, to two or more foreign territories, and it has been broadened to include people seeking work in foreign countries and is also used as a 'metaphoric designation to describe expatriates, expellees, political refugees, alien residents, immigrants' and others⁷.

However, according to Robin Cohen, the concept of a 'victim diaspora' is regarded by most scholars as being the essence of the definition of diaspora – in other words, traumatic experiences that force people out of their traditional homelands. If one broadens the definition of the terms 'refugee' and 'exile' to include South African emigrants who leave because of life-threatening crime, a clear link can be established with the notion of a 'victim diaspora'.


In the South African context the concept of a 'victim diaspora' is essential to understand the essence of South African emigration. In subsequent chapters it becomes evident that most emigrants leave reluctantly because of crime and that they, in this sense, are being 'victimised' by rampant violent crime. In addition, while many of these emigrants settle down in their host countries with relative ease, many others experience all the negative symptoms of other 'victim diasporas', namely a

sense of isolation, insecurity and a deep longing for the people and land that they have left behind.

1.1 A COMPARATIVE VIEW

The South African emigration phenomenon is not unique in world history. Since the birth of humankind men and women have been migrating from place to place, region to region and even across continents. Their goals sometimes were to explore and discover, at other times to escape wars, persecution, genocide or famine. Whole continents such as North and South America and Australia were populated by early emigrants during these past two millennia, while newer emigrants arrived over the past few centuries as the traders and peasants of Europe streamed across the Atlantic in search of opportunities and a better life. About 60 million Europeans left the continent for the New World between the sixteenth and twentieth centuries.⁸ Even the earlier tribes who ironically refer to themselves today as the 'indigenous peoples' were emigrants from Asia*. The overwhelming bulk of the population of the United States were emigrants from Europe and later Asia and the Hispanic countries. A similar pattern followed in Australia and New Zealand, while millions of Portuguese and Spanish emigrants populated South America and, in the process, alternatively exterminated or assimilated with those who had arrived hundreds and thousands of years earlier.

In the twentieth century two World Wars and genocide resulted in the concept of emigration being superseded by large-scale refugee movements, of tens of millions of people fleeing for their lives across borders or being forcibly expelled from their home countries because of ethnic or other differences. Shortly after World War II close to 15 million Hindus, Sikhs and Muslims were forced from their homes as India and Pakistan settled their differences through war and secession. Europe in particular suffered badly from the politics of ethnic/nationalist upheavals and the persecution of whole segments of minority peoples. During World War II 60 million people were forced to move, while immediately after the war a further 20 million people, mostly ethnic Germans, were expelled, transferred or exchanged.⁹ Today, over 120 million people worldwide are either emigrants or refugees, insofar as they live in countries other than those in which they were born. A further 20–30 million people join them every year, although many of these are refugees who would return to their home countries as the level of conflict which forced them to flee subsides.¹⁰ The United Nations



* A more apt description would be the term 'First Nations', as Canada's aboriginal people refer to themselves, meaning that they came to Canada before the European settlers.

found that by 1999 between 130 and 145 million people were legally registered as migrants and were living outside their home countries.¹¹

By definition the term migration implies that a movement of people would be across borders and this could be in both directions; in other words, for every emigrant there might be a reciprocatory immigrant and vice versa. However, the flow of humanity has always been stronger from poverty, disaster- or war-stricken areas to those areas regarded as safer, wealthier and more stable. This has been the case throughout history, as illustrated by the example of Ireland – the country lost two-thirds of its population in the nineteenth century through starvation and emigration to the New World because of a potato famine.

More recently there has been a constant flow of refugees and illegal immigrants from south-eastern Europe and the former Soviet bloc to Germany, from north Africa to France, from the Balkans to Italy and Greece, from Mexico to the USA, and from the rest of Africa to South Africa. In the developed world the one-way flow of poor and desperate emigrants has become a serious problem and a dominant feature in the politics of those countries overrun by illegal aliens. As a result, anti-immigration sentiments have grown rapidly and rightwing parties have become an integral and mushrooming element of the political scene in Western Europe. The most recent example was the election in February 2000 of the rightwing Austrian Freedom Party into a centre-right coalition government in Austria – the Party, under its leader, George Haider, is fiercely anti-emigrant and has been accused of harbouring new-Nazi ideals. The response by Western governments to the flood of immigrants, and the accompanying social strains and growth of anti-immigrant politics, is to strictly control the legal flow of immigrants and refugees, but it is not always possible to control the illegal influx. Today only a handful of countries (mostly outside Europe) still officially regard themselves as ‘countries of immigration’, and pursue well-off and skilled emigrants on a limited scale – they include the USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and a few others.

1.2 AFRICAN EXPERIENCES


[It] graphically documents the endemic corruption of Africa: the tin-pot dictators who salt away their country's wealth in Swiss bank accounts; the brutality of mob rule; the collapse of most basic services and mass starvation – a review of Keith Richburg's book, *Out of America*.¹²

Richburg, an African-American, describes his travels through Africa in horrific detail and provides an unambiguous picture of the worst of the continent. His view

confirms the perception held by many whites in South Africa and by large parts of the Western World – namely that Africa north of the Limpopo River is a lost cause, as evident from a recent article in the *Economist* titled ‘Hopeless Africa’. This view is in strong contrast to the vision of an ‘African Renaissance’ propagated by South African President Thabo Mbeki, who believes that the twenty-first century will belong to Africa and that the continent is on the dawn of an economic, political and cultural resurrection.

Few share Mbeki’s optimism, and the perception that the international world has of Africa is further clouded by ongoing African disasters such as the Aids pandemic, economic suicide by Zimbabwe’s rulers, the ongoing and wasteful civil war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Angola and Sierra Leone, and violent overthrows of governments such as those in the Ivory Coast and Liberia, and large-scale ethnocide such as in Rwanda. This perception of Africa is shared by many whites in South Africa, and while it is related to their political orientation and prejudices in the South African context, it is also reinforced by the history of a continent in which colonial wars led to wholesale slaughter and the subsequent departure of several million whites.

This view of Africa has long been part of the white South African psyche and has not only helped to shape the policies and the philosophy of previous white governments in South Africa, but has also had a profound effect on the psyche of many white people and their view of their long-term presence on the continent. Many white South Africans see the plight of the white populations of the former European colonies of Africa, especially in the twentieth century, as related to their own situation and prospects in South Africa today – the recent expropriation of white land and anti-white sentiments in Zimbabwe again strongly reinforced this perception.



For many decades whites in South Africa were looking at the decolonisation of Africa with a sense of trepidation, always fearing the prospects of it eventually spreading to South Africa. They saw war, followed by liberation from colonial rule and the sweeping from power of generations of white settlers, a phenomenon which made its way further and further south until it reached the Orange and Limpopo Rivers in the 1980s. Anxiety among South African whites that they would become another endangered white ‘settler’ group developed into a powerful political tool with which the National Party and the rightwing parties could mobilise electoral support in the 1970s and 1980s. Time and time again reference was made to the thousands of Europeans who had to flee for their lives before the black hordes of Africa. The *Swart Gevaar* (scaremongering) tactics won the NP many a vote, and later the Conservative Party as well. While

perceptions were often more powerful than reality, the excesses that occurred in the 1950s–1960s had a powerful effect on the collective psyche of white South Africans and led to sporadic increases in emigration which coincided with rises in the levels of violent black resistance against the apartheid state, for instance the surge in emigration following the 1976 Soweto uprising.

The specific examples discussed in this context include the French *Pied Noir* in Algeria, the Belgians in the Belgian Congo, the Portuguese in Angola and Mozambique, English settlers in Kenya, the whites in Zimbabwe and the white Afrikaners and German speakers in Namibia.

Algeria

One of the worst cases of racial conflict between a settler population and an indigenous people occurred in Algeria during the liberation struggle between 1954 and 1962, a conflict so brutal that at its conclusion it led to the mass emigration of more than one million French Algerians back to France and the demise of a thriving and historical French colony on the African coast of the Mediterranean – a civil war between, on the one side, the French military units and the *Pied Noirs* (French settlers comprising about 12% of the population) and, on the other, the Algerian Arabic population. From 1955 the Arab organisation *Front de Liberation Nationale* (FLN) adopted a policy of deliberately killing all French without distinction of age or sex. Massacre after massacre followed, with Arab fighters slaughtering innocent civilians in brutal fashion and the French colonial forces responding in kind – people had their arms and legs cut off, children had their brains dashed out and women were disembowelled.¹³ The bitter and savage civil war ended with the independence of Algeria in 1962 and the mass exodus of close to 1,4 million predominantly French settlers, leaving only 30 000 (less than 3%) of this historic European community behind within one year. At the time books such as Alister Horn's *A savage war of peace: Algeria 1954–1962* evoked a sense of foreboding and confirmed the suspicions of whites in South Africa that Africa was a continent of ferocious fanatics and that such violence could easily spill over to South Africa. While many British and other foreign passport holders resident in South Africa at the time probably checked the validity of their travel documents, events in Algeria and elsewhere in Africa reinforced the feeling among Afrikaners that they had no symbolic 'France' to flee to in the event of a black take-over of South Africa and it strengthened their support of the NP's policies of apartheid and white domination. As will be pointed out in a later chapter, young mobile Afrikaners thirty years later do not share their parents' sense of isolation and of having 'no France to flee to' – for them any English-speaking Western country constitutes a 'France' and a safe haven from the problems of South Africa.


Belgian Congo (DRC) and Kenya

Another African example where whites had to flee their African homeland was in the Belgian Congo in the 1960s in that colony's liberation war. Following Belgium's withdrawal from the Congo, black guerrillas and a black garrison went on a rampage of looting, rape, and murder and killed many innocent Belgian civilians. In Kenya too the Mau Mau rebellion led to an exodus of most of the country's white population of 70 000 (of whom 2 000 were Afrikaans-speaking whites).

The Kenyan rebellion had an enduring impact on the psyche of white South Africans for it evoked images of isolated farms, lonely little groups of whites being crept up on by black figures, a theme repeated over and over during the civil war in the former Rhodesia and currently in the spate of relentless attacks on predominantly white South African farmers, during which more than 800 have been brutally murdered on their farms since 1994. The image today of a typical farm is one of farmhouses surrounded by electric fences, spotlights, packs of angry watchdogs, security guards, farmers and their families armed to the teeth with semi-automatic weapons, and high fences which are not intended to keep their livestock in, but to keep criminals out.

Angola and Mozambique

In the former Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique there was also a mass exodus of Portuguese settlers in the mid-seventies following the wars of independence and Portugal's withdrawal from these territories. Although these guerrilla wars were bloody (over 11 000 Portuguese soldiers and civilians died and 30 000 were wounded and disabled during the colonial wars in Africa) the transfer of power to the Marxist Frelimo organisation (*Frente de Libertacao de Mocambique*) in Mozambique and the equally Marxist MPLA (*Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola*) occurred relatively peacefully. Still, close to 300 000 Portuguese were airlifted out of Angola in 1975 amid scenes of panic and hysteria, and a sizeable number of the settlers from these two colonies emigrated to South Africa. They, together with their cousins from Madeira, constitute most of the 600 000-strong Portuguese community in South Africa, a country in which their resentment over their bitter colonial experiences found an outlet, and made many of them passionate supporters of the former NP's racist policies.¹⁴



Zimbabwe (Rhodesia)

Next in the long list of reluctant white African emigrants were the white Rhodesians. After decades of British-sanctioned white rule in Rhodesia and a unilateral declaration

of independence in 1965, black opposition to the Smith regime became violent as the forces of Robert Mugabe's Zanu organisation and Joshua Nkomo's Zapu waged a full-scale guerrilla war against the Smith government, and from 1979 against Smith's surrogate, Abel Muzorewa. The war of liberation for Zimbabwe lasted for 14 years and became more brutal as it went on, resulting in massacres and cross-border revenge attacks from both sides. Particularly brutal was the shooting down of two Rhodesian passenger aircraft and the massacre of the crash survivors of one of them. Zanu and Zapu forces gradually infiltrated large parts of Rhodesia. Although Ian Smith's forces remained in control of certain parts of the country, the white-controlled government of Smith-Muzorewa finally agreed to a cease-fire and negotiations with their enemies in 1980 after the South African government threatened to withdraw all support and cut off oil supplies. Although the subsequent elections were supervised by international monitors and there was a relatively peaceful transfer of power, fear of revenge and retaliation led to the large-scale emigration of whites, reducing the white population from its peak of 280 000 to less than 100 000 in a short space of time between 1978 and 1980. It has since dwindled to about 70 000. Of these about 20 000 have British passports and an estimated 20 000 more can lay claim to a British passport. During the Zimbabwean crisis early in 2000 when thousands of former liberation-struggle soldiers occupied white farms and when whites were assaulted by blacks in the streets of Harare, long lines of concerned whites reappeared at the British High Commission in Harare and it seemed that the white exodus of 20 years earlier would resume. Apart from the offer by Britain and the European Union to evacuate the more than 20 000 Zimbabweans with access to EU citizenship from Zimbabwe should the crisis worsen, Australia and New Zealand both indicated their willingness to open their doors to white Zimbabwean farmers and to accept them as refugees. The South African government did not make a similar offer, nor did it publicly condemn the Mugabe regime.

Although many settled in Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the UK, a large portion of Rhodesians came to South Africa and settled in KwaZulu-Natal, especially the Pietermaritzburg area. The 'Rhodies', as they were referred to, formed influential pockets wherever they settled. Even today their impact on South African society is evident for example in broadcasting and in sports teams – the former Springbok captain Gary Teichman and other Springboks such as Adrian Carvey and Ray Mordt are former Rhodesians. However, many other ex-Rhodesians were battle-hardened and bitter, and many brought with them racist attitudes shaped by the Rhodesian experience – they were determined to ensure that their adoptive country did not go the same way as Rhodesia.¹⁵


Today ex-Rhodesians can be found all over the world and, like South African expatriates, they stay in touch through social clubs and organisations and through the

Internet. One such website can be found at <http://bluering.cowan.edu.au/~rwebb/docs/resource.html> where online books on Rhodesian history and other forms of nostalgic 'Rhodesiana' can be accessed. Another site lists the e-mail addresses of over 2 000 of expatriate Rhodesians all over the world at <http://scorpion.cowan.edu.au/~rwebb/emailadd.html>. Even though these websites are really just social clubs for those with nostalgia, in 1999 the authoritarian and increasingly paranoid president of Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe, accused these expatriates of being an 'enemy', of trying to undermine his government and of being in cahoots with his opposition in the ailing country.

Namibia (South West Africa)

Namibian whites consisted mostly of Afrikaners who settled there during the six decades of largely illegal South African rule when South West Africa was regarded as a fifth province, and German speakers who settled there when it was a German colony until World War I. After a decade or so of relatively unsuccessful insurgency warfare by Swapo (South West African People's Organisation), South Africa finally withdrew from the territory under international pressure and after drawn-out negotiations. Namibia became independent under the presidency of Sam Nujoma in 1990. In spite of the peaceful transition and Nujoma's benign and reconciliatory rule, a large-scale exodus of whites occurred, mainly to South Africa – the Western Cape and in particular towns on the False Bay coast were popular destinations.

Of the 100 000-strong white population in Namibia only approximately 30 000 remain after independence. Because of the high levels of violent crime in South Africa and the relative lack of it in Namibia, increasing numbers of whites who left for South Africa many years ago are now returning to Namibia. What began as a trickle a few years ago by 1999 had become a steady flow, making Namibia one of the top six emigration destinations for South Africans.



1.3 SOUTH AFRICA: IMMIGRANTS, EMIGRANTS AND MIGRANTS

A country founded by immigrants

South Africa was occupied by forebears of the Bushman and Khoisan tribes hundreds and possibly thousands of years before the Europeans arrived. Large numbers of blacks also migrated from central Africa to the northern, central and eastern parts of the country before the first white settlers landed in 1652. All of these

groups were the first true immigrants to South Africa, but following the wars between black and white and the large-scale inter-tribal genocide called the Difaqane, South Africa came firmly under white control. For the remainder of the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries the only immigrants were a steady trickle of Europeans, Malay slaves and Indians* imported to work on sugar farms in Natal. Afrikaners themselves were an ethnic concoction of Dutch and German emigrants, French Huguenot refugees and an assortment of other ethnic groups and races present in South Africa.

The flow of white emigrants from Europe, especially from Britain, continued in the nineteenth century, but South Africa never drew the same numbers of emigrants from Europe as Canada, the USA and even Australia. The reasons were that South Africa was geographically much smaller than the other three, and was viewed essentially as a black country with a white minority as opposed to a white country with a non-white minority, and that even within this white minority there was a majority of Dutch/Afrikaans speakers. In spite of Lord Alfred Milner's fervent attempts to attract massive numbers of English-speaking immigrants to South Africa and the former Boer Republics after the end of the Anglo-Boer in 1902, their numbers fell well short of the 10 000 settlers he had hoped for within the first year after the war.¹⁶ Ultimately, Milner's dream of establishing an English-speaking vs Afrikaner ratio of 3:2 never succeeded because of the slow immigration from Britain – the consequence was a permanent 60%:40% ratio in favour of Afrikaners in South Africa's white community.

Throughout the twentieth century successive South African governments continued to attempt to actively encourage European emigration to South Africa. Prime Minister Jan Smuts succeeded in attracting 60 000 white immigrants over two years through an immigration scheme launched in 1946 to lure skilled European immigrants. Because of Afrikaner Nationalist concerns, this trend was interrupted briefly during the first few years of NP rule after its rise to power in 1948. The NP made an attempt to limit the inflow of British immigrants because it feared that Afrikaners could become a minority within the white population and that they could lose power to English speakers. From a peak in 1948 of close to 37 000, the number of immigrants declined the following year to just over 15 000 and to 14 000 in 1950. However, emigration was permitted to increase again from the mid-1960s as greater numbers of English-speaking whites threw their support behind the NP and its apartheid policies. In 1963 the number of immigrants increased to 38 000 and remained close to 40 000 per annum until a rapid decline in the mid-1970s and onwards (see table 1.1).



* More than 100 000 had arrived in South Africa by 1900.

Throughout the post-World War II period numbers of South Africans looked for a more stable future elsewhere, but the flow of emigrants was erratic and closely followed political upheavals and incidences. The first wave was in 1949–51, when the NP came to power and began implementing apartheid policies. The second wave was in 1960–61, during a period of political unrest and the Sharpeville massacre, the proclamation of a state of emergency and South Africa's departure from the Commonwealth. The third wave was in 1976–79 when black unrest reached a crescendo with the Soweto uprising and further draconian measures by the state. This period coincided with the large-scale outflow of angry and frustrated black South Africans: thousands went into exile to join the ANC's and PAC's military wings and its leaders in exile, among whom were Oliver Tambo, Thabo Mbeki, and many other members of the ANC leadership, and thousands more, mostly coloureds, settled permanently in Australia and Canada. The fourth wave was in 1985–87 when the Botha regime clamped down on black resistance, a period which was characterised by states of emergency, the collapse of the rand and Botha's disastrous Rubicon speech. Between 1989 and 1992 there was a lull in emigration which corresponded with the first three years of F W de Klerk's rule, the unbanning of the ANC and the dismantling of apartheid. However, in 1993, one year before the democratic elections of 1994, emigration doubled and after that it remained close to 10 000 per year, according to official figures for the rest of the 1990s. As will be shown in chapter 2, this figure underestimates the actual number of emigrants by about two thirds and the total number of emigrants therefore is closer to 30 000 each year. However, the real significance of the post-1994 period was that the increase of official emigrants was accompanied by a decrease in official immigration, resulting in a net loss, which is even more dramatic if the unofficial emigrants are included. For example, in 1998 a total of 4 371 legal immigrants entered South Africa, and 8 276 emigrants left South Africa, resulting an official net loss of 3 905 – however, considering that the actual number of emigrants was approximately three times more, that is about 24 500, the net loss was more than 20 000 (excluding the tens of thousands of illegal immigrants and refugees).



The nature and scope of the South African emigration phenomenon is discussed later in this book, while the rest of this chapter deals with the peripheral and related aspects of emigration, such as immigration, internal migration and pseudo emigration. Whereas internal migration refers to the physical movement of people across provincial and regional and even municipal boundaries, pseudo emigration is defined as the movement of people to secure enclaves in the suburbs of cities and the psychological withdrawal of people from everyday life in South Africa. Both of these issues are included in this chapter because they are often precursors or

alternatives to emigration. The aspect of immigration, on the other hand, is included here because it puts the phenomenon of emigration into perspective by showing that considerable numbers of people also enter the country with the intention of settling permanently and that migration is not just a one-way flow of people.

The Xhosa migration from Eastern to Western Cape

For decades black South Africans have moved from their homes in the rural parts of South Africa to the cities in search of work and better futures. Their limited presence in cities went against the NP policies of apartheid which were intended to keep cities white, but was tolerated partially only because pressure from business, which needed the manpower in mines and industry. After influx control was scrapped in 1986, the influx of blacks into cities increased dramatically, especially Johannesburg and the Witwatersrand, and also the Western Cape, after laws that made the Western Cape a coloured-preferential area were repealed.

Estimates of the number of Xhosa speakers arriving in Cape Town each month range from 10 000 to 40 000. Estimates suggests that approximately 100 000 Xhosa speakers arrived in Cape Town between 1980 and 1985, another 125 000 between 1985 and 1990 and a further 105 000 between 1990 and 1995.¹⁷ Because of the relatively fast-growing Western Cape economy during the period between 1995 and 2000, the number of Xhosa migrants would have increased again during this period, presumably to a further 125 000, giving a total of close to half a million Xhosa speakers arriving in Cape Town and its environs over the past 20 years. Xhosa speakers currently constitute approximately 25%–30% of the population of the Western Cape, whites approximately 20%–25%, with about 50% being coloured.

The ‘Grape Trek’: migrating from north to south

The Xhosa-speaking residents from the Eastern Cape were not the only people to find the Western Cape an attractive option – in the 1990s thousands of whites from Gauteng made the Cape their home in what Michael Morris of the *Argus* referred to as the ‘Grape Trek’. Ironically, the Grape Trek is a reversal of the original Great Trek, insofar as disgruntled whites moved back to the south, less than two hundred years after leaving it to settle in the northern part of the country.


The main reason for the move to the Cape is an unrealistic perception of the relative safety of Cape Town and the fact that migrating to Cape Town is a relatively simpler and often more attractive option than emigrating to Australia or Canada – at least the

locals are familiar insofar as they mostly speak Afrikaans, the weather is great, and all the social and cultural activities that migrants were used to in Gauteng are available in the Cape, if at a slightly slower pace. In addition, for those who are more concerned with politics and who fear 'darkest Africa', the province is still ruled by a Nationalist 'non-African' coalition government and until his retirement in 1998, also had Africa's last white head of government in Hrnus Kriel.* He was replaced by Gerald Morkel, the only non-African premier in South Africa.

Thousands of whites and some blacks left Gauteng for Cape Town in the 1990s, although many of the latter return to Johannesburg, apparently unhappy with a perceived hostility towards blacks in Cape Town. In one case, a professor from Rand Afrikaans University, Helgaard Raubenheimer, moved the entire Inorganic Division of the Chemistry Department to the University of Stellenbosch after he and his staff fell victim of crime once too often.

While many moved everything they had to the Cape from up north, except in frequent cases where they could not sell their houses because of the rapidly declining housing market in Gauteng, others bought houses and moved their families to Cape Town, but kept their jobs in Johannesburg. This is because Johannesburg and Gauteng remain the economic hub of the country, the place where deals are made, and where the really highly paid jobs are.

The trek of whites from Gauteng to the Cape gave rise to the 'breakfast run', that is, the Monday morning rush hour at Cape Town airport when hundreds of the captains of industry fly back to Johannesburg for the week's work while their families reside in Cape Town. The flood returns, of course, on Friday afternoons, irritating Cape Town residents by making it virtually impossible for locals to get seats at these times and pushing house prices in Cape Town skyhigh. One typical example was the corporate communications director of Transnet, Richard Stevens, who spent five days per week in Johannesburg, but flew to Cape Town over weekends to be with his family. He described Cape Town as a safer, nicer environment and argued that by commuting he could balance the requirements of his family with those of his career.¹⁸



* Political correspondent Clive Sawyer argued that many whites saw Kriel's departure as the demise of the last white buffer of white Western civilisation against the encroaching 'Dark Continent', *Cape Argus*, 21 April 1998.

The exact numbers of Gauteng and other northern migrants are difficult to establish, but the following statistics give an indication of the scope of the trek southwards. In the months of December 1997 and January 1998 42% of houses in Cape Town were bought by South African buyers from outside Cape Town, compared to 12% by local buyers and 46% from overseas.¹⁹ Pam Golding Properties reported that in May 1998 it sold 73 houses to Gauteng buyers in the Cape – this translates to almost 1 000 Cape houses being sold that year to Gauteng families by a single estate agency. Conservatively, this represents about 4 000 people moving to the Cape from Gauteng – also, if Pam Golding represents, say, one quarter of the estate market in the Western Cape, it is possible that at least 16 000 Gauteng residents migrated to the Cape in 1997 and probably similar numbers in subsequent years. In schools all over Cape Town children from Gauteng are enrolled in growing numbers, for example a total of 43 pupils from Gauteng enrolled in the Gordon's Bay primary school in 1996 alone, while in other schools the average was about 15.²⁰

While most Gauteng migrants come to Cape Town believing that the city is still relatively safe from crime compared to Gauteng, this perception has rapidly changed in the second half of the 1990s. Although Gauteng was still leading the nation in car hijackings, Cape Town easily overtook Gauteng and the nation as a whole with regard to murder, attempted murder, rape and residential burglary, while car hijackings increased by 29% in 1998. The violent nature of Cape Town that made it the murder capital of the world is reflected in police statistics for the Western Cape for 1997: a murder rate of 80 per 100 000 people, compared to the national average of between 57 and 65.²¹

The very high murder and rape statistics, increasing inter-gang warfare, battles between gangs and the anti-gangster group, Pagad (People Against Gangsterism and Drugs), shootouts, previously unheard of 'cash heists' and brazen robberies in the Waterfront, bomb attacks on police and civilian targets such as the Planet Hollywood and St Elmo's restaurants, and a spate of car hijackings badly damaged Cape Town's once-safe reputation – the 'Cape of Good Hope' quickly became 'Cape of Storms', 'Cape of No Hope', 'Cape of Lost Hope', 'Cape of Fear', 'Rape Town', and 'Cape of Murder'. As a result, the rush to the Cape started to 'lose steam' by mid-1998 when there was a noticeable drop in the number of people from Gauteng moving to Cape Town.²² A further indication of the Grape Trek losing steam was that by mid-1999 the prices of residential property in Johannesburg were rising at a greater rate than in Cape Town, where prices in some cases actually showed a real decline over the previous 12-month period. Moving companies reported declines of between 30% and 50% in the number of Gauteng families moving to the Cape between 1998 and 1999. By early 2000 it was clear that the


Grape Trek had swung in reverse as large numbers of Gautengers began moving back north.

The rightwing alternative: wagons rumbling to Orania

Their language is losing preferential status, their schools and universities are no longer centres of solely Afrikaner excellence, they are victimised in the workplace through affirmative action and many of their children are on a trek out of the country to seek a better future.²³

You are already destroying our language, our culture, our traditions and our way of life. Today it is rugby and our schools, tomorrow it will be our universities, then it will be our churches and history. Enough is enough. If the ANC government wants confrontation, so be it. We are ready to take up the challenge – Freedom Front MP, Corné Mulder.²⁴

Migrating away from political dispensations that do not appeal to them is not a new phenomenon to Afrikaners. As with their present-day descendants, the early Afrikaners commenced the Great Trek of the 1830s because they resented the interference of the British colonial government. Their dissatisfaction was rooted mainly in the emancipation of the slaves and colonial government frontier policy and it resulted in a trek to the territories which later became the Free State, Transvaal and Natal – in all, about 15 000 Afrikaners migrated from the Eastern Cape between 1834 and 1840. The Great Trek became an event of great historical importance and helped to shape the national consciousness of Afrikaners and, as such, was used later to mobilise Afrikaner nationalism.²⁵



If it is assumed that the Great Trek played a part in shaping Afrikaner nationalism, it is not surprising that even today the concept of 'trekking' away from what they perceive as threats to their nationhood forms part of the Afrikaner philosophy, at least insofar as it is (marginally) represented by the rightwing. In spite of their even weaker position in Parliament after the 1999 election, the basic philosophy of a *volkstaat*, in whichever form, is still firmly part of the policies of the dominant rightwing party, the Freedom Front (FF). The FF has the support of only about 10% of Afrikaners, with 44% of Afrikaners voting for the more liberal Democratic Party and 28% for the NNP.²⁶ Still, in the view of those to the right of the political spectrum, the *volkstaat* is the only way to escape from what they perceive as a form of 'persecution' of Afrikaners by the black-majority government and as a means of self-determination. They view themselves as an endangered species and regard

transformation and 'Africanisation' as concerted efforts to destroy the Afrikaner culture, language, and nationhood.

The *volkstaat* option is particularly attractive to those Afrikaners who cannot or do not wish to emigrate to a foreign land but, sensing their impotence to effectively challenge the current government, want to isolate themselves from the black majority to the greatest extent possible and under the constraints of the South African Constitution. Their primary goal is to secede and form an Afrikaner state, but as this is clearly not an option at this stage, they are relatively content to pursue Afrikaner interests within the parliamentary system. The FF and its leader, Constant Viljoen, have established a good rapport with the ANC and the party has functioned well within the confines of Parliament.

The exact location of the *volkstaat* is subject to uncertainty, although the Bushveld area, the Drakensberg North area and parts of the North West Cape have been earmarked. In all these cases it will require a major migration of Afrikaners to establish a viable core with which to pursue self-determination and to be economically self-sustaining. About 600 Afrikaners have so far moved to Orania, the town meant to be the growth point for a *volkstaat* in the Northern Cape.

It is doubtful that many more Afrikaners will opt for this alternative to emigration – polls indicate that only a small minority of Afrikaners really want independence and few are prepared to move to an exclusive Afrikaner territory – not more than 16% of Afrikaners supported an independent territory, although up to 70% supported an area for Afrikaners with significant autonomy in South Africa.²⁷ In addition, the country's second democratic elections in 1999 resulted in an almost-fatal blow for the Freedom Front, whose support declined from an already low 1,9% to 0,75% and its support among Afrikaners declined to 10%.


The relative lack of support for an Afrikaner *volkstaat* can be ascribed to the degree to which Afrikaners have become integrated in the South African economy and society and have become part of the global economy – few would have the nerve to leave behind luxury homes, domestic servants, access to good schools, private hospitals, international airports, modern shopping centres, and their proximity to all the conveniences of South Africa's highly developed urban centres. Trekking to the *volkstaat* means giving up most of these amenities in exchange for being part of an ethnic exclusivity in an isolated territory. When one considers the small number who have made the move to Orania, it is clear that this trek is not an attractive option. However, for those who have moved there, it was the preferred alternative to possibly leaving the country.

Pseudo emigration

The vast majority of whites cannot emigrate or do not wish to do so. A typical response from those who *can* emigrate but *do not* wish to do so is provided by the following anecdote from David Lascelles, writing in the *Financial Mail*:

He wouldn't leave South Africa for the world, even though his own former business is now in shambles, and he recently spent several days in hospital after being attacked by intruders in his home ... he is well set up: a large house on the outskirts of Johannesburg, with hectares of farmland attached, where he can enjoy fine weather, an outdoor life and high living standards ... What was the alternative, he asked? Selling up and returning to his roots in Ireland, where he might be able to buy a two-bedroom semi-detached house ... and stare out at the ceaseless rain. No thanks ... He was prepared to put up with the risks and uncertainties for the special joys of South Africa.²⁸

So, instead of emigrating, many people are prepared to accept the risks of living in South Africa in order to share in the country's unique and indisputable 'joys'. However, putting up with the risks requires a special kind of lifestyle, which often also includes a kind of self-induced emotional detachment from the realities of South Africa, and many people purposefully withdraw from many spheres of South African society, sometimes as a response to crime and sometimes because of a racially based persecution complex. Although they proclaim, rightly, their love for South Africa, they tend to view most aspects of their day-to-day lives and longer-term outlook on life as a 'them-versus-us' scenario and in black-versus-white terms.



Their isolationist mindset and actions could include abstaining from voting in elections (Why bother?), not reading newspapers (too much bad news), not watching SABC news (propaganda), sending their children only to private schools and going only to private hospitals. They could also include elaborate schemes to avoid paying taxes and arguing that this is morally acceptable because of government corruption and the government's failure to protect its citizens from crime. They could also include a general withdrawal from other aspects of civil society, such as not attending or participating in sports or cultural events, refraining from making charitable contributions, and so often changing from a liberal outlook on life to uttering the occasional racist remark – quickly and too easily crime takes on a racial connotation. Such hardening attitudes are evident from the standard response which many whites have developed when accosted by beggars, pan-handlers or by people soliciting donations: 'Go ask Mandela/Mbeki.'

Pseudo emigration then refers to the withdrawal, both physically and psychologically, by certain whites from South African society as another alternative to emigration. Pseudo emigration takes on two forms, the first being the fear-driven migration to secluded and secure environments, and second, a psychological migration in the form of a withdrawal from some of the social, legal and other structures that make up South African society.

For a terrified white and affluent black population the major response to crime has been to flee behind walled high-security housing complexes, electrified fences, private security forces, and guns. The Canadian-based newspaper, *Globe and Mail*, described the changing 'geography' of South Africa as follows:

Security walls, razor wire barriers, electrified fences, privately patrolled streets and 'secure' cluster-housing complexes have redrawn the geography of cities and towns, separating them into anxious enclaves of privilege that serve as refuge from an apparently lawless landscape.²⁹

But, argued Clem Sunter, one of South Africa's foremost analysts, even high walls have become obsolete in the flight from crime:

So you went to your neighbour and said 'Let's build a wall around this neighbourhood and have restricted entry so the thieves cannot lie in wait for us around our houses'. But the thieves clambered over the walls ... So you added razor wire on top ... Then the thieves grouped themselves into larger gangs and ... as soon as you emerged, they grabbed you ... So the whole suburb pleaded for a substantial police presence in the vicinity ... and demanded that the army should be permanently encamped around the suburb ... [But still], sporadic attacks took place.³⁰

So far in Sunter's narrative all of this is an everyday occurrence in many suburbs in South Africa. But then follows the really frightening part:

Then you stayed home in sheer terror. By this time you and your family were completely under siege ... So you decided to resettle on a high koppie way out of town behind yet another wall ... Luckily the top of the koppie was fertile and you could grow enough food for everyone ... Basically, your life has reverted to that lived in medieval monasteries and castles. The idea of going out anywhere by car had completely disappeared. South Africa outside your fortress was a complete no-go area.³¹

The frightening reality is that in the four years since Sunter wrote this piece in 1996, most of his predictions, including the inevitable shift to a medieval, self-sustaining 'Mad Max' society, have come into existence in many parts of South Africa. Not only have whole communities settled in walled suburbs outside large cities, but with the growth of the technological society work can be done and income earned from home with the help of a modem, and some 'refugees' are even producing their own food (at least fruit and vegetables) in the more spacious rural walled enclaves.

A typical example is the neighbourhood of Wendywood in Sandton, Johannesburg, where 827 households decided, after several murders, hijackings and armed attacks, to close off their neighbourhood to the outside world by fencing it off, erecting booms across all access roads, and manning these with security guards. By 1999 more than 200 neighbourhoods countrywide have closed themselves off in this way, providing protection for more than 140 000 people. Technically speaking it is illegal to fence off a public road, but as one resident of Wendywood argues, 'There are two ways to survive the crime wave in South Africa – you emigrate or fend for yourself'³².

On a more abstract level, many people are making a psychological move away from the anarchic society that South Africa appears to have become. Psychological emigration is a response to the perceptions among many whites that they are being targeted by criminals because they are deemed wealthy, and that because of past apartheid injustices are being viewed as 'fair game'. In addition they feel isolated in the new post-apartheid South Africa and believe that affirmative action and other forms of 'reverse racism' have made them second-class citizens.



Eddie Webster, a professor at the University of the Witwatersrand, describes the psychological emigration as follows:

Whites are experiencing a psychological immigration where they create an artificial and separate world for themselves and with their money ... They've retreated to their suburban homes where they've hired security ... and built taller and taller walls. They've retreated to the private schools, and they've, in a way, retreated inside their own minds, convinced that they have become second-class citizens in their own lands.³³

These dual options of moving to residential secure havens or psychologically withdrawing from society are the last resort for those who do not wish to emigrate. For thousands of others these are not acceptable options and do not constitute a normal way of living. Instead they choose simply to pack their bags and leave the

country – in Australia, Canada and New Zealand there are no ‘medieval villages’, houses are not ‘fortresses’, and they would not be viewed as ‘second-class citizens’.

The incoming flood: immigrants, illegal aliens and the ‘returnees’

The common perception is that South Africa is losing large numbers of its population through emigration, but although the number of people that are leaving should not be underestimated, it pales into insignificance when measured in pure numerical terms against the illegal aliens and legal immigrants that are streaming into the country. While the Human Sciences Research Council estimates the number of illegal immigrants at between 2,5 and 4,1 million, other estimates place this figure between four and eight million people. They are predominantly from Africa, especially from Nigeria and Mozambique, while most of the legal immigrants come from the UK, Eastern Europe and Asia.

It is estimated that there are between 70 000 and 100 000 illegal Nigerians in Johannesburg alone. To illustrate the scope of the influx, almost 100 000 illegal immigrants from Mozambique were deported during the first ten months of 1998 and a total of 160 000 illegal immigrants for the whole of 1998. Considering these statistics, the extraordinarily high figure of 8 million does not seem so improbable. Most of these immigrants and refugees enter South Africa with the help of false documents or simply slip over the border; others arrive legally on a tourist visa and either ‘disappear’ or obtain false documentation.

What makes immigrants come to South Africa? For illegal immigrants from Africa, it is clearly the perception of South Africa as a wealthy country by African standards and the lure of jobs, informal business opportunities, and in some cases the drug trading and other criminal activities. The South African GDP is larger than that of all of sub-Saharan Africa and its per capita income is about four times the African average. The lucrative nature of having a job in South Africa, relative to African standards, is clearly evident from the position of the 600 Nigerian medical doctors working in South African public hospitals – here they are earning close to R6 000 per month, which is equal to almost a full year’s salary in Nigeria.³⁴

Although South Africa already has an unemployment rate of over 30% (and a further 500 000 jobs have been lost since 1994) and is one of the most violent countries in the world, this does not appear to act as a deterrent to the influx of illegal immigrants. Neither do increasingly violent attacks on illegal aliens by disgruntled South Africans in places such as Alexandria township in Johannesburg, where three men from Senegal were killed in 1998 by an angry mob.

As well as the millions of illegal aliens residing in South Africa, the country also remains an option for many bona fide legal immigrants, although their numbers have been in sharp decline since 1994. South Africa has been a popular destination for immigrants during most of the twentieth century, particularly for Europeans from the UK, Germany, The Netherlands and Greece. Considerable numbers of Portuguese came from Angola and Mozambique after independence and whites from Zimbabwe and Namibia.

Table 1.1 Legal immigrants to South Africa³⁵

1945	2 949	1974	35 910
1946	12 030	1975	50 464
1947	29 827	1976	46 239
1948	36 734	1977	24 822
1949	15 576	1978	18 669
1950	13 663	1979	18 680
1951	15 890	1980	29 356
1952	18 975	1981	41 542
1953	17 267	1983	30 483
1954	16 719	1984	28 793
1955	16 684	1985	17 284
1956	15 238	1986	6 994
1957	14 631	1987	7 953
1958	14 701	1988	10 400
1959	12 598	1989	11 270
1960	9 805	1990	14 499
1961	16 373	1991	12 379
1962	20 972	1992	8 686
1963	38 013	1993	9 824
1964	40 896	1994	6 398
1965	38 337	1995	5 064
1966	48 051	1996	5 407
1967	38 937	1997	4 102
1968	40 548	1998	4 371
1969	41 446	1999 est.	4 500
1970	41 523	TOTAL	1 220 863
1971	35 845		
1972	32 776		
1973	24 016		

In the seventies close to 330 000 immigrants entered South Africa, in the eighties a further 230 000, but during the nineties only approximately 75 000 people immigrated officially to South Africa. The number of immigrants declined rapidly after 1994 and only 29 844 immigrants entered South Africa in the first five years of the post-apartheid era between 1994 and 1999. The total number of official immigrants that settled in South Africa in the post-World War II era between 1945 and 1999 amounted to 1,2 million.


If and when immigrants finally manage to get past the Department of Home Affairs, they rapidly become acquainted with the other scourge of South African society, violent crime. One immigrant family from Britain fell victim to crime on arrival, when robbers stole household items and a wheelchair from their containers as these were being transported from Durban to Johannesburg. The Long family had a further taste of lawlessness when their disabled son's remaining wheelchair disappeared with their 4x4 after it was hijacked in front of their house in Johannesburg. Their response was that they cannot live like that and they were seriously considering leaving the country.³⁶ Others never make it back to their home country – Alistair Hector, the father of two young boys, who was planning to return to Scotland from South Africa because his wife was terrified by the growing tide of violence, was murdered in 1999 just yards from his home by a gang who stole his pick-up truck.

Other immigrants, probably not yet touched personally by crime, view things differently: Alexander Potplavski left the Ukraine for Cape Town and argues that the crime in his home country is much worse than in South Africa. In addition he has a level of financial security here which he could not find in Odessa.³⁷ Yospon Nanichargorn swapped Thailand for Cape Town and loves the beauty and relatively low traffic congestion and lower levels of pollution of Cape Town. Deborah Herd immigrated from Britain and admits that she is worried about violent crime but she loves the beauty of the country and the 'sense of optimism' among the people. Gabby Gramm of Germany argues that even though she is earning less than in Germany, the cost of living is lower – to her, South Africa is the most beautiful country in the world, she finds crime levels bearable, and she would not like to live anywhere else in the world.³⁸ An anonymous immigrant from Australia, 'Aussie' from Cape Town, claims that he/she feels 'incredibly lucky' to be living in Cape Town and cannot believe that South Africans would like to leave the country – 'Aussie' argues that crime is not unique to South Africa but happens everywhere in the world.³⁹

About 5% of emigrants who leave South Africa eventually return to the country. They come back because the conditions in their foreign destination did not meet with

their expectations, because they could not find work, but mostly because they miss their friends and families in South Africa too much. While overseas, many of these emigrants become the notorious 'whenwes', that is, those emigrants who are overcritical of their host countries and are never satisfied – citizens from host countries often joke about the tendency of South African emigrants to complain about the conditions in their new countries and to draw unfavourable comparisons.* Some emigrants are extremely happy about their decision to come back, while others find that the problems that drove them away in the first place still exist and have even worsened – they then begin planning to move to another foreign destination, hoping that it would be kinder to them than the previous time – they become perpetual emigrants.

Many of those emigrants who return to South Africa, especially those who came back after the 1994 elections, originally left the country to escape the immorality of apartheid, military conscription, political violence and uncertainty and the siege society that was so prevalent during the 1980s – they tend to fit in immediately on return to South Africa. Others left shortly before the 1994 elections for fear of a racial conflagration or in the subsequent period because of increasing crime, falling standards and First World opportunities available elsewhere – the five per cent of these emigrants who return came to the realisation that the proverbial grass is not always greener on the other side and, all things considered, South Africa with all its problems was not so bad after all.



Among the better-known people who have come back in recent years were Donald Woods, an ex-newspaper editor and friend of Black Consciousness leader Steve Biko. Woods came back in 1996 and regarded returning to South Africa as the 'natural thing to do' when Mandela was released. John van Ahlefeldt (a former financial editor of the *Sunday Times*) came back from England to open a guesthouse in Smithfield, describing the 'splendour of the landscape of the Upper Karoo' as a major reason for coming back. The Rom family came back from England after a 15-year stay to settle in Johannesburg, claiming that they would never want to live anywhere else in the world again, even though 'the country has a Mickey Mouse economy and it is dangerous'. Former television presenter Jani du Plessis-Beltrami returned to South Africa in 1999 after living in Portugal for ten years, following her divorce from her Italian husband. The former chairman and founder of the retail group, Pep Stores, Renier van Rooyen, came back to South Africa in 1996,



* An often-repeated joke is: 'What is the difference between a jumbo jet and a white South African? The jumbo stops whining at Sydney Airport.'

after an 11-year stint in Europe. Van Rooyen claimed that in his view 'the country is heaven', compared to the pre-1994 days and that it is wrong for whites to be leaving the country just as everything seems to be going well. Journalist Howard Donaldson wrote about how he stood in a queue in London in 1994 to cast his vote in South Africa's first democratic elections – he realised, after speaking to people around him, that he was terribly homesick after many years abroad and simply had to return to South Africa: 'After too many dreary British winters, I packed for Durban and the "New South Africa"'. It is good to be back home.⁴⁰

Among the many coloured emigrants who made a beeline back to South Africa after the first democratic elections was opera singer and clinical psychologist Fred Martin, who returned to Cape Town in 1997 after close to 30 years overseas, but although he is happy to be back, he is worried about problems such as continuing 'racism'. Another such person is Graham Falken, who returned to Cape Town after the 1994 elections following a stay in England of more than 30 years – he argues that the high levels of crime are 'to be expected in a country with a history like that of South Africa'. Colin Howard left South Africa in 1964 and returned to the Cape from the UK in 1997 – he claims to be happy to contribute to the country but is concerned about falling standards of education in the arts. Kay-Robert Volkswijn left for the USA in 1974 but after 25 years returned to Cape Town on a semi-permanent basis – he believes in South Africa's future, but is concerned about crime and about having to live in a 'fortress', and about persistent racism and friction between coloured and black communities in the Cape.⁴¹

In what must have been one of the briefest-ever cases of emigration, Andre Louw, the former MD of Ocean Diamond Mining, returned from Canada within three months of emigrating there. It is unclear whether the notoriously cold Canadian winter influenced his decision, but Louw returned to South Africa in February 2000 to rejoin the South African diamond mining group Trans Hex, as director in charge of the company's operations at sea. Another returnee is former rugby Springbok flyhalf De Wet Ras, who came back from New Zealand after completing only eight months of an intended two-year stay – Ras commented that when comparing the two countries, he realised that New Zealand had its own problems and was not necessarily a better place in which to live than South Africa⁴². Ex-Springbok and Canadian international rugby player Christian Steward, who lived in both Canada and Australia, returned to South Africa because his friends and family were 'very important to him' and after all, 'home is home'⁴³.

The Ogg family of Durban are examples of disillusioned emigrants who could not adapt to their new environment. The Oggs left for England with the intention of

earning money in the medical profession and of bringing up their children in a First World environment. However, after two years they decided that the British winters were more than they could endure and that the types of accommodation that they were living in were sub-standard (this was to be expected as Dr Ogg spent only R640 of his monthly pay of R30 000 on rent). They found British stores 'old and dirty' and British food unpalatable. 'The English live on pie and chips or sausage and beans,' said Mrs Ogg and 'there were no waiters, except in the most expensive places'. The British landscape and the people were described by the Oggs as 'grey'.⁴³ However, to be fair, apart from their accurate assessment of the British climate, the Oggs' description of Britain is so far off the mark that the more than 300 000 South Africans who live in the UK would not recognise it. It is obvious that the Ogg family's view of Britain is representative of the small number of South African emigrants who could not adapt overseas, and made the mistake of trying to compare each aspect of their new homelands with what they had in South Africa – these types of emigrant would never really be happy anywhere but in South Africa.





THE SCOPE OF SOUTH AFRICA'S EXODUS

Thousands of predominantly white, young, skilled South Africans of all persuasions, regions and professions are leaving the country each year to settle mainly in Australia, New Zealand, Britain, the USA and Canada. Official statistics suggest that just over 8 200 people had emigrated from South Africa in 1998 and about 9 000 in 1999, but because of an under-reporting of between one half and two thirds the unofficial total would have been between 16 000 and 25 000. These latest emigrants joined the 550 000 emigrants who have left officially since 1945, in addition to the 500 000 to one million emigrants who may have left the country unofficially during this period.


The real significance of this exodus can be found not so much in the sheer size of the exodus – even though it is large by any standard – but in the fact that these emigrants represent a huge loss of human capital: they are mostly professionals and their skills and ability to create wealth and jobs cannot be replaced overnight, if at all. In addition, emigration on this scale raises the questions of how many more people may join this new Trek, and whether this emigration will continue at current levels or whether a sudden mass exodus might become a possibility.

2.1 OFFICIAL STATISTICS VS THE ACTUAL NUMBERS: THE 2:1 AND 3:1 RATIOS

As mentioned earlier, the number of people leaving South Africa each year is at least double and could be triple the official numbers provided by Statistics South Africa. This is because many people who leave the country do so on the pretext of temporary visits and do not state on their departure forms that they are emigrating – therefore they will not appear in the official emigration statistics. The result is the huge discrepancy between official or self-declared emigrants and unofficial emigrant numbers (the undocumented migrants). Even the South African authorities are aware of this phenomenon, but are powerless to do anything about it, according to Mark Orkin, chief of Statistics South Africa.¹

The discrepancies between official and unofficial statistics (the latter obtained from the embassies and immigration departments of several countries) are glaringly obvious:

- Official South African figures claim that 29 000 South Africans had settled in the UK between 1984 and 1993, compared to a figure of 100 000 claimed by British sources.² Assuming that the British numbers are the correct version, the number of emigrants who arrived in the UK was three times that of South African sources. For the period of 1994–1997, 8 874 South Africans entered the UK as immigrants although South African official sources counted only 4 654 – almost double.³
- Australian authorities claim that 9 092 South African emigrants entered the country between 1994 and 1997, as opposed to Statistics South Africa's estimate of 5 514 – almost double.
- In Canada the discrepancy is even greater: a total of 3 261 emigrants were processed by the Canadian embassy in Pretoria between 1994 and 1997, compared to the 1 288 claimed by official South African sources – almost three times as many.
- USA sources claim that 5 721 South African emigrants entered the country between 1994 and 1997, as opposed to official South African statistics of 3 267.
- The discrepancy between official and unofficial numbers is even higher for professional emigrants and those in the economically active category. For the year 1996 Statistics South Africa claimed that 3 168 such emigrants left South Africa, but foreign diplomatic estimates were 15 000, five times as many.⁴
- A study by UCT's Development Policy Research Unit found that the actual number of emigrants between 1989 and 1997 was 233 609, compared to the official number of 82 811 – three times as many.⁵



A 1999 study on emigration by Fourie and Joubert produced similar evidence of an underestimation of between three and four times, which they refer to as the 'multiplication factor'. Their study suggests that the New Zealand authorities counted 3,3 times as many South African emigrants arriving in New Zealand between mid-1995 and mid-1996 as official South African statistics (1 123 vs 3 712). Similarly, Canadian statistics indicated that 3,7 times as many South African emigrants arrived from South Africa as Statistics South Africa had recorded for the period mid-1994 to mid-1995 (947 vs 3 500). Australian statistics also indicate that three times the number of South African emigrants arrived that Statistics South Africa had recorded for the period mid-1997 to mid-1998 (1 405 vs 4 281).⁶

These statistics clearly indicate that the discrepancies are not a once-off abnormality and follow the same pattern in several countries. They provide irrefutable evidence that the scale of emigration is at least twice as great and probably three times greater than official South African government sources claim. The huge underestimation is




not the result of a secret government conspiracy to hide the true extent of the problem, but of the way information is gathered at international departure points. A departing passenger has to fill out a form indicating his or her reason for travel as business, holiday, diplomatic or emigration. When an emigrant chooses the last option, he or she will be required to have the necessary paperwork which will verify that the government has given its stamp of approval, that tax clearance has been received, plus a multitude of other smaller inconveniences. Many emigrants prefer not to go through the bureaucratic red tape and choose not to alert the authorities about their status, in case they want to come back later. Because they are not emigrating formally, this also provides a psychological anchor for the thousands of emigrants who are not totally sure about their decision to leave the country and do not wish cut loose their lifeboats by formally emigrating.

The price of leaving South Africa as a tourist instead of an emigrant is that these unofficial emigrants are not able to take out their furniture and household effects or their emigration allowance, which nowadays can amount to close to R1million. However, because of Finance Minister Trevor Manuel's generosity, most of them can now take a travel allowance of close to R500 000 (per family of two adults and two children over 12). For most average families that covers about all the money they may possess anyway, and many younger people would not even own that much, making the emigration allowance irrelevant.

2.2 HOW MANY PEOPLE HAVE LEFT SO FAR?

A good starting point for calculating the number of people who have emigrated is to find the total number of *official* emigrants that left the country in the post-World War II era by relying on Statistics South Africa, and then multiplying this by two or three.



The numbers in table 2.1 cover the 55-year period between 1945 and 1999 and add up to 545 642 emigrants. As they stand, they are dwarfed by the official numbers of immigrants during the same period, amounting to 1,2 million. However, by applying the 'multiplication factor' or the 2:1 and 3:1 ratios, it can be safely assumed that about two or three times as many people have left South Africa in total. Assuming that for every person who emigrates officially, another one or two leave unofficially, the total emigration figure for the post-war period could be 1,1 million or even as high as 1,6 million.

Table 2.1 Official emigration statistics⁷


1945	4 881	1973	6 401
1946	9 095	1974	7 428
1947	8 040	1975	10 255
1948	7 623	1976	15 641
1949	9 403	1977	26 000
1950	14 956	1978	20 686
1951	15 546	1979	15 694
1952	9 877	1980	11 363
1953	10 324	1981	8 791
1954	11 461	1982	6 832
1955	12 636	1983	8 247
1956	13 031	1984	8 550
1957	11 034	1985	11 401
1958	8 954	1986	13 711
1959	9 502	1987	11 174
1960	12 705	1988	7 767
1961	15 046	1989	4 911
1962	9 162	1990	4 722
1963	7 272	1991	4 256
1964	8 293	1992	4 289
1965	9 479	1993	8 078
1966	10 289	1994	10 235
1967	11 289	1995	8 725
1968	10 945	1996	9 708
1969	9 313	1997	8 946
1970	9 278	1998	8 276
1971	8 407	1999 est.	9 000
1972	7 884	Total	545 642

For the 20-year period between 1980 and 1999 a total of 157 808 people emigrated officially, but once again if the unofficial emigrants are added, this figure becomes approximately 315 000 and could be as high as 473 000. Another way of reaching roughly the same figure for this period is by using the UK's official statistics as a starting point: British sources claim that approximately 100 000 South Africans arrived in the UK on a permanent basis between 1984 and 1996.⁸ As the UK is the emigration destination of about 25% of South African emigrants,

multiplying this number by four suggests that the total emigration by South Africans to all countries was about 400 000 between 1984 and 1996. To this number should be added the additional 10 000–20 000 people per year who have left unofficially since 1996, to arrive at a total of about 430 000–460 000 emigrants between 1984 and 1999.

The emigration statistics for the post-apartheid era after 1994 deserve specific scrutiny, because emigration during this period is viewed by many analysts as a reflection of the degree to which whites have accepted an ANC government, the transformation process and, crucially, the impact that rampant crime has had on emigration. R W Johnson, British historian and head of the Helen Suzman Foundation, estimates that between 250 000 and 500 000 South Africans have left South Africa since 1994.* A much more conservative estimate is that of Deon Geldenhuys, a professor at RAU, who suggests that about 65 000 people emigrated during the five-year period between 1994 and 1998.⁹

The actual figure probably lies somewhere in-between – Statistics South Africa's figures show that about 55 000 emigrants officially left South Africa between 1994 and 1999: this implies that at least a further 55 000 and possibly as many as 110 000 may have left unofficially, and therefore that the total number of people who left South Africa under the ANC government could be as high as 165 000.



The net loss/gain

Table 2.2 below depicts the net gain (+) or loss (–) of people each year since 1945.



* R W Johnson, quoted in the *Sunday Times* [UK], 22 November 1998. A few months earlier his estimate was more conservative, when he suggested 'at least 200 000', *Sunday Times* [UK], 5 September 1998.

Table 2.2 Net gain/loss¹⁰

1945	-1 932	1973	+17 615
1946	+2 935	1974	+28 482
1947	+21 787	1975	+40 209
1948	+29 111	1976	+30 595
1949	+6 173	1977	-1 178
1950	-1 293	1978	-2 017
1951	+344	1979	+2 986
1952	+9 098	1980	+18 002
1953	+6 943	1981	+32 751
1954	+5 258	1982	+38 952
1955	+4 048	1983	+22 236
1956	+2 207	1984	+20 243
1957	+3 597	1985	+5 883
1958	+5 747	1986	-6 171
1959	+3 096	1987	-3 221
1960	-2 900	1988	+2 633
1961	+1 327	1989	+6 359
1962	+11 810	1990	+9 777
1963	+30 741	1991	+8 123
1964	+32 603	1992	+4 397
1965	+28 858	1993	+1 746
1966	+37 762	1994	-3 837
1967	+27 648	1995	-3 661
1968	+29 603	1996	-4 301
1969	+32 133	1997	-4 843
1970	+32 245	1998	-4 660
1971	+27 438	1999 est	-5 000
1972	+24 892	Total	+662 379


The net loss/gain table suggests that for 42 of the last 55 years more people officially entered the country on a permanent basis than those who left the country. A total of 1,2 million immigrants legally entered South Africa versus the 550 000 official emigrants, leading to an official (but incorrect) assumption of a net gain of just over

660 000 people. This figure should be adjusted to incorporate the number of unofficial emigrants, which could result in an emigration total of two or three times many, that is, between 1,1 million and 1,6 million emigrants between 1945 and 1999 – the result is either a small net gain of about 100 000 people or a net loss of 400 000 people. However, the 4–8 million illegal immigrants that have entered South Africa in the past decade may also have to be brought into the equation, for many of these are granted residency and will never leave South Africa again.

The official statistics, however inaccurate they may be, suggest that the only period in which there was a consistent net loss of people was from 1994 to 1999, when for the first time the country experienced an outflow for six consecutive years. This official net loss of 26 000 people translates to an unofficial net loss of approximately 135 000 (official emigration multiplied by three equals 165 000, minus 30 000 legal immigrants).

The mystery of the missing white million

The 1996 census indicated that there were only 4,4 million whites in South Africa, a figure which contrasts sharply with the 1985 census, which counted 4,9 million whites. This means that if the natural increase is added to the 1985 figure (equal to the positive difference between births and deaths due to a white birth rate of between 1% and 2%), and the approximately 130 000 immigrants since 1985 is also added, the white population should have been closer to 5,5 million by the mid-1990s. This implies that up to 1 million whites have disappeared since 1985. Is this possible? Could a census result be inaccurate or have a million whites indeed left South Africa during this *ten-year* period alone (almost equal to the author's estimate for the whole period between 1945 and 1999)?



Assuming that emigration during this period accounted at the most for 300 000 (close to 100 000 through official channels and a further 200 000 unofficially), a further 700 000 whites remain unaccounted for. This leaves two possibilities: either the 1985 or the 1996 census results were inaccurate, or both – an unlikely scenario – or the official scope of white emigration is totally underestimated. As argued before, the latter is the most probable.

Political analyst Lawrence Schlemmer argues that it is impossible that as many as one million whites could have emigrated. He offers another option, namely that the results of the survey are skewed because of an 'underestimation built into the census structure'. He claims that if a million whites had actually physically left the country, it

would have resulted in a vacuum in the economy that would have been evident in rapidly declining house prices and a shortage of skills.¹¹ Schlemmer's argument can be attacked from two sides: firstly, it ignores the influence of a rapidly growing black middle class which could have filled some of the gaps in the housing and skilled labour markets left by white emigrants; secondly, the housing market did in fact suffer a sharp decline during the period under consideration and it is indisputable that South Africa has been experiencing a drastic shortage of professional and managerial skills. Nonetheless, Schlemmer's argument cannot be discounted completely for it is virtually impossible for one million whites to have left the country over a ten-year span without various statistical sources (domestic and foreign) picking it up. However, at least the census confirms that the author's estimate of at least 500 000 emigrants over the past two decades is not too far off the mark.

2.3 HOW MANY PEOPLE POTENTIALLY MAY LEAVE?

Between 1,1 and 1,6 million people may have left South Africa since 1945 and the crucial question is whether South Africa will follow the example of other African countries such as Zimbabwe and Namibia, by losing between one half and two thirds of its 'European' population (and in Algeria's case almost all of its European population)?

Although emigration is the topic of animated discussion at dinner parties all over South Africa, and hundreds of thousands of people admit that they have given the topic of emigration serious thought, it is doubtful that the country will ever experience a sudden large-scale exodus of its white population. What is likely to continue is the slow haemorrhaging of approximately 20 000 to 30 000 predominantly white emigrants per annum unless events in South Africa become apocalyptic and a racially based civil war or poverty-induced revolution erupts.

A survey commissioned by the *Sunday Times* in 1998 concluded that 74% of professional people in South Africa were thinking of emigrating.¹² A survey by *Finance Week* concluded that 31% of its readers want to emigrate, while 21% of the readers of its Afrikaans sister publication want to do so.¹³ A subsequent survey one year later by this newspaper found that 71% of professional South Africans were still considering leaving the country¹⁴. A survey by the Institute for Democracy in South Africa (Idasa) suggested that 69% of skilled people had *considered* leaving South Africa and that 28% *had a desire* to leave, but that only 20% were *very likely* to leave¹⁵. If these surveys are to be believed it is possible that between one quarter and three quarters of South Africa's professional sector, mostly white, could leave the country. It is a harsh reality that most South African

emigrants are from the professional sector but the converse is also true: most professionals in South Africa are potential emigrants.

If the current emigration pattern of between 20 000 and 30 000 per year continues, between 200 000 and 300 000 additional emigrants will leave South Africa over the next ten years. There is no convincing reason that this figure should be adjusted downwards – crime is the major reason that people are emigrating and there is little reason to assume that it will decline in the foreseeable future. Although the government appears to be willing to get to grips with crime, the underlying socio-economic causes of crime such as unemployment, poverty and the culture of violence are so firmly entrenched that a turnaround is virtually impossible over the short and medium terms – not only is the level of violent crime unacceptably high, but unemployment and, inter alia, poverty are increasing*.

Considering South Africa's relative economic and financial stability it is expected that current levels of emigration will be maintained unless a sudden political calamity arises. Should South Africa's political miracle come to a sudden end and conditions deteriorate to the level of civil war, the exodus would be of much greater proportions, not unlike what happened in Zimbabwe or Namibia, where between one half and two thirds of the whites emigrated. Under the latter scenario up to two and a half or three million of the remaining five million whites in South Africa could theoretically emigrate (flee might be a better description). Depending on the nature of the calamity, they could be joined by many middle-class blacks.



In practice, however, their numbers will be limited because the majority of whites in South Africa would probably not meet the strict entry requirements of most emigration destinations or would not have sufficient capital to buy their way into these countries. The whites of Namibia and Zimbabwe had a natural and virtually restriction-free refuge in South Africa, Britain and Germany, and the *Pied Noirs* of Algeria had a similar sanctuary in France, but most whites in South Africa do not have such a natural safe haven in the event of a racially based calamity. Apart from the 800 000-plus British passport holders and ancestral claimants, and the few hundred thousand Portuguese speakers and other Europeans, many English-speaking whites and most Afrikaners have no such option and will have to remain in South Africa or become refugees.



* Over 1 million jobs have been lost since 1990, of which 500 000 disappeared after 1995, while 45 000 non-farm jobs were lost in the 1998 fiscal year alone

2.4 WHO IS LEAVING?

For many years the profile of the typical South African emigrant was white, educated, English-speaking, and liberal in political orientation.* Emigration was regarded as an English-speaking South African 'disease', and as such, emigrants were derided by the Afrikaans media and the NP regime as people without loyalty to the country. Ironically, by 1999 the numbers of English-speaking Smiths and Joneses had been matched by the Afrikaans-speaking Van der Merwes and Van Niekerks, as well as occasionally by Dlameni, Fortuin and Naidoo.

Today the average emigrant is likely to be white (less than 10% are generic black – of these most are coloured and Asian rather than African), with the language split estimated at 50/50 English/Afrikaans, in his or her thirties and forties, and accompanied by one or two children and possibly a dog.** More than half, about 54% in an average year, will be from a professional (doctor, engineer, accountant, teacher/lecturer) or managerial/executive background. Only about one half or one third will notify the South African authorities that they are emigrating. The prime driving forces behind these emigrants are fear of violent crime, lawlessness and the lack of physical safety and in the vast majority of cases they would have had personal experience of South Africa's crime wave.

The professionals: a brain drain

South Africa's current emigration wave is closely associated with the flight of skills – the much-spoken-of 'brain drain'. Because of the strict entry requirements of various popular emigration destinations, people who have the most sought-after skills constitute the bulk of emigrants. Losing its skilled citizens is disastrous for South Africa, and is made worse by the huge shortage of skills as a result of South Africa's strict entry requirements for skilled immigrants. During the four-year period between 1995 and 1998 South Africa experienced a net loss of professional people, with the result that one third of companies cannot find the management and other skills that they require from the pool of local employees.¹⁶ By the end of 1999 South Africa had a shortage of between 350 000 and 500 000 managerial and technical staff¹⁷.



* The Nationalists claimed that PFP, the abbreviated name of the Progressive Federal Party, meant 'Packing for Perth' because so many of its supporters emigrated to Australia.


** Emigration consultants like to claim that 'lots' of their customers are African – this, however, is largely an attempt on their part to be politically correct and it is done with the intention to allay the concerns of white emigrants: the argument is that, if Africans are also emigrating in numbers, it must be 'OK'.

This critical shortage is exacerbated annually by a further loss of an estimated 18000 skilled people of whom about 7 500 are professionals.

The make-up of the emigrant population follows a clear pattern: on average 54% of South African official emigrants are economically active, among them doctors, scientists, engineers, teachers, nurses, farmers, clerical workers, artisans and accountants. The remainder are involved in housekeeping or are children, students, pensioners and others. The proportion of professionals relative to the total number of emigrants is higher than average for people moving to the USA – 77% of South African emigrants to America have tertiary education qualifications.¹⁸

According to Statistics South Africa the breakdown per occupational category for the 4 693 economically active emigrants in 1998 was as follows (of course, this number only represents official emigrants – the actual number should be triple, that is between 9 000 and 15 000, but the percentages below should remain relatively constant). Professional, semi-professional, technical and managerial occupations, that is, the first two categories below, made up 54% of skilled emigrants:

- Professional, semi-professional and technical occupations: 38% (of whom 7% were engineers, 5% educators, 5% accountants, 2% medical practitioners, and 19% other professions, totalling 38%)
- Managerial, executive and administrative occupations: 15,6%
- Clerical and sales: 17%
- Transport, delivery and communications: 0,8%
- Service occupations: 2%
- Artisans, apprentices: 6,5%
- Farming: 0,6%
- Others: 20,5%



(These categories are discussed in greater detail in chapter 5 under the ‘Impact of emigration’.)

Afrikaners

Afrikaners are real South Africans. They do not have a second citizenship. This is their country – ANC spokesman, Smuts Nkonyama¹⁹.

Most Afrikaners in the post-1994 South Africa have experienced some degree of alienation from the structures within the new political dispensation. This is because Afrikaners, the now-disempowered ethnic minority, were the former rulers of South

Africa and carried most of the apartheid 'baggage'. In addition, they are an integral part of the supposedly wealthy white 'nation', according to Mbeki's thesis. Afrikaners ruled the country through their political vehicle, the National Party, exclusively between 1948 and 1994, a period of 46 years. During this period they had control of all the branches of state and dominated almost all aspects of society. Their loss of political power in 1994 resulted in the loss of access to the Civil Service and government patronage, and of the ability to use the power of the state to promote and protect the Afrikaans language and culture.

For Afrikaners the most immediate manifestation of their loss of power was the perceived and real loss of status of the Afrikaans language – in Parliament, in the Defence Force, in the courts, on national television, at South African Airways, in educational institutions, in the Civil Service and elsewhere. For the first time since 1948 Afrikaans became just one of 11 languages, and what's more, it was superseded by English as South Africa's lingua franca. While the elevated position of English is logical in a country with 11 official languages, many Afrikaners view it as a humiliating downgrading of their language, an onslaught against their culture, and confirmation of their fear that they have become 'second-class' citizens in their country of birth.

However, if the protection and promotion of the Afrikaans culture and language is a priority to many Afrikaners, it is obvious that this issue would not receive priority in Auckland, Sydney and New York, and that emigration will only further weaken the survival prospects of Afrikaans, especially in second-generation emigrants. For this reason it is not likely that too many Afrikaner emigrants will list the perceived 'assault' on their culture as a persuasive reason for emigration, and instead will fall back on the issue of violent crime to justify their departure.

Afrikaners now constitute almost half of the total number of South African emigrants in countries like New Zealand while 51% of South African doctors who emigrated to the Canadian province of Saskatchewan are Afrikaans-speaking²⁰. It is therefore possible to postulate that Afrikaners constitute almost half of the total estimated 20 000–30 000 emigrants each year. Still, the approximately 15 000 annual Afrikaner emigrants represent a very small percentage of the Afrikaner population of three million plus (over a period of ten years this will amount to 150 000 Afrikaner emigrants or 5% of the Afrikaner population).

The vast majority of Afrikaners, however, are still prepared to engage in a new struggle for the preservation of their position in South Africa and as part of the 'rainbow nation'. As the editor of *Beeld* commented: 'We're from Africa not from

Europe. We regard ourselves as Africans with paler skins . . . This is where we want our children to live and we want to make this country great for all its people'²¹. Leading this struggle are Afrikaner intellectuals, cultural leaders and politicians, and the DP in particular, as well as the Freedom Front and NNP, has become a vocal proponent of the cultural rights of Afrikaners – this is hardly surprising, considering that more than half of Afrikaners voted for the DP in the 1999 general election. Other Afrikaners have organised themselves in informal and formal cultural organisations such as the 'Group of 63', the 'Pro-Afrikaanse Aksiegroep, the Afrikanerbond, the FAK, the ATKV and the Akademie vir Wetenskap en Kuns, to fight for the protection of Afrikaans and minority rights in general. In this regard the 'boetman' debate as initiated by radio producer Chris Louw early in 2000, probably achieved more than any of the attempts of the above organisations to highlight the sense of powerlessness experienced by Afrikaner males in present-day South Africa. In addition, Afrikaners as a group have responded to their loss of political power by actively pursuing economic power and broadening the Afrikaner share in the economy. Between 1994 and 1999 Afrikaner control of the JSE increased from 24% to 35%, while Afrikaans speakers (white and coloured) paid 37% of the country's personal taxes and possess 32% of its disposable income.²² Proportionally this is a high figure, considering that Afrikaners make up only about 7% of the country's population and Afrikaans speakers about 14%.

But, like the white population as a whole, the departure of Afrikaner skills will eventually have a serious impact on the strength and viability of this ethnic group and in economic terms on the country as a whole. It is precisely because the proportional economic power of Afrikaners is so much greater than their numbers that their departure from the country will have such an impact.



English-speaking South Africans

At least 800 000 British passport holders are living in South Africa, according to the British Consulate in Pretoria.²³ However, probably a much higher number can apply for British passports through ancestral ties, should they so wish.* It is estimated that between 3% and 7% of UK passport holders are planning to leave South Africa over the short term, that is, between 24 000 and 56 000 people over the next few



* About 20% of the 1,5 million South Africans who travel overseas each year do so with British passports, ie 300 000 people.

years.²⁴ This is considerably more than the 0,5% (or 2% over the next four years) of the whole of the white population that will emigrate.

How real a possibility is it that close to one million South Africans with British passports could arrive in the UK en masse? Although occasional rumours claim that the British government had drawn up contingency plans to evacuate all its subjects in the event of a racial conflagration in South Africa, there is little doubt that Britain would not cherish the idea of absorbing and providing jobs and houses to close to a million British passport holders from South Africa, many of whom had never set foot in the UK and are about as British in culture and allegiance as the Afrikaner world-class athlete from Bloemfontein, Zola Budd, was when she laid claim to a British ancestral passport in the 1980s to enable her to participate in the Olympic games.

The nervousness of the British government about large-scale influxes of expatriates from the former colonies is evident from its response during the Zimbabwe crisis in March 2000 – the British Foreign Office Minister, Peter Hain, caused some panic when he announced that contingency plans have been drawn up to evacuate the 20 000 British passport holders from Zimbabwe should the crisis worsen, and the *Independent* newspaper warned that the extent of the crisis will only dawn on the British public when they ‘have to take in 20 000 British citizens’²⁵.

In the light of this one can only imagine the British reaction when 800 000 to one million British passport holders arrive en masse at Heathrow Airport in a similar crisis situation in South Africa or in the not unlikely event that the Zimbabwean crisis should spill over to South Africa.

This is not an impossible scenario, seen in the light of the ease with which Mugabe declared in April 2000 that white Zimbabweans were ‘enemies of the state’, and considering ANC spokesperson Smuts Ngonyama’s suggestion that only Afrikaners and those without a second passport are ‘real’ South Africans. It can be assumed therefore that Ngonyama implied that those of Anglo-Saxon stock and the million-odd people with two passports are not ‘real’ South Africans. This could be a short step from declaring that certain ‘unpatriotic’ people in South Africa are enemies of the state, and ultimately that their citizenship should be taken away, as Mugabe’s regime has recently attempted to do to whites in Zimbabwe.


During the visit by British Prime Minister Tony Blair in January 1999, British officials made a special effort to calm the nerves of British passport-holders and those with access to British citizenship. This was in response to concern in the UK over the scale of South African emigration, and one of the reasons for Blair’s visit was to persuade

prospective emigrants not to leave the country. His plea was presumably aimed directly at British passport holders and many others with ancestral ties who, if they should all leave for the UK at once, would cause major disruption to its socio-economic fabric. As expected, Blair was very frank in his advice to the government on the crime situation and suggested that crime should be viewed in the same light as an external threat, that is, it should be countered with similar resources to an invasion by an enemy country: 'Security from crime is the most basic demand the people of any country make and we must strive to answer it, just as we would an external threat from a warlike nation.'²⁶ Yet, he also placed a great deal of emphasis on the South African miracle and stressed that South Africans should stay and contribute rather than leave the country.

Jewish Emigration

They used to say you should watch the Jews. When they start leaving, then you know things are going downhill. They were the canaries in the mine shaft of society – Peter Godwin.²⁷

Godwin refers tongue-in-the-cheek to an old myth that Jewish migratory habits were a barometer of pending upheavals in a particular society – however, he claims that they have been replaced in South Africa today by a different kind of barometer, namely the exodus of 'lift technicians and computer programmers'.



Yet it is indisputable that over the past few years the Jewish community of South Africa have been leaving in steady numbers, and in proportionally greater numbers relative to the white population as a whole. The Jewish population in South Africa has declined because of this emigration from a peak of 120 000 to 75 000, that is, by almost 40%.²⁸ The Jewish Board of Deputies' estimation is more conservative: it judges the number of Jews in South Africa to be down from a peak of 120 000 in 1970 to about 100 000 today, that is, a decline of about 16%.²⁹

The actual figure is probably closer to 45 000, simply because 18 000 have settled in Israel alone, leaving little room in the calculation to account for the thousands of South African Jews who live in places such as the USA and Australia. If 45 000 is accepted as a reliable estimate, then it represents 37% of the total former Jewish population in South Africa, and suggests that Jewish emigration is proportionally higher than the percentage of other whites who have left the country.



Well-known personalities who have left South Africa in recent years

Our president has called those who leave the country cowards. I have to confess that I am now about to join the number of those cowards who are streaming out of the country – Anne Paton.*

Joining the ranks of the hundreds of thousands of ordinary South Africans who are leaving South Africa are many well-known people. Some have been living abroad for many years without ever emigrating officially, mostly without evoking much response from fellow South Africans. They go overseas on a temporary basis, ostensibly to continue with their careers, but after a few years many of these temporary emigrants return less frequently and become emigrants for all practical purposes.

Many sports stars fall into this category: although not officially an emigrant, former Springbok captain François Pienaar left South Africa after being dismissed as captain of the national team to continue his career in England, to be followed four years later



* Anne Paton's husband was one of South Africa's foremost liberals and author of 'Cry the beloved country' – she left South Africa because of intolerable levels of crime in 1999.

by his successor, Gary Teichman. Joel Stransky, another hero of South Africa's World Rugby Cup victory, has also been playing in England for the past four years. Tiaan Strauss, former Springbok and Western Province rugby captain, went to Australia after failing selection for the 1995 World Cup squad, became naturalised and played for Australia's national rugby team against South Africa in 1999.* Other South African rugby players who live overseas include Dion O'Cuinneagain, who captained Ireland in the last World Cup, Mike Catt, who plays for England, and André Blom and Juan Grobler who play for the USA. Former Springbok flyhalf Gerald Bosch has been living in Brisbane for a few years.** The former SA Schools captain and flank of the former Northern Transvaal team, Bernard Pienaar, emigrated to Australia in 1999, as did Daniel Vickerman, a star of South Africa's 1997 under-21 rugby team.

Another sports hero who lives overseas most of the year is South Africa's top golfer, Ernie Els. Els's house near George was ransacked twice in three months, the second time by a man who has just murdered four people on a neighbouring farm – following this incident Els declared that 'crime was ruining the country he loves'.³⁰ Although he denied that the incident would make him leave South Africa, he already spends most of his time overseas and has recently bought a house in Britain.

Most members of the national soccer team, Bafana Bafana, live overseas and only come back occasionally to play matches for the national team. Tennis players like Amanda Coetzer and Wayne Ferreira have been living outside South Africa for years, but still play for the country in Davis Cup matches. World-class swimmer and holder of eight world records, Penny Heyns, lives in the USA. The first South African-born person to scale Mount Everest, George Mallory, lives in Melbourne. Irene van Dyk, South Africa's top netball player and one of the best players in the world, emigrated to New Zealand early in 2000.



* Strauss bravely sang the Australian national anthem before 50 000 Springbok supporters at the Newlands rugby stadium in Cape Town in 1999 and received a thunderous applause when he ran onto the field as a substitute.

** Former Springbok captain, Joost van der Westhuizen, threatened to emigrate in 1997 due to crime and fear for his family's safety, *Die Burger*, 20 June 1997. Other sports personalities who were less reluctant to use a threat to leave the country but claimed that they would understand if people leave the country because of crime included cricket stars Kepler Wessels and Fanie de Villiers, and former Springbok rugby captains Divan Serfontein and Naas Botha, *Die Burger*, 24 June 1998.

Many South Africans who are active in the film and media spheres have left South Africa. Actors like Arnold Vosloo, Charlize Theron, Embeth Davids and former television presenter/actress Sue-Anne Braun have made their mark in Hollywood and live more or less permanently in the United States. Several local television personalities, among them Prudence Solomon, Anand Naidoo, Nadia Bilchik, Jane Dutton and Tumi Makgabo, have left South Africa in recent years for places such as New York and Atlanta, and are working for the international news network CNN. Former SABC presenter and Afrikaans Radio personality Norma Odendaal and her husband, Frans, a radio producer, left for New Zealand in 1997. The Odendaals list crime and low expectations of South Africa's future as the main reasons for emigrating and argue that although they love the country and will miss their friends and family, the security risk of staying on has become too great. In 1998 South Africa lost two key players in the local entertainment industry when film and television producers Koos Roets (*Kooperasiestories*, *Kaalgat tussen die daisies*) and David Lister (*John Ross*, *Barney Barnato*, *Panic Mechanic*, etc) left for Australia because of crime and lack of work opportunities in the film industry. One of South Africa's foremost actors, Sean Taylor, half brother of former leader of the PFP, Frederick van Zyl Slabbert, was scheduled to settle in Melbourne in 2000.³¹ A former winner of the Miss South Africa beauty competition, Suzette van der Merwe, is living in Florida in the USA.

Famous Afrikaans author Marieta van der Vyver, whose book *Griet skryf 'n Sprokie* received numerous literary awards, left for France in 1999. She describes how she is caught up, like many Afrikaners, not knowing where she wants to be – if she is in South Africa, she longs to be in Europe, and if she is in Europe, she longs for South Africa. But even though Van der Vyver remains adamant that she 'was not emigrating' and would visit South Africa for two months each year, it is obvious that her move is more or less permanent, especially when she describes the safety, variety and general high quality of life in Provence. Other authors who are living outside South Africa include Annesu de Vos, Breyten Breytenbach, Christopher Hope (both in France), Athol Fugard and André P Brink. Andrea Durbach, the lawyer who represented the 25 people who were convicted of killing a policeman in Upington in 1985 (14 of whom were sentenced to death) and later published a book on the subject, titled *Upington*, emigrated to Australia in spite of her assurances that she would never leave this country³².

Many prominent academics and clerics are also leaving the country. Among them are people like Heila and Helgard Visagie, lecturers at the Technical College in Rustenberg, who emigrated to New Zealand because of crime. Professor Daneel Ferreira, winner of the Havenga Award for Chemistry and the only A-rated scientist

at the Free State University also left South Africa in 1998. Ferreira went to the USA because he did not see a future for South Africa, as it was 'fast becoming just another African country'. Referring to crime, he said that no amount of 'sunshine and money' could guarantee the safety of his family in South Africa.³³ Former Cape Town resident Professor Michael Hayden left South Africa to become director of the University of British Columbia's Centre for Molecular Medicine and Therapeutics.* Professor Mel Gray, formerly of the Faculty of Community and Development Studies at the University of Natal, emigrated to Australia. Robin Cox, a top Cape Town educationalist and acting principal of St Joseph's College in Rondebosch, emigrated to New Zealand in 1998, claiming he was 'exhausted' by the constant fight with the government over the future of private schools.

Prominent Muslim academics and scholars in the Cape left the country because of harassment and threats to their lives because they were deemed to be too moderate for fundamentalist Muslims. In September 1998 leading UCT academic and moderate Muslim scholar Ebrahim Moosa left on a 'sabbatical' to the USA, following threats to his life and a bomb attack on his family home. In the same month Sheikh Sa'dullah Khan, imam of Cape Town's largest Muslim congregation, also left for the USA after death threats.

Among the thousands of doctors who have left South Africa in recent years was Fanus Serfontein, after Chris Barnard probably South Africa's foremost heart surgeon. Serfontein left for Saudi Arabia in 1998, following his threats to emigrate because of the falling standards of healthcare in South Africa and confrontations with the Department of Health over heart transplants.³⁴ Barnard himself left South Africa to settle in Vienna, Austria, in March 2000, because he felt aggrieved by the treatment he received from the South African media. Former Cape Town heart specialist Christopher Knott-Graig emigrated to the USA in 1992 and lives in Oklahoma – he became the first heart surgeon in the world successfully to operate on babies with the normally fatal Ebstein's disease³⁵.



Among the many business people who have left the country is Rob Lee, a top economic analyst at the Board of Executors. In 1996 Lee left Cape Town for England, citing reasons ranging from the 'declining quality of education' and 'bleak job prospects for his children' to 'the deterioration of the public health sector, high



* Hayden recently made an important discovery about the relationship between certain people's genes and their propensity to unhealthy cholesterol levels.

personal tax rates, inflation and unemployment'.³⁶ Another emigrant with a strong business background was Ben Vosloo, former chief of the Small Business Development Corporation (now called Business Partners). Under Vosloo the SBDC provided more than 400 000 jobs and 50 000 businesses, but in 1996 he opted for the greener pastures of Australia, if not permanently, then for at least eight months of each year. Like many other emigrants he did not decide to emigrate formally but just to live elsewhere. He euphemistically describes his decision to leave as a 'relocation', as he would not be ending his citizenship. Vosloo cited his reasons as criminality, violence and the deteriorating quality of schools and public service. South Africa's top hotelier, Sol Kerzner, has been living in the USA and the UK for years, and has built himself a hotel empire outside South Africa with resorts in the USA, Bahamas and elsewhere. In 1999 one of South Africa's most experienced and successful marine diamond mining businessmen and MD of Ocean Diamond Mining, André Louw, left for Canada, and a former managing director of Iscor, Ben Alberts, for Australia, where he joined the board of Australia's largest resource company, Broken Hill Proprietary (BHP).^{*} Brent Hoberman, a South African living in the UK, became a billionaire in March 2000 when the company of which he was a co-founder, 'lastminute.com', was listed on the London Stock Exchange for over R5 billion.

One of the more unusual cases of emigration by politicians was that of Member of Parliament Cehill Pienaar, former member of the rightwing Conservative Party and later a member of the Inkatha Freedom Party. Pienaar's family had been living in New Zealand for a few years but he chose the unusual option of long-distance commuting between New Zealand and South Africa to enable him to fulfil his duties as MP during the six months that Parliament was in session each year. Pienaar was considering living in New Zealand permanently because of his concern for 'spiralling crime and a collapsing judiciary' in South Africa.³⁷ A member of the right of the political spectrum, Piet Gous, a former Member of Parliament and former president of the Free State Agricultural Union, announced in 1999 that he wanted to emigrate: 'There is no future (in South Africa) for educated professional Afrikaners'.³⁸ The statement by the leader of the New National Party, Martinus van Schalkwyk, that 'there would be no reason to stay in this country' should the ANC win a two-thirds majority in the 1999 elections drew an angry response from the ANC, which, through MP Tony Yengeni, expressed its 'disgust' at Van Schalkwyk's 'lack of commitment to South Africa'. Constand Viljoen, leader of the rightwing Freedom




^{*} Interestingly, Louw's residency in Canada lasted only three months – he returned to South Africa in February 2000.

Front, also threatened to emigrate if the new firearms law forces him to surrender his personal weapons³⁹. Billy Corbett, Director of Housing in the Cape Town municipality and a former Director-General of Housing in Mpumalanga, left South Africa for England in 1998 after he exposed a housing scam in Cape Town and in return received death threats from gangsters. At first he remained in his post and sent his family away to the safety of Oxfordshire, but after more threats abruptly left South Africa. The *Cape Times* lamented Corbett's departure:

There will be people who question Corbett's commitment to South Africa and argue that he took the easy way out while so many others continue to suffer in South Africa without the option of fleeing to another country. But Corbett's credentials, politically and professionally, are impeccable. [He] was forced to flee the country ... after death threats from gangsters.⁴⁰

Some South Africans who are driven to emigration by crime use their fame/reputation to make a political statement and to protest against violent crime. Their departures tend to cause ripples of anxiety among those remaining behind, especially in white society. One such case is Anne Paton, whose husband wrote the book, *Cry the beloved country*, that alerted the world to the injustices of apartheid. Her decision deserves a special mention: Anne Paton decided to leave the country after being the victim of a brutal car-hijacking, having experienced several break-ins at her home, and having several close friends becoming murder statistics. She poignantly described how her experiences left her with a sense of fear and dread of blacks and of being vulnerable at night-time and how her liberal values were being eroded by this fear:



I am still a liberal ... but I cannot live like this. This is not a life ... I am afraid it is simply not going to get better ... Many liberals are not feeling so liberal anymore. What is awful is the dreadful suspicion and fear.⁴¹

Corporate emigration – chicken run or global reality?

Not only humans cross the oceans in search of better opportunities and safer havens, but capital and corporations do so as well. The world has become a global village with capital moving freely each day in search of bigger returns, South Africa being no exception. Since 1994 the country has experienced large inflows and outflows of capital, but with more capital coming in than leaving, in contrast to the pre-1994 era

when disinvestment and the illegal transfer of funds overseas drained the country of capital. It is estimated that up to R50 billion may have been smuggled out of the country in the past few decades under successive apartheid governments, much of it by corrupt government officials.*

Like their human counterparts, the trend among South African companies is to relocate to the developed English-speaking world, mostly to the UK, Canada, Australia and the US. This is understandable as these countries are part of the First World and provide a safe and comfortable basis from which to operate. Access to an environment with low crime and cultural familiarity also determines the destination of such companies, especially as many members of senior management and their families normally have to relocate to the new host countries.

Much of the money that left the country after 1994 was with the blessing of the ANC government, which relaxed exchange controls and not only allowed individuals to invest overseas but also let companies list on foreign stock markets and move capital abroad. Private investors, who were allowed to invest R750 000 overseas by 2000, were initially slow on the uptake and only a trickle of funds left the country in 1997, amounting to R613 million. The trickle turned into a steady stream in 1998 after the collapse of the emerging world markets and the drastic 40% decline in the value of the rand between June and August 1998. By October 1998 the amount of money invested overseas by South Africans rose to over R2 billion and to over R9 billion by the end of 1999 – still far less than the R60 billion that some economists expected.⁴² The total funds that ‘emigrated’ from South Africa after the relaxation of foreign exchange controls commenced under the ANC-led government, amounted to more than R200 billion by late-1999 – however, this included loans to foreign institutions by individuals and companies in South Africa.⁴³

South African companies benefited greatly from the return of South Africa to the global economy and from fewer restrictions on the flow of capital. The trickle of corporate emigrants of the mid-1990s became a flood by 1998–99, with Anglo American’s listing on the London Stock Exchange leading the pack in terms of sheer size, but many others joined. Apart from Anglo, among the other companies which




* One such example is the head of the apartheid government’s chemical warfare programme, Wouter Basson, who is accused of stealing over R40 million of government money, a large part of which was stashed away in foreign property and bank accounts.

listed overseas were De Beers/Centenary in 1990 in Switzerland with R41 billion, Trans Hex in Canada in 1996, Gold Fields (USA or Canada), Anglo Gold (USA), Sappi (USA), and insurance giant Old Mutual, Dimension Data, South African Breweries and Billiton in London. By 1999 the government had become anxious and began subtly to discourage too many primary foreign listings.

Other companies went on shopping sprees to acquire footholds outside South Africa, with Australia a particularly popular destination. By early 1998 South African companies had spent close to Aus\$3 billion expanding, acquiring or buying stakes in Australian companies – these included Billiton, Dimension Data, Bidvest, Barlow, Pepkor, Wooltru, Woolworths, Metro Cash & Carry, JCL, Iscor, Ingwe, Plessey and LeisureNet.

It is difficult to judge the impact on the South African economy when Anglo American and other large companies start expanding overseas and then moving their headquarters and primary listings as well. Anglo American's decision in October 1998 to move its primary listing from Johannesburg to London became the benchmark of corporate emigration. Anglo is South Africa's largest corporate entity with a market capitalisation of R4 -billion and has become synonymous with wealth and capitalism in South Africa. Its decision to move its head office outside the country had few obvious negative consequences on the economy. In fact, one of its main reasons for listing in London was to gain easier access to cheaper capital, and part of this capital could find its way to South Africa. Besides, no capital is actually leaving the country as such, according to analyst Nico Czipionka.⁴⁴ The South African government was quick to signal its approval of the move by Anglo, claiming that it 'made a lot of sense'.⁴⁵



The current Minister of Finance, Trevor Manuel, has been one of the strongest defenders of offshore primary listings, arguing that the core assets and business activities of these companies remain in South Africa, the majority of their shareholders remain South African and these companies are able to raise larger amounts of capital than would have been possible on the JSE only.⁴⁶ Although most members of the South African business community viewed the move as a natural part of the globalisation process, certain analysts such as John Clemmow of London-based Investec Securities, viewed the move as a show of no confidence in South Africa, and stockbroker John Balderson described it as a 'sad' attempt to expand away from South Africa.⁴⁷ In the trade union movement too there was great unhappiness about 'unpatriotic' acts of 'economic treason' committed by the emigrating companies and what they perceived as a vote of no-confidence in the

future of South Africa.* The Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu) accused Anglo of being 'only interested in making a quick buck regardless of the consequences to South Africa's people'. In an editorial titled 'Going offshore – chicken run or global reality?' the *Cape Argus* suggested that 'only time will tell' whether it strengthens or weakens the South African economy.⁴⁸

What impact does corporate emigration have on individuals? There is little doubt that by geographically diversifying Anglo and others are perceived to be expressing a note of disquiet over the longer-term prospects of the country. Many ordinary citizens become anxious when large corporations take measures to reduce their risk and exposure to a South African economy plagued by emerging market status. The psychological impact of this move on the fragile nerves of many skilled whites cannot be underestimated. For years they have been saying goodbye to many of their colleagues and neighbours who were emigrating, and now that the major companies and their employers are also 'jumping ship', where does this leave them and should they follow?

2.5 WHERE ARE THEY HEADING?

Language and cultural similarities, living standards, family ties, climate, and the demand for the skills of emigrants are decisive in determining where an emigrant will settle. Shortages of certain skills in a particular country will create a huge demand for emigrants with those skills, albeit temporarily, and will ensure an easy passage through the tangle of immigration bureaucracy and red tape. Statistics over the past few years indicate that South African emigrants overwhelmingly choose English-speaking, industrialised countries and 81% of South African emigrants settle in First World countries. Between 65% and 75% settle in the five most popular countries, namely the UK, the USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand.

The growing popularity of Australia and New Zealand in particular is an indication that many emigrants want to live where there are some kinds of cultural similarities, like language, sports such as rugby and cricket, huge open spaces and a similar climate. In spite of its climate, the UK remains a perpetually popular choice, but this



* Corporate emigration added a new dimension to the 'chicken-run' debate. Cartoonist Zapiro drew a headless 'Anglo' chicken running with his suitcase towards an aircraft that depicted the London Stock Market, with the caption 'Join the chicken run – Anglo's: a taste of Britain', *Sunday Times*, 18 October 1998.

is partly because of historic ties and because hundreds of thousands of South Africans have access to British passports and therefore to opportunities anywhere within the European Union. Because of the availability of work and its reputation as the premier emigration destination in the world, the USA remains a major destination for South African emigrants, especially professionals and IT specialists. Canada has also become increasingly popular because of its reputation of being the best country in the world in which to live in spite of its cold climate – it is also seen as a backdoor to the USA.

The most popular destinations for South African emigrants, according to official figures provided by the Statistics South Africa for 1996 to 1998, are listed in table 2.3:

Table 2.3

Country	1998	1997	1996
UK	26%	26%	23%
Australia	16%	11%	5%
Namibia	10%	5%	n/a
USA	8%	9%	10%
New Zealand	7%	11%	10%
Canada	5%	7%	8%

Emigrants not listed in the above table went to destinations such as Zimbabwe with 2,5% of emigrants in 1997, Germany with 2%, the Netherlands with 1,2%, Switzerland with 1%, Israel with 1%, Malawi with 1% and Zambia with 1%. Europe as a whole, excluding the UK, was the destination for close to one third of emigrants in 1998, according to Statistics South Africa.

When one considers the preferences of only those with professional qualifications, the USA is by far the most popular:

Table 2.4

Country	1998
USA	38%
UK	26%
Australia	19%
Canada	9%
New Zealand	5%

Taking both tables above into account, the six most popular destinations for South African emigrants over the past three years were:

Table 2.5

UK	25%
Australia	18%
USA	10,6%
New Zealand	10,3%
Canada	6,6%
Namibia	5%
(Rest of Europe)	25%

3 THE LOGISTICS OF EMIGRATION

Emigration is not just a matter of selling your home, finding a new owner for Rex the dog and buying a one-way ticket to a crime-free world of suburban bliss – Esann de Kock¹

I have lived here for 35 years. I shall leave with anguish. To leave my home and my friends, my country, will be like cutting off a limb – Anne Paton²

We will know our grandchildren mainly by courtesy of undersea cables – Denis Beckett³

Leaving South Africa for me is not a matter of simply packing my bags and going. My predecessors came out with Jan van Riebeeck in 1652 and there is a lot to be sorted out – former MD of Ocean Diamond Mining, André Louw⁴



3.1 HOW DIFFICULT IS IT TO EMIGRATE?

The presence of hundreds of thousands of South African emigrants all over the world is evidence that, irrespective of obstacles and sacrifices, emigration has become a realistic and logical choice for many predominantly white South Africans and is viewed as a readily available alternative to life in South Africa. However, at least four distinct obstacles face a typical emigrant: emotional and psychological barriers; the steep costs of emigration; the financial and administrative barriers erected by the South African authorities; the entry restrictions placed on emigration by various countries through a multitude of entry requirements.

The key to successful emigration lies in overcoming these barriers one by one, but even the most meticulous planning and the highest number of emigration points cannot always overcome what could be the biggest hurdle, namely the emotional costs of emigration – saying goodbye to family, friends, the family pet, to a particular lifestyle, traditions and familiar things, and to one's country of birth and all it represents – these are all the things that often prove to be the greatest obstacle.

This emotional aspect can be so overwhelming that it deters many prospective emigrants at the last minute or at least makes them postpone their move as long as they can, while it makes some return to South Africa after only a short time overseas. For this reason many countries follow a liberal emigration policy when it comes to the reuniting of families – for example in Canada, Australia and New Zealand it is possible for emigrants to sponsor parents, brothers and sisters, and sometimes even grandparents to enter these countries as immigrants.

Psychological and emotional aspects

It is not unusual for emigrants and the ones they leave behind to describe emigration as a kind of a 'death', for emigration can be a very traumatic experience. The psychological stress of leaving behind family, friends, contacts and familiar surroundings and exchanging these for a new alien environment acts as a deterrent to many prospective emigrants. Among the typical comments from emigrants describing the pain and emotional turmoil are the following:

Most people who emigrate do so after a great deal of agonising and soul-searching ... Emigration is one of the most stressful of life's experiences – emigrant⁵

It's not right to describe emigrating as a funeral, but it is a type of death ... When the plane took off from (Johannesburg Airport), I looked down and wondered what the hell I was doing ... some people go through emigration sobbing – Pam Nordon in Sydney⁶

When she finally got on the plane, [she] cried so much that the air hostess asked her if there had been a death in the family – emigrant, Sydney⁷

[He] talks about missing the 'five Fs' when assessing life in Australia: family, friends, finance, fellowship and familiar things – Barry X, Australia⁸

People may call it the chicken run, but emigration is the most painful thing you can ever do. I just long for those people who've been part of my life for 38 years – Jane de Jong, Perth⁹

This may also explain why so many people do not to use the term emigration, that is, because of its finality – instead they refer euphemistically to 'relocation' and to 'going overseas for a while' – in fact, as mentioned elsewhere, up to two thirds of

people leaving South Africa each year do not formally 'emigrate', although this is probably largely for practical reasons rather than emotional ones.

Many emigrants have to cope with feelings of guilt at leaving the country in which they grew up and which educated them – they are often accused of having lived off the fat of the land and wanting to jump ship when the going gets tough. However, up to two thirds of emigrants, according to an Idasa survey, want to stay and help build South Africa, but feel compelled to leave because of crime. As a result, they feel unfairly targeted by accusations of cowardice and claims that they are not 'real South Africans'. Such guilt feelings will probably not deter an emigrant from leaving South Africa, but they do have a psychological impact.

In addition, once they have committed themselves to going (and especially when formal emigrants sign their emigration forms), many emigrants develop serious doubts about whether they are doing the right thing. These feelings intensify as their date of departure draws closer and they begin to question their decision. Typical questions may include the following: if so many people talk about emigrating, why do so few actually go? How will they cope with the weather and how long will it take to make new friends? What if they can't get jobs? The worse time is the period shortly before they depart and when they see their friends, family and other people carrying on with their lives as usual – planning their next beach holiday at Hermanus, 'Plet', Sun City or in the Kruger National Park, getting excited about the coming rugby or cricket season and the Springboks' chances against the All Blacks – for many emigrants the sense of isolation starts long before they board the plane for Sydney or London.



That these emigrants are torn between their love for the country and the fear of crime in itself is a tremendously complex psychological issue and is discussed in a later chapter. Emigration also places strain on relationships with family and friends who oppose the emigrant's choice. According to Mark Lister, brother of Truth Commissioner Richard Lister, his decision to emigrate to Australia was met with anger and resentment from friends and relatives, which is not an unusual response.¹⁰ The following comments re-enforce the perception that many people are reluctant emigrants but feel they have no choice:

My daughter and her friends love their home. They love South Africa. Like thousands of others they welcomed change with the innocence and exuberance of youth. They were proud to be part of the rainbow nation, but now, like hundreds similarly affected by crime, they say they must go

– driven out by a madness that has gripped this wonderful country and is slowly smashing it to bits – Liz Clarke, journalist*

Last year [referring to the 1994 elections] I was so elated – standing in queues to vote was the most incredible feeling. It was the first time I could walk around and look everybody in the eye. I was acquiring my freedom, too. But then with the first hijacking I got my first taste of fear . . . I am not prepared to sacrifice my future and my children's future. I just don't want to live with this fear – anonymous emigrant about to leave for Australia.**

Fear of the unknown that awaits an emigrant adds to the psychological stress. Some emigrants, especially those who are sponsored by family, have never even been outside South Africa, while most others may have visited another country but never actually lived in one. Although many emigrants take along some of their household possessions, clothes and books, many others go with only their bulging suitcases.***

All emigrants though, both official and unofficial, have to say goodbye to things that they took for granted and start anew. Emigrants have to make new friends, build up new social and business contacts, apply for jobs, convert their degrees and professional qualifications, and do mundane things like apply for drivers' licences and social security cards and become accustomed to the local Sydney, New York, Liverpool and other accents. Many emigrants suddenly realise that they have to start all over again and that their status and achievements in South Africa mean little in their host country: 'In Jo'burg I was popular and busy – here (in Sydney) the phone didn't ring. Emigration has been the best leveller that I've ever experienced' – Sharon Diamond, in Sydney.¹¹

For this reason, age is another distinct factor that has to be considered – the older the person, the more difficult it becomes to adapt to a new environment, make new friends and find work. To quote Fourie and Joubert:



* Liz Clarke, correspondent of the *Saturday Argus*, 3–4 May 98, after her daughter was assaulted at her home by five thugs and had her car hijacked.

** An anonymous Johannesburg-based accountant about to emigrate to Australia, contrasting her elation of being part of the South Africa's 1994-miracle and her despair of being caught in the crime wave, *Vancouver Sun*, 18 December 1995.

*** Many emigrants ship their South African wine collections to their new homelands and quickly learn how to make their own boerewors and biltong.

The net present value of migration formula shows us that older migrants have fewer years to recoup their migration investment. Older people also have higher levels of human capital that is specific to their present employers and this capital cannot always be transferred to a new employer. Thus, the remunerations will be lower at the new employer . . . Taking all of the above into account, we can state that 'All else being equal, the greater a person's age, the less likely he or she is to migrate.'¹²

Another possible psychological obstacle is fear of how one will be received in a foreign country as an immigrant. Fourie and Joubert describe this not just as a fear, but as the reality of 'foreigner negativity' which South African emigrants may experience in the form of hostility once they arrive at their destination. The reasons for these feelings could be that the locals feel that the immigrants take their jobs, or feel threatened by the foreign culture, especially if emigrants don't assimilate quickly.¹³ This hostility may not always be directed against South African emigrants in particular, but could be a result of the growing worldwide backlash against emigrants and refugees in general.

However, white South Africans do carry the particular burden of their apartheid history, which sometimes causes ill-feeling among locals, as is shown in the discussion of emigrants in New Zealand in a later chapter. A further issue that can result in foreign hostility is the attachment and the value that many white South Africans place on material possessions, status and titles, which can cause offence or elicit ridicule in more egalitarian societies such as Australia, New Zealand and Canada.



In addition, South African emigrants may also feel ill at ease in countries where the culture or faiths differ sharply from their own.¹⁴ However, this is not really an issue in any of the five top emigration destinations.

To prepare themselves better for the emotional and practical shocks that inevitably accompany the emigration process, prospective emigrants are advised to do their homework properly through research on the Internet, read newspapers at foreign embassies and, most important, discuss the logistics and implications of emigration with friends and family members who have already emigrated.

Emigrants will do well to consider the following advice when deciding to take the big step:

- Prepare and plan thoroughly and try to find work before they go.
- Allow themselves at least five years to settle down.

- Do not complain, and try to adapt to the ways of the host country.
- Be prepared to do/accept any kind of work initially.
- Make sure that the whole family unit is united in its desire to emigrate.
- Use the many opportunities that will present themselves.
- Expect setbacks, disappointments, culture shock and homesickness.
- Make use of networking and support systems.
- Do not try to duplicate another South Africa somewhere else.¹⁵

Financial aspects

A rough estimate of the major costs of emigration is as follows, using Australia as a benchmark:¹⁶

Table 3.1

Emigration application with Australian High Commission	R 3 500
Minimum legal fees for application	R 3 500
One-way tickets for example to Sydney for a family of four	R 16 000
Shipping a container from Cape Town to Sydney	R 25 000 (to R 40 000)
Storing household effects in Sydney for month	R 2 000
Quarantine (3 months in Pretoria and 4 months in Sydney)	R 16 000
Flying large family dog to Australia	R 4 000
Total	R 70 000 (to R 85 000)


The biggest cost component of moving overseas is physically transporting the contents of a house. The South African Reserve Bank stipulates that unless people emigrate officially they are not entitled to take along their household effects with one or two exceptions. They will therefore not have to incur the moving costs, but the downside is that furniture and household effects will then have to be purchased overseas. In certain countries where the cost of living is relatively low, such as Canada, it might be possible to furnish a house with the money saved on not taking a container across – R40 000 can buy a lot of furniture, depending on personal taste and requirements.

Because of the recent relaxing of exchange controls, there are exceptions to the Reserve Bank's rules: the first is that people who 'relocate', that is, go overseas temporarily (presumably fewer than five years), can take along household goods and personal belongings on condition that they bring these back with them when they return; also, anyone who leaves the country unofficially can take along household and personal effects worth up to R50 000, without prior official approval or tax

clearance forms or other bureaucracy – all that is required is a written note to the removal company that the items packed in a container are not worth more than R50 000, and they can be insured at replacement value.

Although animal travel companies claim that business has never been better, the exorbitant cost of transporting and in particular the quarantine of domestic animals result in the majority of emigrants emigrating without their pets. This leads to a great degree of additional stress for finding a safe home for pets is never easy.* While the UK, Australia and New Zealand adhere to strict quarantine regulations that could add between R16 000 and R20 000 to the transportation cost and result in pets being held in quarantine for up to eight months, Canada has no quarantine regulations and it is therefore considerably cheaper to move animals there – all that is required is a rabies certificate and the transportation costs. A pet travel agency such as 'Animal Travel Services' of Cape Town asks about R5 000 to transport a medium- to large-sized dog like a Rhodesian Ridgeback or German Shepherd to Canada via Europe, and close to R6 000 for a large St Bernard-type dog.

Companies which specialise in international removals such as Britannia, Econo-Freight, Pickfords, Eliot, Stuttaford Van Lines, Magna and others are all doing brisk business and have all become familiar names in suburban streets as growing numbers of families depart for foreign shores. The various removal companies offer basically the same service and follow the same procedure to physically move the emigrant's household effects to the country of destination. Attending a moving seminar provides the emigrant with useful information on how to go about the whole removal business, which can appear daunting at first.



A typical removal company is Magna International Movers, a company which claims that its 'professionalism will move you'. Magna offers regular free (and well-attended) seminars countrywide and its affable managing director and presenter, David Buchanan (a 'lad from Glasgow'), often has his spellbound audience in stitches with recollections of his experiences in the business of international moving.



- A typical emotionally-draining story is that of the Slatem family of Cape Town, who emigrated to New Zealand in 1999 to join up with their children, who had left earlier. After the Slatems decided that they could not afford taking their beloved boxer dogs, which were like children to them, they succeeded, after a lengthy search, to find a decent-looking owner for the dogs. However, when they went to check on the dogs the next day to make sure that they were being looked after, they found the bewildered-looking dogs running around in the street. The Slatems took the dogs back immediately and after terrible agony, called in a veterinarian to their home to put the dogs down the night before they left for Auckland.

Although most of these prospective emigrants, predominantly white and mostly between 20 and 40 years old, have already qualified to emigrate, attending this seminar brings them closer to the reality of what it means to physically transplant themselves to another country. For the first time many of them hear terminology such as 20 ft (30 cubic metres of packing space) and 40 ft containers (60 cubic metres), 'bubble packs', 'corro wrap', 'crating', 'MP336 and NEP forms, storage, transit times, marine insurance and blocked accounts. Most listen in awe and takes notes religiously, and it is obvious from the questions that many are nervous or slightly apprehensive. Buchanan tries to reassure them by exclaiming: 'It's OK to move, don't worry about negative propaganda' and urges them to 'be positive' to 'take one day at a time', to 'communicate with your spouse and children' and to regard the relocation as an 'adventure'. At the end of the evening many of these prospective emigrants appear to leave the venue slightly dazed by the amount of information they had received and more than a little shocked by the costs of moving. However, they seem excited and the animated discussions that continue long after the seminar ends indicate that for most of them there will be no turning back.

Rules and regulations


Traditionally South African authorities, especially under the former NP regimes, have placed draconian administrative and financial barriers in the way of emigrants, as part of their strategy to contain the flow of whites and capital out of South Africa, particularly when the country became increasingly isolated and the world more hostile. Although the NP government took some tentative steps towards relaxing foreign exchange regulations in the early 1990s, the ANC-led government began to relax these restrictions almost immediately after it came to power in 1994. Apart from ever-increasing travel allowances and a more relaxed approach to emigration allowances, Finance Minister Trevor Manuel for the first time allowed individuals and companies to invest money overseas.

The rules governing emigration and travel allowances change constantly, and the amount of money that one can take depends greatly on whether one is leaving the country officially or unofficially. As of February 2000 the regulations for emigration allowances were as follows: emigrants who leave the country through official channels are allowed to take with them R1 million worth of personal effects such as household goods, cars and jewellery, a settling-in allowance of R400 000 per family (if married with children) and a further R130 000 travel allowance per family member older than 12 (R40 000 if younger than 12). This means that a family of four (with children over 12) can take R1 920 000 when they emigrate officially and slightly less if the children are younger. An independent emigrant older than 18 can

take a settling-in allowance of R200 000. Any money that is left behind has to be placed in a blocked account with a bank. All the income from this money can be taken overseas, but the capital (up to R75 000 per year) can only be used to cover living expenses when visiting South Africa, while additional money can be used for donations and a few other personal expenses in South Africa.

Should a family of four who want to leave South Africa decide to skip the red tape and leave unofficially, they can only take along their travel allowance of R130 000 per person, that is, R520 000 (with two children older than 12) and household effects worth less than R50 000. The benefits of leaving unofficially are that it saves the time and effort of obtaining all the official documents and waiting for a tax clearance certificate from the Receiver of Revenue, and it makes it simple to return to South Africa if the grass is not greener on the other side. In addition there is a way to get past some of the restrictions – it is technically possible, although legally a ‘grey area’, to regard one’s overseas stay as temporary and return to South Africa every year to collect the R130 000 travel allowance – the only requirements are that one’s ticket must be bought in South Africa and that the money must only be spent on travel and subsistence.¹⁷

If an emigrant has already invested some of the R750 000 that he or she is allowed as a South African resident overseas, this amount will be subtracted from his or her settling-in allowance.



While the amount of money that emigrants are allowed to take with them may sound a lot, its value diminishes rapidly when converted into the currency of all top emigration destinations – for example R1 translates into about 14c in the USA or 9 pence in the UK. Because of a weak currency it is much harder for an emigrant to maintain a similar lifestyle in most emigration destinations if he earns the same sort of salary. The following example illustrates this problem: if an emigrant earns a salary of, for example, a typical financial manager in Johannesburg of R325 000 (\$50 000), he or she will have to earn about \$64 000 in Wellington, New Zealand, about \$147 000 in New York and almost FF700 000 in Paris to match his or her Johannesburg lifestyle¹⁸. The website www.homefair.com provides a tool for calculating comparable local-foreign lifestyle/earnings ratios.

With regard to insurance policies or retirement annuities, Martin Spring, editor of *Personal Finance* newsletter, advises emigrants that South African insurers will maintain the life cover of an emigrant for a reasonable period until new arrangements have taken effect. Spring warns, however, that emigrants can only transfer their insurability, and not the actual contract with its accumulated benefits. If

an insurer in the country to which an emigrant moves is associated with that emigrant's South African insurance company, he or she should receive the same amount of life cover, with a premium for age and gender, and a medical examination will not be required. However, the investment value of a policy, that is, the amount payable at death or maturity over and above the life cover, is not normally transferable to the country of emigration, but can be transferred as part of the settling allowance. Spring suggests that with other life insurance policies the best option would be to keep on paying monthly premiums, rather than cashing in the policies or discontinuing premiums.¹⁹

Administratively, emigrants have to overcome some red tape: a person who emigrates officially has to obtain an MP336, that is, a request for a settling-in allowance, which can be obtained through a commercial bank. To obtain such a form, emigrants have to have a tax clearance certificate from the Receiver of Revenue to certify that their tax affairs are in order. An NEP form is also required, which has to be attested by a commercial bank and allows emigrants to take their household effects along, should these be worth more than R50 000. Should an emigrant want to ship his or her wine collection, an export permit is required from the Directorate for Plant and Quality Control, while a police clearance certificate and an export permit are required if he or she wishes to ship a car.

A disturbing trend which has emerged recently is that a number of people are leaving the country without honouring their debts. These emigrants regard their debts in the same light as other problems they are trying to escape. Since it is almost impossible for creditors to chase after them and use legal means to get their money or goods back, they normally get away with it, as long as they intend never to return to South Africa. This kind of activity is simply a matter of breaking the law, which clearly states that goods bought on credit cannot be moved anywhere until they have been paid for in full. Still, the law does not seem to deter such unscrupulous people who wish to emigrate away from their financial obligations. It is becoming more of the norm now for removal companies, debt collectors and retailers selling on credit to share information about customers whom they suspect of wanting to take this route.

Entry requirements of selected countries

Entry requirements for emigrants vary from country to country and depend on whether the person falls into the category of an independent applicant, a business applicant, a family sponsorship applicant or a refugee. This chapter provides a brief overview of the entry requirements for the five top emigration countries – the

purpose is primarily to highlight the constraints posed by emigration law in each country and is in no way meant to be a guide to their emigration requirements. More detailed information is obtainable at all the embassies or high commissions in Pretoria or at their websites on the Internet as listed below.

United Kingdom

About 800 000 people in South Africa have British passports and more are eligible through parents/grandparents – the UK's 'right of return' clause provides applicants with temporary residence and a work permit for four years before applicants can apply for permanent residence. The information on emigration below was obtained from the British High Commission and from the website: <http://www.britain.org.za/visa/visainfo.html>

There are several categories of emigration and relocation to the UK for non-British nationals residing in South Africa. Apart from the two-year work permit for those below 27 years (or four-year permit if one has a British parent or grandparent), there are various emigration categories: for example for Commonwealth citizens with a grandparent born in the UK (ancestry); for joining one's family in the UK; the right of abode category; as a self-employed business person; as an investor; as a retired person of independent means; or as a dependant of someone in one of these categories.



The rules regarding the right of abode are as follows. If an applicant's parents were born in the UK he or she may be a British citizen or have the right of abode in the UK. All British citizens have the right of abode. Even if they are not citizens they could still have the right of abode if they were Commonwealth citizens before 1983 and had a parent who at the time of their birth was a citizen of the UK and colonies and had received his or her citizenship by being born in the UK, or if he or she was a Commonwealth citizen and is or was the wife of a man with the right of abode.

For Commonwealth citizens with a grandparent born in the UK the rules stipulate that they must be at least 17 years old, and they must have a job offer or genuinely intend to seek employment in the UK. The ancestry visa grants applicants entry into the UK for four years.

Business or self-employed applicants or investors must bring with them at least £200 000 of their own money to invest in the business, and these investments must create new, paid, full-time employment for at least two people who are already settled in the UK.

United States of America

The American system of emigration is reasonably straightforward, even if the process of obtaining an immigrant visa is not. To become a legal permanent resident, an alien must first be admitted as an immigrant. There are three basic methods for obtaining this immigrant visa: through a family relationship with a US citizen or legal permanent resident; through employment; through the Green Card Lottery, an annual worldwide event which is meant to ensure that immigrants to the USA come in equal proportions from all countries in the world. In 1998 a total of 55 000 lottery visas were granted out of millions of applicants.

Immigrants to the United States are divided into two categories: those who may obtain permanent residence status without numerical limitation; and those who are subject to an annual limitation. Unlimited immigrants cover immediate relatives, that is, a spouse, widow(er), minor unmarried children of a US citizen, and the parents of a US citizen who is over 21. Former US lawful permanent residents who are returning to the US after a stay of more than one year abroad also fall in this category.

Limited immigrants refer to those 675 000 people per year who fall within the limits set by the US government. They fit into three sub-categories: family-based; employment-based (priority workers; professionals holding advanced degrees and

people of exceptional ability; professionals; skilled and unskilled workers; special immigrants; and investors with about \$500 000 to \$1 000 000 capital who will create employment for at least ten unrelated persons; and the immigrant visa lottery. More detailed information is obtainable at <http://www.usembassy.org.uk/ukimvisa.html>

Canada

Immigrants to Canada can enter as independent applicants, on business visas, family visas or as refugees. Business immigrants are people who enter as investors, entrepreneurs or self-employed persons. Family-class immigrants are sponsored by a relative such as a parent, fiancé or spouse. Refugees are people seeking protection because of fear of persecution in their own country. Canada accepts between 200 000 and 225 000 immigrants each year.

A prospective South African emigrant who wants to apply for a visa to enter Canada as an independent applicant has to meet a minimum number of points, a requirement needed to set the process in motion. If applicants obtain the minimum number of points, according to the self-evaluation test forms obtainable on the Internet from the Canadian High Commission, they have to submit their application forms to that office in Pretoria. A R4 000 non-refundable application fee (plus a further R3 000 landing fee should the application be successful) should accompany the application, and thereafter applicants must undergo a medical examination by a designated physician, ensure that sufficient funds are available to support themselves and their dependants, and obtain police clearances certificates – the waiting period is normally between six and nine months.



The points system is based on ten criteria, each weighing a different number of points – a minimum of 70 points is needed to qualify:

- Age – a maximum of 10 scored if an applicant is between 21 and 44 years old, and zero if older than 49;
- Education – a maximum of 16 points on offer if an applicant has a second or third-level university degree such as a master's or PhD, with other lower qualifications worth 15, 13, 10 or fewer points;
- Education/training – a maximum of 18 points based on the length of training, education, and/or apprenticeship required for this occupation in Canada;
- Occupation – a maximum of 10 points. In 1999 the following occupations were among those which scored 10 points: occupational therapists, radiation therapists, speech and language pathologists, audiologists, chefs, computer programmers, and computer systems analysts;

- Arranged employment – a job offer by a Canadian employer equals 10 points;
- Work experience – a maximum of 8 points;
- Language ability – a maximum of 15 points – fluency in both English and French is worth 15 points, but fluency in only one language is worth 9 points;
- Demographic factor – this is pre-determined by the government and will automatically give the applicant 8 points;
- Personal suitability – a maximum of 10 points are on offer, depending on how successfully an applicant is expected to settle in Canada – the average score is 6 points (applicants should have at least 60 points before these points are added);
- Relatives in Canada – a brother, sister, mother, father, grandparent, aunt, uncle, niece or nephew who is a permanent resident is worth 5 points.

More detailed information on the points system and other requirements is available at <http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/immigr/index.html>

New Zealand

Of the five top emigration destinations, New Zealand currently appears to be the least difficult country to enter as an emigrant from South Africa. There are four main categories for residence applications in New Zealand: general skills; business investor; family; and humanitarian.

- The general skills category is a system whereby applicants score points for a number of factors such as qualifications, work experience, an offer of employment and age. To be granted residence under the general skills category applicants must score enough points to meet the pass mark and all other requirements. Applications scoring the minimum of 25 points or more will be approved only if they meet the relevant weekly pass mark. This category is rated, first, according to 'employability factors', whereby applicants must score between 1 and 10 points for work experience and a minimum of 10 points for qualifications; a maximum of 5 points can be allocated if there is a genuine offer of employment in New Zealand, dependent on certain requirements; a maximum of 10 points can be allocated if the applicant is between 25 and 29 years old, but those above 50 years will get 0 points. The second element in this category is 'settlement factors', whereby a maximum of 7 points can be allocated for funds transferred to New Zealand (for example 2 points for N\$200 000); a maximum of 2 points are given for the principal applicant's spouse's qualifications; a maximum of 2 points can be scored for work experience gained lawfully in New Zealand; a further 3 points can be


allocated for a family sponsor who must be able to provide financial support and accommodation for at least the first 12 months of residency in New Zealand.

- The business investor category allows applicants to score points for factors such as investment funds, business experience, qualifications and age.
- The family category is available to those applicants who are in a genuine and stable marriage, de facto or homosexual relationship with a New Zealand citizen or resident; or have immediate family members who are New Zealand citizens or residents and who live permanently in New Zealand.
- The humanitarian category is available to those applicants who have the support of a close family member who is a New Zealand citizen or residence permit holder and whose circumstances are causing serious physical or emotional harm to the applicant or the New Zealand party that can only be resolved by the applicant being granted residence in New Zealand.

For more details contact <http://www.immigration.govt.nz/migration/general.html>

Australia

Australia's migration programme emphasises skilled migrants, that is, migrants with a good track record in business, a high level of education and occupational skills, or outstanding talents in a particular field. Of the 70 000 places in the annual migration programme half are allocated to skilled migrants, with the balance being made up of family-sponsored migrants and those qualifying under special eligibility arrangements. In addition, Australia has a humanitarian programme (12 000 places) which caters for refugees and other people who have left their homes and countries because of war or civil strife or who have experienced human rights abuses. More information is obtainable from the Australian Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs – at <http://www.immi.gov.au/allforms/migrate.htm>



Most emigrants enter Australia under the independent migration category or under the category of business migration and retirement. 'Business owner' immigration applicants are required to deposit A\$750 000 in Australian government bonds and they must have been successful owners or managers of businesses in which they had at least a 10% equity – the value of this business or other business interests should amount to at least R1 million. Other business categories are 'senior executives', 'starting a business in Australia' and 'starting a regional business in Australia'.

Under the independent migration category, points are awarded for a number of factors and the minimum requirement is 110 points. Applicants must be under 45 years when applying and will receive a maximum of 30 points if they are between 18 and 29 years; they must have sufficient ability in the English language for working in Australia – the ability to communicate effectively in English, that is reading, speaking, understanding and writing, is worth a maximum of 20 points; applicants must have post-secondary (such as university or trade) qualifications (in some cases substantial relevant work experience may be acceptable); applicants must nominate a skilled occupation which fits their skills and qualifications – this nominated occupation is worth up to 60 points, – but applicants must have been in paid employment in a skilled occupation for at least 12 of the 18 months before they apply. The initial non-refundable application fee for the principal applicant is A\$1 075, or about R4 000.

If potential emigrants discover that they do not meet Australian entry requirements, there are other, less conventional ways to enter the country. In 1998 Australia had the dubious distinction of becoming the first country to officially host a white South African refugee from crime. Cheryl Kennedy from Johannesburg and her two daughters applied for refugee status in Australia because they feared for their lives in a ‘country where criminals were waging war on ordinary citizens’ (she claimed that her brother had been murdered, she had been mugged five times, and a gun had been put against her daughter’s head). With travellers’ cheques worth R31 000 Kennedy simply packed her bags, bought air tickets and flew into Perth on a visitor’s visa. On arrival she bought a car, found accommodation at a campsite, and enrolled her children in a local school in Broome in Western Australia. After the Australian government refused her application, she requested a review and the outcome is pending.²⁰

3.2 THE EMIGRATION CONSULTING INDUSTRY

... one of white South Africa’s pastimes: finding a way to get the hell out of this country – Jeremy Gordin²¹

Although emigration consultancies provide a service which many prospective emigrants find useful, it is also perfectly possible to apply without their assistance. The information provided by the high commissions of Canada, Australia and New Zealand is particularly straightforward and easily obtainable by mail or on the Internet. Consular officials are generally helpful, if overly bureaucratic at times, and the whole application procedure is time-consuming but relatively simple.

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Once an emigrant has completed an assessment form and obtained the minimum number of points required for residency, it is a matter of requesting the application forms from the embassy, filling these out, getting originals or in some cases certified copies of all required documentation, getting police clearance certificates, and together with a non-refundable application fee, sending the whole application package, preferably by courier, to the embassy. Processing times can take from six months to two years, depending on the country and the backlog of applications.

Should the point systems and stringent entry criteria appear confusing to the average prospective emigrant, a whole industry of emigration consultants has emerged to assist emigrants in understanding the complexities of applying and ensuring that they meet the strict criteria. They will charge a few thousand rand in the form of processing or consulting fees, which could be viewed as money well spent or, in other cases, a complete waste. On average, an emigration consultant could charge between R12 000 and R20 000 per family for handling the paperwork and all the other aspects of applying for a visa.

Emigration consulting has become big business in South Africa. Sunday newspapers are filled with advertisements by emigration agents and a multitude of weekly emigration seminars. The Business Section of the *Sunday Times* on any Sunday in 1999 contained 10 to 15 advertisements by emigration consultants. Among these, with their slogans, were SBS International ('A complete and professional one-stop service to Australia'), International Immigration Alliance ('Where in the world do you want to be?'), Four Corners Migration Specialists, and Execu Immigration ('We can be of assistance with all your immigration needs').

A typical emigration consultancy based in, say, Canada, will occasionally offers free emigration seminars in South Africa and even a free personal assessment of the emigration prospects of individual clients. During an emigration seminar consultants inform prospective clients of the points system, the latest changes to Canadian migration law, and the costs involved in applying for and making use of their services. They provide an evaluation of the relative weight of each category in the points system and general information on the average income, taxes, cost of living and social security system in Canada. Their fee amounts to roughly US\$3 500 for a independent worker application and US\$4 000 for a business application.

Similar information on other countries is available from companies such as Protea Management Services, Australia–Canada–New Zealand Consultants, Network Migration Services, and the Australian Business Migration Network. A free service is offered by Soft Landings: Newcomers Assistance Inc Canada. This group was founded by an ex-South African, Harris Abro, and his goal is to provide prospective emigrants with information on what to expect in Canada and put them in touch with service providers in the emigration industry, including Canadian banks, emigration lawyers, furniture removers, insurance brokers and placement agencies. Soft Landings operates on a 'not-for-profit' basis and covers its costs by charging service providers an advertising fee. Its Internet address is at <http://www.softlandings.co.za>. The 'Australia South Africa Connection' provides information on emigration to Australia, lists hundreds of South African-owned businesses in Australia, and provides useful information about the country itself – it publishes a booklet and owns its own website at www.ozza.com.au.

Emigration seminars have become part of South African social life – it is not unusual to see crowds lining up outside seminar rooms in hotels booked by emigration consultancies on any specific night in Cape Town, Johannesburg and Durban. Since many people who are considering emigrating prefer to keep their intentions low-key for various reasons (not wanting to risk jobs or alienate family members) until quite close to their departure, it is amusing sometimes to see the embarrassed, surprised or

delighted responses when people who know one another socially or from work bump into each other at these seminars – after the knee-jerk reaction of ‘You too?’, the discussion quickly turns to newly discovered aspects of mutual concern such as where to?, when? and why? Should they discover that they are going to the same country or, even better, the same city, contact numbers are quickly exchanged, for this is a clear case of the-more-the-merrier – emigrants are firm believers in the strength of numbers and draw comfort from the knowledge that they will not be alone in a place like Auckland, San Diego or Toronto.

Charlotte Bauer of the *Sunday Times* attended one such seminar and she provided an entertaining summation of a mechanics of a typical seminar:

Couples silently took their seats, many clutching notebooks, while a video showed the sights and culinary delights of ‘marvellous Melbourne’ ... A lone black couple stood out among a sea of anxious white faces ... Towards the end of the seminar [the emigration lawyer] introduced the prospective clients to the dreaded ‘points system’, by which dreams of living in a condo on Sydney Harbour hang or perish. The audience grew tense with concentration as he explained Australia’s ever-tightening immigration noose ... Afterwards, an obedient line of couples queued up to buy an ‘Info Pack’ ... Mr and Mrs Average looked dazed but hopeful as they left the seminar.²²



The anxiety on the faces of those who attended Bauer’s emigration seminar tells its own story: these people are not emigrating because of the ‘culinary delights’ of Melbourne or to find a ‘condo’ in Sydney Harbour, as insinuated so flippantly by Bauer – their reason for ‘wanting to get the hell out of here’ is much more modest – they simply want to escape from the relentless onslaught of violent crime that is ravaging South Africa and its people. This is the core message of the next chapter.



4 WHY DO PEOPLE LEAVE SOUTH AFRICA?

All of them, white and black alike, recounted the same litany of motivations that made them leave SA: security, security and more security ... fear, it seems, is the most potent currency of our time – Peter Godwin¹

Yet, we must think about our futures and we fear for it in South Africa ... We just want a better life ... Free from racial conflict, bombs, Third World economy and hair-raising crime rates – M Carstens²

Sometimes I lie awake at night worrying about our future. What would happen to my children if I was hijacked or shot during a mugging? ... Crime is not the only reason for my decision. Standards of health and education are dropping and child abuse is rife ... If wanting the basic rights of security, safety and prosperity makes me a coward, then I am one – F Nkwanvana³

They no longer feared for their children. They had realised part of their parental responsibility of creating an environment where their children were relatively safe from harm. It had meant leaving South Africa – Journalist Phylicia Oppelt, who previously held the view that emigrants were simply cowards⁴


South African emigrants are motivated by a number of typical 'push' factors and these are countered by many 'pull' factors. The typical emigrant will list various 'push' factors in order of importance, among which will be uncertainty about the future, falling standards, the economy, affirmative action and bleak job prospects, and loss of faith in the ANC-led government, but most importantly, as the quotes above indicate, he or she will list violent crime as the real reason for wanting to emigrate. Surveys indicate that 60% of emigrants regard crime as the major reason for leaving South Africa, while 19% cite concern for their children's education. A total of 15% of emigrants said that they were looking for a better quality of life, 14% wanted better prospects in general, 20% were concerned about healthcare, and 10% cited the government, the economy and affirmative action as reasons for emigrating.⁵

In this chapter each of these issues will be examined in the context in which it contributes to emigration from South Africa. The main focus is on crime and the lack

of personal security insofar as these are the major driving forces stoking the exodus from South Africa. Other concerns raised by emigrants revolve around other socio-economic and political problems, which in reality are problems which most countries share with South Africa to greater or lesser degrees. On the whole they are non-life-threatening issues which can be debated in Parliament, can be exposed by a free and objective media, and ultimately can be viewed as challenges to overcome – in other words, these are issues which in theory should not constitute compelling reasons for emigrating. Nonetheless, they are consistently raised by emigrants, in conjunction with crime, to explain why they are leaving South Africa.

Therefore, while few South Africans would emigrate purely on the grounds that some Mpumalanga official stole a few million rand or a director-general runs a soccer team from his office, hundreds of thousands leave because they fear for their lives in a country infested with crime and lawlessness. Crime has reached such epidemic proportions that it extends way beyond what is acceptable and bearable to ordinary citizens. Crime has taken the country into a state of anarchy with the highest or second- and third-highest rates of rape, murder, car hijackings and violent crime in the world. This is not a normal state of affairs.

Of additional concern is the growing perception that the government is either unwilling or unable to doing anything about it, and even if it was committed to changing matters, that the crime situation may have deteriorated to such an extent that it can't be turned around over the short term or even the medium term. These perceptions are the reasons that people lose hope and are the most potent push-factors behind emigration.



4.1 CRIME: 'THE CIVIL WAR THAT NEVER HAPPENED'

South Africa is sick. Apartheid is gone, but its evil social engineering has left behind a monster of crime and barbarous violence terrorising the country with fear, rape and death – editorial in Canada's national newspaper⁶

Let us not mince our words. This country is in a state of civil war, a war between the forces of law and order and the criminal class, and there is no doubt about who is winning – Stephen Mulholland⁷

Kill, plunder, rape, destroy – that's the language of the new South Africa . . . We are in the heart of darkness – let nobody tell you otherwise – Liz Clarke, journalist⁸

I have always loved this country passionately, and always will ... But I am scared ... very scared – M Carstens⁹

Violent crime and barbarous violence, the 'monster' that is terrorising South Africa and devouring its people at a rate of approximately 25 000 per year, is described by journalist Mike Nichols as 'the civil war that never happened'. Nichols was referring to the widely held belief prior to the country's successful transition to democracy in 1994 that a bloody racial conflagration and civil war would be the natural outcome of the country's racial and political set-up. However, he argues, instead of a civil war South Africa is experiencing a wave of violent crime that is equal in intensity and in the number of lives lost to a full-scale civil war.

The killing fields of South Africa

The killing fields of Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge regime cost the lives of over one million people in a murderous campaign to transform it into an agricultural socialist paradise. In 1997 in Rwanda a campaign of genocide by the extremist Hutus against the Tutsis led to the death of over one million people. Ethnic cleansing and the brutal secessionist wars in the republics of the former Yugoslavia led to the deaths of 10 000 people in Croatia in 1991, and 250 000 died in the vicious war in Bosnia-Herzegovina between 1992 and 1995.¹⁰ Outside these volatile regions where civil war and genocide are the order of the day, South Africa, along with drug-crazed Colombia and gangster-ridden Russia, leads the world in per capita murder, and in sheer numbers the South African murder rate rivals even that of countries involved in civil war.


In the nineties South Africa's own killing fields led to the non-political deaths of approximately 250 000 South Africans who were criminally murdered in their homes, in their cars, on the streets, on sportsfields and even in places of worship. Of this number about 150 000 died during the six-year period of democracy between 1994 and the end of 1999. The victims were predominantly ordinary men, women and children going about their day-to-day business who became prey to ruthless killers who robbed, abducted, raped, tortured and murdered them at a rate and with a level of impunity that is almost beyond comprehension.

To put it differently: 25 000 innocent South Africans are being killed each year, or 67 each day. This is the equivalent of a fully laden jumbo jet, carrying 300 South Africans, crashing almost every four days and killing all on board. Should this happen, it would be a national disaster, air travel in South Africa would come to a dead halt, and the country would come to a standstill – people would then travel by

car or on foot only, setting the country back 90-odd years before the advent of air travel.

In all, about 750 000 violent crimes are reported each year, or one every 17 seconds. With regard to other types of crime, such as car hijackings, house break-ins, attempted murder, serious assault, and rape in particular, South Africa has also achieved the reputation of a world leader. About 49 000 cases of rape were reported in 1998, that is, about 134 per day, or one every 10 minutes.

Ironically, despite South Africa's former reputation as a country of extreme political violence, the number of political deaths in the country pales virtually into insignificance compared to South Africa's murder rate. For example, approximately 300 000 innocent people were murdered in South Africa during the 12-year period between 1985 and 1994. In comparison, the total number of deaths resulting from the low-intensity civil war between the ANC and the IFP in KwaZulu-Natal over the past two decades amounted to about 20 000. Furthermore, the total number of political deaths during the 12-year period between 1985 and 1996 was just over 23 000, of which 15 000 were incurred during the tense transitional period between February 1990 and April 1994.¹¹ In other words, the total number of political deaths during the struggle to free South Africa from the apartheid regime was significantly lower than the number of murders in the same period: for each political death in the cause of destroying apartheid, 13 innocent people were murdered by fellow South Africans. This pattern still persists, except that the number of political deaths had fallen to insignificant numbers by 1999.



By way of comparison, one look at the rest of the world will illustrate why emigration is such an attractive option to shell-shocked South Africans. The average South African murder rate over the past ten years hovers between 50 and 60 per 100 000 people, or about 65 murders per day, the third highest in the world after Russia and Columbia. The most recent murder rate (in 1999) is 55 per 100 000 people, and although it has dropped from 59 in 1997, it remains very high.¹² The world average is about 5 murders per 100 000 population, while in the USA the figure was 6 per 100 000 people in 1998. In 1998 the total number of murders in the USA, with a population of close to 300 million, was 17 000, which was less than South Africa with a population of 40 million. New Zealand, with a population of 3,5 million, recorded only 47 murders in 1998.* The murder rate for Canada was 1,9



* If New Zealand's murder rate was the same as that of South Africa, about 2 250 people would have been killed in New Zealand in 1998 instead of the actual figure of 47.

per 100 000 in 1997; for England it was 1 per 100 000 and for France 1,6 per 100 000. Canadian Justice Minister Anne McLellan commented ruefully on the 'unacceptably high' figure of 600 murders out of a population of 30 million – however, compared to the 25 000 killed in South Africa, this is a very low figure.*

But even more illuminating is a comparison between South Africa and Zimbabwe, a developing country which has slipped into a virtual dictatorship with economic conditions bordering on anarchy: compared to South Africa's murder rate of approximately 55 and its sexual assault rate of 100 per 100 000 people, Zimbabwe's murder rate was only 5 and its sexual assaults only 24 per 100 000 population in 1997.¹³

The question is why should large-scale murder in South Africa be treated any differently from large-scale disasters such as jumbo jets crashing every few days? And if South Africa's murder and violent crime rates are higher than those in industrialised First World nations *and* higher than those in developing Third World countries, shouldn't a national emergency be called immediately and the country brought to a standstill until the killings and violence are brought under control?

The nature of violent crime in South Africa

Violent crime takes many forms in South Africa, ranging from petty criminals who steal because it is a way of life; to those desperate to put food on their families' tables at night; to ruthless gangs that kill, steal and rape and often engage each other in open warfare for 'territory'; to organised crime syndicates that trade in drugs, stolen goods and cars; to white-collar criminals who devise schemes to defraud companies and the public alike; to corrupt civil servants who enrich themselves with public money; and the list goes on and on. These categories of crime will be found in various degrees in most countries, but what makes South Africa unique is the utter disregard for the sanctity of human life which characterises local criminal behaviour.

It was mentioned earlier that approximately 25 000 people are murdered each year in South Africa. Theoretically it would be possible to list every one of the 100 000 people who have been killed since research on this book commenced in 1996, but at about 30 entries per page that would have taken up over 3 300 pages. Instead, the author decided to list some of the categories of violent crime, each illustrated




* The number of armed robberies in South Africa was 159 per 100 000 in 1996, compared to 23 in an industrialised nation like Canada.

with a randomly selected number of examples of brutal, wanton and merciless killings that exemplify violent crime in South Africa.

These examples are not meant to be sensationalist but merely to provide the reader with an insight into the nature of violent crime and to illustrate that no-one is safe from the attentions of violent criminals, and that there is really nowhere to hide. Only by comprehending the encompassing and brutal nature of violent crime in South Africa would it be possible to understand why so many people regard emigration as the only foolproof method of safeguarding themselves from the threat that it poses.

Gangsterism and vigilantes in the Western Cape

The Western Cape is regarded as the region with the highest murder rate in the world, with a figure of over 80 per 100 000 people. Almost half of all Cape Town residents have been victims of crime between 1993 and 1997.¹⁴ Not only does this region battle with large-scale unemployment and vast informal settlements filled with thousands of destitute and desperate people, but about 80 000 criminals belong to an assortment of gangs, while anti-drug and anti-crime groups like Pagad (People against Gangsterism and Drugs) have become part of the problem by targeting both gangsters and the police. In 1997, 667 cases of suspected vigilante incidences of violence were reported, mostly bomb attacks, but also the assassination of gang leaders and policemen. By early 2000 about 100 Pagad supporters were on trial in 55 separate cases of murder, intimidation, possession of unlicensed firearms and the manufacture of explosives. Amidst the violence, many members of the public became victims and many lost their lives. In January 1998, 20 people were killed on the Cape Flats as a result of drug and gang warfare and at least 12 children were killed in crossfire in 1998.



Attacks on the police

Every country has its own 'thin blue line' that forms the barrier between law and order and anarchy. Because of the nature and goal of law enforcement, members of the police are obvious targets for criminals. In South Africa this thin blue line is thinner and more porous than most, because the police force are understaffed, underpaid and demoralised. On occasion and in areas where the police manage to form a credible presence against crime, criminals do not hesitate to shoot their way out. More than 400 members of the police force are killed each year in the line of duty. One of many such killings involved Sergeant Craig van Zyl, who was shot in

front of the Durban Supreme Court while trying to intervene in a shootout by rival taxi organisations. Van Zyl's image was captured in a photograph in a local newspaper where he lay in the street, fully conscious but bleeding to death, unable to comprehend why he had to become another of the murder statistics for 1998. Several policemen involved in investigations against Pagad have been wounded or killed in assassination attempts, including Bennie Lategan and Schalk Visagie, son-in-law of former state president P W Botha.

Car hijackings

Car hijacking took on epidemic proportions in the 1980s and 1990s, especially in Gauteng, where many vehicles were hijacked by large syndicates, often in conjunction with corrupt members of the police. More than 15 000 car hijackings occurred in South Africa in 1998.¹⁵ The odds of being hijacked are shockingly high, particularly in Johannesburg. For example, in recent years five of the 28 judges on the Witwatersrand Division of the Supreme Court had their cars hijacked¹⁶. Since these hijackers could not have known their victims were judges and therefore could not have targeted them specifically, it must be assumed that these represent average hijacking statistics, that is, one out of six (17%) motorists in Johannesburg will be hijacked over a period of a few years. As South African motorists began taking more effective precautions against having their cars stolen by installing car alarms, 'guerrilla locks' and even satellite tracking devices, car thieves responded by simply hijacking cars with their drivers inside and, under threat of death, forcing them to hand over the keys and disconnect the alarm and satellite systems. If it is a woman driver, the odds are high that she will be regarded as part of the loot and be forcefully taken with the car, possibly to be raped and murdered later on. Even babies or small children are not always spared and several babies have been thrown out of moving hijacked cars. In March 2000 the *unborn* Courtney Ellerbeck became the youngest-ever victim of a car hijacking in South Africa when her heavily-pregnant mother was shot in her car by hijackers in Boksburg because she did not leave it fast enough. Although a bullet passed through the bodies of both the mother and her unborn daughter, an emergency caesarean miraculously saved their lives.

Although Johannesburg remains South Africa's car hijacking capital, Cape Town and Durban have also become targets in the second half of the 1990s. Among the thousands of victims in Cape Town was South African Airways pilot André Viljoen, who had his car hijacked in Cape Town and was shot in the head by gangsters out on parole. Fellow pilots handed in a petition to the police for bail conditions to be tightened, and threatened to leave the country should the justice system not be put in order. The torture and murder of 28-year-old Marelise Holmes, a Johannesburg-

based businesswomen on holiday in Cape Town, and her American friend Edward Keim, shocked Cape Town, reverberated on the front page of the *Miami Herald*, and led to cancellations of hotel and air bookings by frightened tourists. The couple's car was hijacked on Signal Hill by a gang. After torturing and raping Ms Holmes, they shot the couple execution style on a desolate beach on False Bay. They stole only a cellphone and a CD player before burning the car. Two days earlier the same gang had hijacked another couple, Mike and Maggie Knot, in the driveway of their home in Somerset West. They were driven to the same beach, assaulted and shot execution style. What makes these crimes even more reprehensible is that the hijackers brutally and methodologically murdered their victims in addition to stealing their cars, as opposed to the normal *modus operandi* of hijackers, namely taking the vehicle and killing the driver only if he or she resists. A similar *modus operandi* was followed by the hijackers of Brenda Fairhead and her 11-year-old daughter Kia in Kleinemonde in the Eastern Cape in January 2000 – once again not only was their vehicle stolen, but they were assaulted, abducted and murdered as part of the hijacking.

Durban has also had its share of hijacking. In 1997 a young couple, Graham and Bernadette Ridge, and their two sons, who were two and four years old, stopped next to a highway outside Durban to allow the children to relieve themselves. No sooner had they got out of the car than two men stormed out of the bushes and shot both Ridge parents in cold blood – the murderers considered killing the two children as well, but eventually tossed them out onto the road next to their parents' bodies. It was dark and raining, but somehow the traumatised infants clung to their parents' bodies and managed to stay away from the speeding traffic until found by a passing motorist.



Among the thousands of victims of car hijackings in Johannesburg and Gauteng was top South African economist Ronnie Bethlehem, who was killed in 1997 by car hijackers at his home in Johannesburg's northern suburbs in broad daylight. Another well-known businessman, Yong Koo Kwon, President of Korean car manufacturer Daewoo, was killed in a botched car hijacking attempt in his driveway in Johannesburg in 1999. Seven-year-old Bianka Luwes was killed in 1997 by a stray bullet from a hijacker's gun while playing in her family home in Kempton Park – the hijacker was trying to steal a car at a neighbour's house. In 1998 Hennie Hancke died in his daughter's lap as he tried to shield her from bullets fired at them in a hijacking in Ogies in Gauteng. In January 1999 a prominent trade unionist, Jerry Moatshe, was killed by hijackers in his neighbour's driveway in Johannesburg, while television sports presenter David Williams was shot in a hijacking attempt at his

house in Johannesburg. In 1999 one of South Africa's foremost soccer administrators, Monwabisi Clarence, was killed in a botched car hijacking in Soweto.

In 1999 motorist Riaan Smith's car was hijacked in Johannesburg by two armed men. Smith offered no resistance and got out of his car on demand, but one of the hijackers pointed a gun at him anyway and pulled the trigger twice. Fortunately the gun jammed both times and they were later arrested by the police. What made the headline news later was not the brutal attempt on an innocent motorist's life, but that the hijackers had been manhandled by the police after they were apprehended (a BBC film crew accompanied the police and filmed the 'assault'). As a result six policemen were suspended and human rights activists had a field day exposing so-called 'police brutality' and pointing out how the rights of the 'poor hijackers' were trampled upon – nothing was said about the rights of the victim – fortunate to be alive – or about the dangerous task of the police who had to apprehend these two ruthless armed criminals. As Smith rightly asked: 'Where was the camera when the guy pointed a gun in my face and squeezed the trigger?'¹⁷

This case again confirmed the belief among millions of anxious South Africans that the scales of justice have tipped in favour of the perpetrators of crime, and against the victims, and probably convinced many others that only emigration will ensure the greatest distance between them and ruthless car hijackers. Others came up with innovative ideas to counter the problem: a new anti-hijacking device came onto the market in 1998. It throws a wall of flame from nozzles in the door with the aim of incinerating a hijacker. While the rest of the world could only look on in amazement, nervous South African motorists were clamouring to install this potentially life-saving device, hoping that they too would be fortunate enough to be able to roast a hijacker alive.

House break-ins

Many suburbs in South Africa's more affluent areas remind foreign visitors of the sort of picture they frequently see on a CNN news item filmed in a war or militarised zone. The houses and housing complexes have walls up to 12 feet high often with an additional roll of barbed wire or electrified fencing on top. Heavy remote-controlled steel gates with video cameras complete the picture, and inside the property might be two or more fierce dogs or possibly a security guard. In certain neighbourhoods whole streets have been cordoned off and only residents with identity cards can enter. Most 'retirement' villages and other luxury developments are completely enclosed by walls with controlled access, and often have their own sportsgrounds, shops, community halls, etc.

In spite of such elaborate security measures for those who are lucky enough to afford them, robberies at homes continue unabated. In the Bryanston suburb of Sandton 10 out of 30 houses in one street were targeted by criminals in less than one year – what makes this more outrageous is that not even the presence of the home of the Minister of Safety and Security at the time, Sydney Mufamadi (complete with a phalanx of armed guards), could prevent robbers from targeting this street with virtual impunity.¹⁸

One of the most brutal cases of a house break-in and murder occurred on a smallholding in Nieuwoudtville outside Cape Town in 1996. In this incident, known as the 'Flower Murders', Julia Fairbanks-Smith, her four-year-old daughter, Emma, their host Gansie Louw and her friend Johan Viviers, were attacked while having supper by a gang of former convicts. The assailants brutally stabbed and clobbered the two women to death, sawed through the throat of the little girl with a blunt bread knife while she cried for her mother, and almost fatally injured Viviers.



Attacks on tourists

Not even foreign visitors and diplomats are safe in South Africa. Tourists routinely become victims of crime, partly because they are not streetwise and because criminals expect them to carry valuables. In this category, South Africa has established itself as one of the most dangerous countries in the world to visit. The country's immense beauty still attracts growing numbers of tourists each year, but the growth is hampered by its reputation of danger. The German, Canadian, British and American governments, among others, have issued stern warnings to their citizens of the dangers of travelling to South Africa and the steps to take to lessen the odds of becoming victims of crime.

Not a day goes by without reports of attacks on tourists, ranging from murder, being forced off roads to be robbed and raped, to attacks in hotel rooms and knife attacks in CBDs by savage 'street children'. Among the many incidences of crime involving tourists and diplomats was the murder in 1998 of German tourist Helmut Kriegbaum, who was stabbed by robbers in front of his two children on Durban's beach front, and was then kicked by passers-by while he was lying in the street, dying. Two Swedish tourists, Anders Franson and Jan Anderson, were murdered in 1998 at their hotel in Umhlanga Rocks because they dared to leave open the door on their second-storey luxury apartment. In 1998 three Swiss tourists joined the list of rape victims when they were hijacked just outside the gates of the Umfolozi Game Reserve in KwaZulu-Natal.


The concept of diplomatic immunity apparently does not carry much weight among South Africa's criminal classes. In February 1999 the Canadian High Commissioner in South Africa was attacked by a burglar in his Sea Point Hotel in Cape Town, beaten and shocked with an electrical device, but survived. The British High Commissioner, May Fort, had a similarly close escape when a friend's house in which she was staying in the Cape West Coast town of Velddrif was attacked by a burglar who assaulted her friend. They were saved only after she managed to get to her cellphone to call for help. The Zimbabwean Vice-Consul in South Africa, Madzorera Meki, was less fortunate – he was shot dead in front of his 11-year-old son when robbers hijacked his car in Johannesburg in 1999. In the mid-1990s the Lebanese ambassador in Pretoria requested his government to recall him to the 'safety of Beirut', following a hold-up and several break-ins at the embassy.

In a historic world first, the first cricket test between South Africa and Pakistan was postponed by a day after two Pakistani players were apparently attacked and injured by muggers outside their hotel in Johannesburg in 1998.

Farm killings

Between 1994 and 1997 a total of 554 farmers were killed on their farms, averaging almost 200 murders per 100 000 farming population. There were 1 400 violent attacks on farmers in the same period, in what appeared to have been a systematic campaign of violence against the white farming community.¹⁹ The extent of this violence is evident when comparing the 800 farmers who were killed between 1994 and 1999 in 'peaceful' South Africa (an average of 11 per month) with the five white Zimbabwean farmers who were killed during the first six months of the violent occupation of farms in that unstable country up to June 2000.

Among the hundreds of farm attacks in 1997 was the incident on a farm in Burgersdorp when armed men shot Ansie Venter in cold blood in front of her four children. They then abducted and beat the children and sexually assaulted the eldest girl. The children eventually managed to escape from their attackers, but the image of the 11-month-old baby girl, Charlotte, being held by her grandmother and crying desperately for her dead mother next to the open grave will remain forever. In November 1998 a retrenched farm worker in George went on the rampage, torturing and killing four innocent people on the farm. In another rural killing in 1998, this time accidental, a baby girl, Angelina Zwane, was shot by a white landowner, Nicholas Steyn, who mistook the girl and her siblings for intruders and fired a warning shot. The acquittal of Steyn caused great bitterness among blacks, but it was an indication of how tense the situation in rural areas has become since the terror attacks against white farmers began.



Sexual assault: 'a declaration of war'

What the hell is going on in this country? Things are getting worse. More babies are being raped and murdered – Director of People Opposing Women Abuse, Nthabiseng Mogale, following the rape and murder of yet another two-year-old girl²⁰

Six months before we decided to leave, I received a letter warning me that if my wife, maid or daughter were in the house during a break-in, there was a 100% chance that they would be raped . . . I felt I was playing Russian roulette with my family – Richard Lister, emigrant in Australia²¹

South Africa has the highest incidence of rape per capita in the world with 120 rapes per 100 000 people. A total of 49 000 rapes were reported to the police in 1998,

but police estimates suggest that only one in every 20 cases is reported, so the figure could be closer to 1,2 million rapes per year, out of a population of 20 million women. These statistics also suggest that a South African woman will have a one-in-three chance of being raped in her lifetime, leading the Network of Violence Against Women to describe the pandemic of rape as a 'declaration of war' against South African women.²²

President Mbeki publicly questioned the accuracy of these statistics, claiming that there was no actual proof of the scale of under-reporting, but the under-reporting of rape is a worldwide phenomenon – the British Home Office estimates that only one in 12 incidences of rape and sexual assault is reported, and that more than 300 000 women in England and Wales are raped or sexually assaulted each year, as opposed to the official statistics of 25 000.²³

Being the world leader in the rape and sexual abuse of women, it is hardly surprising that South Africa became the first country in the world to launch a rape insurance policy. In 1999 CGU Insurance introduced 'The Rape Survivor' policy to assist rape victims with medical treatment and counselling.

The high incidence of rape in South Africa suggests that no woman is safe from this type of crime: victims range from young girls and sometimes babies, to those being raped by Aids carriers because they believe raping a virgin will cure them of this disease, to a grandmother aged 104 years being raped by her 14-year-old grandson. Women are raped in broad daylight in their houses, in parking lots, on streets, at concerts, in their houses. Even prominent journalists, foreign diplomats and tourists fall victim to rapists.*

In August 1998 the daughter of a prominent ANC politician and her two friends were raped in Johannesburg, while in 1997 the wife of another prominent ANC MP was raped on Robben Island (prison home of Nelson Mandela for almost 20 years). In 1999 Sizakhele Zuma, a wife of South Africa's deputy president, Jacob Zuma, was raped inside her house in KwaZulu-Natal.

If even the wife of the deputy president is not safe from being sexually assaulted, is any woman realistically safe from rape in this country? And is the government taking sexual assault and rape seriously? If so, how do they explain the arrogant antics the




* Makhaya Ntini, the first African cricketer selected to play for South Africa's national team, the Proteas, was convicted of rape in 1999, but his conviction was overturned on appeal.

Minister of Justice, Penuell Maduna, and the Minister of Sport, Steve Tshwete, when interviewed by an American television channel. Responding to the statistics that a South African woman is raped every 26 seconds, these gentlemen flippantly responded that cannot be true as 'they have been standing on the street for more than 26 seconds and have not seen any rapes'. This mind-boggling comment from senior members of Mbeki's Cabinet strengthens doubts about the government's commitment to stop this kind of crime, and one cannot but wonder how Deputy President Jacob Zuma, whose wife was raped, views his colleagues' attitude.

Bank robberies

Banks and cash-in transit vehicles have become big targets for criminals in the 1990s. In 1997 there were 465 such attacks, involving R136 million. Crime prevention cost banks over R500 million in 1997.²⁴ Together it means that crime cost South African banks R636 million in 1997 alone. By 1998 crime-related losses and the cost of crime protection had increased to R1,1 billion, according to Bob Tucker of the South African Banking Council.²⁵ As a result of heightened security measures at banks, such as bullet-proof windows, delayed-time safes and armed guards, bank robbers are increasingly turning to cash heists, that is, targeting vehicles that transport cash between businesses and banks. Although these vehicles are always heavily protected by armed guards, robbers usually appear to have the upper hand in terms of firepower, numbers, ruthlessness and the surprise element. Frequently, sophisticated weapons like armour-piercing AK47s and R5s are used. It is not uncommon for robbers to cordon off sections of roads or to douse vehicles in petrol to force the security guards out of their vehicles, sometimes burning them alive. A typical cash heist occurred in January 1998 in broad daylight in Sandton in Johannesburg, when a 15-strong gang overpowered a security vehicle, seriously wounding four guards, stole R5m and for good measure sprayed passing motorists with bullets.



Attacks on small business

The small businessman should be able to serve his customers without one hand on the .45 under his counter – Clem Sunter²⁶

One of the cornerstones of a developing economy with a desperately high unemployment rate such as South Africa is the small business sector and the nurturing and development of entrepreneurial skills. In South Africa, however, apart from high interest rates and a lack of investment, this sector is facing an even more serious challenge in the form of violent crime.

Running a small business in this country has become a security risk and is a permanent trade-off between personal safety and economic survival. A small business owner may want to remain open for business for an extra hour or two at night to increase his turnover and income, but this exposes the owner to the very real risk of a robbery. Even then security measures are hardly a deterrent for the committed criminal, as the following statistics show: between 1997 and 1998 close to 68% of small businesses had experienced a burglary, 8% the hijacking of a vehicle, 5% muggings and hold-ups and 15% shoplifting and pilfering.²⁷

Whereas personal safety is a relatively minor concern for a small business operator in Canada, Australia or New Zealand, South African entrepreneurs have to spend a sizeable portion of their income on installing security and insurance, in addition to fighting their competitors and suppliers and pleasing their customers.

Tens of thousands of criminal attacks were targeted at small businesses over the past few years. Mark Taylor, the manager of a pizza restaurant in Cape Town and father of a two-year-old baby, was shot by robbers after being overpowered on his business premises and taken on a death ride in the boot of his own car. In 1997 Stuart Gaskell, 26 years old, was killed by robbers at the transport business he was managing in Cape Town, minutes after his wife arrived at his workplace to tell him that they were expecting their first baby. In February 1999 a butcher, together with five of his colleagues and employees, was robbed at gunpoint and locked in the back of the meat transport van – they died of suffocation within half an hour, but not without first experiencing terrible stress and trying to use brute force to cut an opening in the impenetrable steel sides of the van. In 1998 a Taiwanese factory owner, Neng-shih Wang, was shot to death at his clothing factory in KwaZulu-Natal, while 20-month-old Danny Zhong was killed by a bullet when robbers attacked his father's store in Johannesburg – his father, heavily wounded himself, was too distraught to inform their family in China about his baby son's death, for in China being unable to protect one's child is a great dishonour.

In January 1998 the 33-year-old community doctor and former anti-apartheid activist, Aadil Moerat, was stabbed to death in his surgery in Guguletu. Moerat, who decided to return from Canada to South Africa to serve the black community, was killed by robbers for R60, after he gave them all the cash he had and offered them the keys to his car. In 1996 Gauteng rugby player Louis van Rensburg was seriously wounded by robbers at his family business in Johannesburg – he lost his father and brother in the same incident. Two years later his car was hijacked but again he survived. In February 1999, 27-year-old Carmen Weber, manager of a pizza restaurant in Constantia, Cape Town, was brutally murdered in her restaurant – she

was drowned in a sink by robbers while her small son and a baby girl of 16 months were waiting in vain for her to return home.


At least certain of the tormentors of small business appeared to have kept their ghoulish sense of 'humour', even if their victims haven't, as illustrated by the note from burglars to the owner of a ransacked Pietermaritzburg restaurant, Rasheed Khan: 'Please leave money because we will be back again. If *theys* (there is) no money, we will *ben* (burn) everything. That's all. Thank you'.²⁸

The perceptions and realities of crime

Not only do the extraordinarily high actual levels of violent crime contribute to emigration, but this is assisted by the perception among whites that crime has taken on a racial connotation; that the government is not really concerned about crime, that crime rates are not declining; and that the judicial and police structures are falling apart. These perceptions are based partly in fact and partly on the conclusions that people draw for themselves – either way, perceptions such as these listed below are what drive emigrants to search for safer havens.

The perception of crime as an act of revenge against whites

Although in proportion blacks are victims of the largest number of crimes, many white victims feel that crime is targeting them in the form of a racially delineated redistribution of wealth from white to black, and as a form of retribution for past apartheid sins. As a member of a Johannesburg-based hijacking gang commented: 'I do not steal from a black man ... At the suburbs, we know that the white man, the settlers, do have money. We were the real comrades because we weren't stealing from a black man.'²⁹



The perception that a large portion of crime is targeted specifically at whites is not that far-fetched. Adrian Guelke suggests that there is widespread fear in the white community that the crime wave is partially 'an expression of a demand for a racial distribution of the country's wealth, as well as of a disappointment at the economic fruits of liberation'.³⁰ According to Wimpie de Klerk's analysis of the 'psychology of crime' in South Africa, crime is committed predominantly by those who derive a deep satisfaction from crime and violence; by have-nots who are jealous of those who have; by those who believe that they are trampled, forgotten and abused by society; by those who act out of desperation for example for food and shelter; by those to whom crime and violence have become a reaction to years of apartheid

and injustice.³¹ Although De Klerk does not spell it in so many words, three of these categories refer to those viewed as previously disadvantaged and in these cases criminal actions are targeted specifically against whites who are perceived to have obtained wealth through the exploitation of blacks and are deemed legitimate targets because of their support of apartheid.

While it is understandable that a destitute and desperate man might need to steal to feed his children, this does not explain the extent of violent crime and the large number of needless murders that often accompany housebreak-ins and car hijackings.

The perception that the government does not really care about crime

Violent criminals are not the only ones who do not understand the difference between stealing out of need and resorting to violence and murdering when stealing. In his inauguration speech in June 1999 President Thabo Mbeki made a confusing attempt to justify the actions of the 'millions who have no jobs' who, he claimed, are forced to 'beg, steal and *murder*' in order to feed their families – Mbeki's inclusion of 'murder' in his equation indicates his inability to understand the extent of violent crime and murder in this country. Nobody is forced to *murder* as well as to steal to feed his family and the question is how anyone, and particularly the president of South Africa, can imply that it is understandable that people can murder in order to feed themselves and their children. No criminal, once he or she has overpowered his or her victim and stolen what he or she wanted, should have the need to continue to kill that victim – unless murder has become a case of revenge and a wanton act by those who derive a deep satisfaction from crime. Mbeki appears to have missed this point, and this is the sort of message which a country with 25 000 murders per year simply cannot afford.

In a country in which crime is seriously out of control, the government's response, unlike that of the terrified citizenry, has been indecisive and weak. President Thabo Mbeki blamed crime on a 'Third Force' and suggested that crime has only now become a public or media issue because it has spilled over to white areas, and is better reported under the new government. He also accused the South African Chamber of Business of being 'racist' because the Chamber's Business Confidence Index claimed that business confidence was declining partially because of crime. Furthermore, the government had harmed the cause of combating crime when former president Nelson Mandela released 8 000 prisoners on his eightieth birthday in 1998, some of whom immediately went on to kill again.

The perception that crime is on the increase

There are conflicting points of view between those who claim crime is on the decrease, usually the government, and those, including the overwhelming percentage of the population, who believe it is on the increase. Statistics can be used to prove anything, but at first glance it seems that some categories of serious crimes have stabilised or declined slightly between 1994 and 1998. For example, the Institute of Race Relations claimed that between 1994 and 1997 the murder rate declined by between 10% and 15%, theft of cars by 10% and robbery with aggravating circumstances by 25%.³²

However, temporary declines in crime appear to be mere aberrations in a pattern of steadily increasing crime. For example, armed robberies increased from 73 to 90 per 100 000 people between the first six months of 1997 and the first six months of 1998, while vehicle theft increased from 110 to 117 per 100 000 people in the same period.³³ The most recent statistics pointed to an increase in serious crime in nearly all categories for the three-month period between November 1998 and January 1999 compared to the corresponding period one year beforehand. For example, car hijackings increased from 7,6 to 9,2 per 100 000 (an increase of more than 20%), armed robberies increased from 44 to 56 per 100 000 people (an increase of 25%), while intrusions in private homes increased from 159 to 170 per 100 000 people (an increase of 7%).³⁴

The majority of South Africans firmly believe that crime is increasing or, at best, has stabilised at unacceptable levels which are among the highest, if not *the* highest, in the world. They simply refuse to believe official statistics or use their own statistics to prove the opposite. For example, 77% of Cape Town residents believe that crime has increased over the past five years, according to the Institute of Security Studies.³⁵ Countrywide, the percentage of whites who feel unsafe rose from 30% in 1994 to 80% in 1997.* Among blacks this figure rose from 11% in 1994 to 43% in 1999.³⁶ A survey conducted for *Rapport* indicated that crime was the biggest problem for 63% of Afrikaners, 70% of English-speaking whites, 31% of blacks, 34% of coloureds and 66% of Asians.³⁷

Laurie Schlemmer of the South African Bureau for Racial Affairs argues that the current unacceptably high levels of crime will remain at these levels for the next 30 years if an economic growth of at least 4% to 6% per annum cannot be sustained.



* Contrary to other surveys, the Institute claimed that this number had declined to 56% in 1999.



With the current economic growth rates ranging between 0% and 2%, and with about 400 000 new job seekers entering the job market each year in vain, Schlemmer's prediction is probably not too far off the mark. The previous Commissioner of Police, George Fivaz, agrees with Schlemmer's estimate: 'We will sit with the culture of violence in South Africa for another decade or two, until we are free of the systems of the past'³⁸.

The perception that the police and justice systems are inefficient

Crime has become part of South Africa's way of life. Two thirds of Johannesburg's citizens and half of Cape Town's were victims of crime between 1993 and 1997. The police force is underpaid and demoralised. The justice system fails to convict criminals and ill-judged amnesties have made the problem worse. The government's response has been woeful – editorial in the *Sunday Times* (UK).³⁹

Nationally, police make arrests in only 45 per cent of murder cases and 12 per cent of robberies in South Africa, compared to 70 per cent of murders and 30 per cent of robberies in the United States⁴⁰.

To add to the problem of high crime levels, the South African justice system does not work well either: only one in 20 serious crimes results in a conviction. By 1996 there were 180 000 unsolved murder cases in South Africa, while by 1999 about 300 000 people had warrants out for their arrest for crimes committed. For every 1 000 crimes committed only 77 people are arrested and only 8 will spend more than a year in jail. For each of the 25 000 murders committed in 1997 only 15% resulted in convictions; of the close to 50 000 rapes reported, only 7% resulted in convictions; only 6% of the 86 500 businesses robbed resulted in convictions; of the 250 000 houses burgled, only 4% resulted in convictions; of the 12 000 cars hijacked in 1997, only 2% resulted in convictions.⁴¹

Other sources, such as the Institute of Security Studies, confirm how inefficient the investigative, judicial, and legal systems are. In 1998 only 24,5% of murder cases, 17,7% of rape cases, 6,4% of domestic burglaries, 3,1% of car thefts and 2,8% of car hijackings that were given to prosecutors were actually prosecuted in court. Of every 6,1 murders recorded by the police, only one resulted in the perpetrator being found guilty, and for rape this figure is one in 11 and for vehicle theft one in 53.⁴²

The financial implications of crime

In 1996 the direct cost of crime to South Africa was estimated by the Nedcor Project at approximately R31 billion per year.⁴³ This includes financial losses, medical costs of victims, insurance premiums, security costs and others, but if indirect costs such as the loss of investments, the loss of tourism and the cost of emigration are included, it would certainly be vastly higher. The Durban Chamber of Commerce estimates that fraud is costing South Africa R40 billion per year, equalling the household income of 100 000 families⁴⁴.

As a result of having to put up with the highest crime rates in the world, South Africans are paying much more than their counterparts in other countries for insuring their possessions against criminals. Premiums have gone up from 2% of household income in 1976 to 10% in 1999, while crime costs the insurance industry an estimated R4,5 billion per year in claims. The private security industry has a turnover of R11 billion per year, constituting a whole separate industry comparable in size with certain other major sectors of the South African economy. Today it is virtually impossible for the average homeowner to obtain home insurance without a proper electronic security system linked to armed response, and it costs up to R600 per month for such a service. In addition, insurance firms penalise car owners who do not possess anti-theft devices.

There are numerous examples of the financial effect of crime on the South African economy. International credit rating agencies such as Fitch IBCA (1998) have rated South Africa as a more risky proposition and cited crime as the reason – this relates directly to higher borrowing costs to South Africa.⁴⁵ In 1997 British car manufacturer Landrover cancelled the unveiling of its Freelander model in Cape Town because of security issues and instead invited 3 000 dealers and foreign journalists to Spain. More than half of the directors of German companies in South Africa have been victims of violent crime and about 80% of German companies in South Africa were reconsidering their position in South Africa because of crime.⁴⁶



Crime acts as a deterrent to local and foreign investors because uncontrolled crime equals anarchy and creates the perception of ungovernability, and ultimately questions the viability and the long-term prospects of the post-apartheid South African state:

Crime is a barometer of much more than the safety of the individual and his possessions. It is an indication of the degree to which the state has the

capacity to manage the often tumultuous social forces in which it is enmeshed. A state which, like SA, struggles to bring to account those who refuse to play by the rules cannot be relied on in the sense that the pillars of the market are being eroded – editorial in *Finance Week*⁴⁷


A measure of a civilised society is the extent to which it safeguards its people from violent crooks and crazies in their midst. This is a basic requirement that the 'new' South Africa is manifestly failing to achieve – Gavin Bell, former Southern African correspondent of *The Times*, in response to the murder of world-acclaimed photographer, John Rubythorn⁴⁸

Clem Sunter agrees: 'If crime continues unabated we will revert to a wasteland as severe as the one we predicted before . . . With the high level of crime there will be no business revolution.'⁴⁹

The psychological effects of crime

We now find that a tiny minority [of criminals] is ruling the majority by fear. People are leaving and I cannot blame them. Those who are staying have to live behind locked gates and locked doors – golfer, Gary Player⁵⁰


An epidemic of armed robbery, aggravated assault and car hijacking has made South Africans of all ethnic backgrounds virtual prisoners in their homes, cars and offices – *Toronto Star*.⁵¹



In addition to the monetary costs of crime, violent crime affects the psychological state of victims and non-victims alike. Most people in South Africa, to a degree, live like prisoners in their homes, even if they do not always realise it – on the surface people appear to go on with their everyday lives, and seemingly are accustomed to barbed wire around their properties, to burglar bars, to looking over their shoulders all the time, but feelings of unease, stress and fear have become part of the South African psyche. A 1997 report by the Institute of Security Studies claimed that because of crime in South Africa '[t]he average person in the street has a fear level associated with countries experiencing war'.⁵²

Violent crime causes fear and results in profound psychological stress in most South Africans, not unlike citizens of warring countries. The symptoms of this stress are anxiety, fear of the unknown and suspicion of strangers and, according to Don Foster, a professor of psychology at UCT, result in paranoia about security measures, feelings of helplessness and hopelessness, and anger and revenge expressed in renewed calls for the return of the death penalty and a desire to emigrate to get away from crime.⁵³ Other symptoms include sleeping problems, headaches, spastic colons, depression, aggression, an over-protectiveness towards loved ones, and an identification with the plight of victims.⁵⁴ Psychologists use the term 'post-traumatic stress' to describe the feelings of powerlessness, fear, guilt, irritability and anger/vengeance which victims of violent crime display after an attack.

When he began his counselling sessions, he said he was fine. He did not, however, want to talk about the robbery . . . Eventually he broke down. 'It was his son,' he said. He was devastated by the thought of not being able to protect his son.'⁵⁵



Between half and two thirds of people in Cape Town, Durban and Johannesburg have been victims of crime over the past five years. Because of the widespread nature of crime and because it touches the lives of most of South Africa's citizens, it is not inconceivable that a large part of the population could be suffering from a collective post-traumatic response similar to a population of a country involved in a major war. The frequency and the violent nature of crime in South Africa may also explain the growing trend for revenge and street justice, as well as the overwhelming support for the return of the death penalty.⁵⁶

In June 1999 the South African Society of Psychiatrists requested the government to acknowledge that violent crime has become a national disaster for South Africa because its citizens are being denied their constitutional right to safety and security

as a result of crime – this in turn causes a threat to the mental health of South Africans. The Society claimed that 20% of the population suffered from violence-related mental problems such as post-traumatic stress, conditions related to anxiety and depression, and schizophrenic tendencies. In addition, the culture of violence has become such a part of South African life that it will be very difficult to eradicate and it leads directly to emigration, a general feeling of apathy, and to victims taking the law into their own hands. Furthermore, having to deal with the victims of violent crime on a daily basis also takes its toll of mental healthcare workers and many leave the profession and even the country, leading to a growing shortage of professionals in this field.

Anxiety and other symptoms of stress are very real feelings which have become part of the psychological make-up of many South Africans. In most cases the feelings of anxiety subside to a degree after a while, but settle at higher levels than before, and rapidly reach intolerable levels after they become aware of the next incidence of murder or hijacking and especially if they witness a crime or become a victim themselves. As a result, the percentage of South Africans who are anxious about crime and who fear for their personal safety has risen from 20% in 1994 to 50% in 1999.⁵⁷


A characteristic of such high levels of anxiety is that they remain part of people's psychological make-up for long periods, depending on the individual personality. Often such anxiety and fears are transferred to their children, shaping their personalities as they grow up.⁵⁸ Some emigrants recall how it took some years in their adopted countries to shake off their paranoia about security and how their obsession with finding (mostly in vain) fenced or walled properties in the safe suburbs of Sydney, Perth and Toronto often resulted in peculiar looks from estate agents and neighbours.

The worst aspect of South Africa's crime wave is that it permeates all aspects of the lives of its citizens. From security at home, to getting to work, to leisure and recreational time, the dangers posed by violent crime are omnipresent and never far from the mind of the average person. Consider for example the position of a middle-class white man who might be living in Cape Town or Johannesburg, with the initials PE (Potential Emigrant). The odds are 50% or greater that someone in his family would have been the victim of a crime against his or her person or property in the past five years – this will have had an effect on his or her psyche and he or she is now experiencing heightened levels of anxiety and stress. As head of the household Mr PE lives in fear of house break-ins at night. If he could afford it, he would have burglar bars in front of all his windows, walls and a gate around his property, and access to a 24-hour security firm. Getting to work is not only a matter of avoiding

rush hour traffic – there is the extra problem of ruthless car-hijackers outside his driveway or waiting at the first traffic light – if he lives in Johannesburg his chances of being hijacking on his way to work are about 100 times higher than his friends in Sydney. While at work he would worry about the safety of his wife and children at home or the quality of their education at school. After a stressful day at work, having to cope not only with the normal rigours of the workplace, but also with the stress of an affirmative action appointee taking over his job, he might meet friends for a drink. The odds are good that during such a social gathering the talk will revolve around crime and the latest gruesome stories of hijacking, murders and rapes, making everyone more depressed and anxious:

Tales of violence have become the new pornography in which episodes gain in horror at every hushed retelling, like a Chinese whisper. We've all done it. But it has a serious multiplier effect on emigration – Peter Godwin⁵⁹

At weekends Mr PE knows that even his leisure pursuits have become fraught with danger, as the spate of deadly attacks on isolated and even populated beaches in Cape Town and the surrounding mountains have proven. For tens of thousands of Cape Town residents, walking on the slopes of Table Mountain is a pastime spanning generations, a pleasant way to take exercise and to get away, even briefly, from the stress of living in a city ravaged by crime. For many it is almost a spiritual experience, but after several criminal attacks in 1999 police have warned hikers not to walk in groups of fewer than five or not to walk at all. Hikers have described this threat to their way of life as akin to 'cutting off an arm', 'like the severing of the umbilical cord', and as something which seriously affects the quality of their lives.⁶⁰



The implications are clear – crime is destroying the quality of life for many South Africans, and even ordinary stress-relieving recreational activities like walking on a mountain have come under threat, with very negative consequences to the psyche of South Africans and their ability to live normal lives.

The responses to crime

These days, every house is a fortress with burglar bars on the windows and a steel 'rape' gate separating the bedrooms from the rest of the house at night ... Garden walls are topped by ever-evolving forms of razor wire ... Carrying a gun is ever more commonplace ... Dinner parties have become a frenzy of horror stories ... Should we stick

around and risk our children's lives? – a prospective South African emigrant⁶¹

Reactions of South Africans to the death and destruction caused by violent criminals are threefold: additional safety precautions such as higher walls, burglar bars, security firms and moving away from the most dangerous areas; demands for corporal punishment and sometimes a reversion to street justice; and emigration.

The first response was discussed in detail in chapter 1 under the heading 'Pseudo emigration', which leaves us with revenge and emigration as responses to intolerable levels of violent crime. In a society with levels of criminality such as South Africa and a perceived inefficient justice system, a large proportion of citizens have demanded the return of the death penalty and many others have opted for street justice. Whereas the government refuses to reinstate the death penalty or even to permit a referendum on this issue, ordinary citizens are clamouring in ever-greater numbers for murderers to be hanged or, as the leader of the Pan African Congress, Stanley Mokgoba, pleaded in the run-up to the 1999 elections, for their heads and limbs to be chopped off. Between 1995 and 1997 the percentage of blacks favouring the death penalty increased from 49% to 76% and among whites from 80% to 94%.⁶² In addition, the people of Alexandra township in Johannesburg, Guguletu in Cape Town, and elsewhere have been taking the law into their own hands to deal swiftly with criminals and to ensure punishment – after suspects are caught and pointed out by witnesses and victims, they are severely beaten and handed over to the police, if still alive, or, in some cases, simply put to death.

It is difficult for someone who has not personally been a victim of violent crime to truly understand why crime is such a strong push factor to emigration. One can only imagine how mortally wounded hijack victim Graham Ridge felt as he was lying next to a dark freeway, knowing that his wife was already dead and that he himself was bleeding to death, incapable of comforting his traumatised and helpless two- and four-year-old sons who were clinging to his body. Multiply this scenario by 25 000 each year and it becomes clear why so many South Africans are so desperate to put as much distance as possible between themselves and the deadly menace of violent crime through the only really effective method, by emigrating to safer havens.

To conclude, fear of violent crime and the way it pervades every aspect of their lives are the reasons 60% of emigrants leave South Africa. Violent crime is not only life-threatening but it also limits freedom of movement, makes people virtual prisoners in their own homes, and adds a financial burden to every South African. Their counterparts in Australia for example do not have to turn their homes in fortresses,

spend exorbitant amounts of money on insurance, sleep with guns under their pillows at night, drive around in cities with doors locked, and drive through red traffic lights at night to avoid being hijacked. Nor do they usually have to harden themselves mentally to be able to endure living in a country brutalised by crime and held hostage by criminals who appear to be a law unto themselves.

Crime in South Africa has become the country's Achilles' heel – no matter what progress has been made in reconstruction, reconciliation, nation-building and even economic miracles, these will remain empty words if the citizens of this country are subject to a levels of violent crime akin to a 'civil war that never happened'. As a result, people will keep on leaving the country for places where they can feel safe and conduct their lives in a normal fashion. Although it is correct to assume that much of today's crime is the product of apartheid, that is little consolation for hapless victims, both black and white. The demise of apartheid did nothing to change the material position or the mindset of the perpetrators of the countless crimes of South Africa's killing fields. To a crime-weary South African with the skills and ability to emigrate, it serves no purpose to look for blame for the origins of crime – all that matters is finding a solution or, if that is not possible, finding a way to 'get the hell out of here'.

But although crime is currently the most important push factor for South Africans leaving the country permanently, this was not always true. White emigrants from the 1950s up to the mid-1980s lived in whites-only suburbs which were unrealistically low-crime environments because of heavy police protection, pass laws and other apartheid legislation that kept black and white apart. Violent crime as it is experienced in South Africa today was certainly not evident in white suburbs or even in the CBDs of the main cities before the 1980s, and white emigrants in those days left largely because of political violence and uncertainty, not because of crime. Crime has therefore become a serious issue for white emigrants only in the past ten years or so when it was perceived to begin spilling over into white suburbs and when whites began to experience it to the same extent as black areas had for decades. Whether or not this is a merely a perception, an HSRC study indicated that the proportion of whites who felt unsafe because of crime rose from 30% to 80% between September 1994 to February 1997.⁶³



4.2 CONCERNS OVER THE ECONOMY

About 10% of emigrants list the 'perilous' state of the South African economy as a reason for leaving the country. They feel that taxes are too high, their savings are being eroded by inflation, and the falling currency could 'trap' them in South Africa

by turning their money and life savings into worthless paper. In addition, they fear that the South African Communist Party and the trade union federation, Cosatu, are exerting a disproportionate influence on the government. Nor do the ill-considered comments by the secretary-general of the ANC, Kgalema Motlanthe, contribute to the confidence of whites or foreign investors. At a Workers' Day ceremony Motlanthe argued that South Africa should follow the socialist examples of Cuba and China, and that workers must develop a 'hatred' of capitalism.


Some of these fears have substance, but a look at the broader picture tells a less pessimistic story. The South African economy, like most emerging economies, had been negatively impacted by the Asian, South American and other crises and subsequent recessionary conditions in 1998, but this appears to have been a temporary setback. The economy has rebounded in 1999 and has entered the new millennium with remarkable resilience and strength in the face of adversity, considering South Africa's status as a developing country. The country's relatively developed economic infrastructure, sophisticated banking system and stock market, and a number of world-class companies all contribute to an economy with huge potential which offers exceptional entrepreneurial opportunities. The country boasts the largest and by far the most industrialised economy on the African continent and compares well with other emerging nations. For example, its per capita GDP of \$3 200 in 1998 is higher than that of Thailand, equal to that of Slovakia, and is not too far behind Mexico and Brazil. Its inflation rate fell to below 5% in 1999, the lowest since 1970 and among the lowest of the emerging economies, and even its currency had stabilised in 1999 after a sharp decline over recent years, before slipping against the US\$ early in 2000.

Although the economic growth rate was just over 1% in 1999, it is expected to improve significantly to above 3% in 2000. It is widely believed that Trevor Manuel is the best Finance Minister the country has ever had, and in a tough economic climate, he has managed to stabilise the currency, lower company and personal taxes, greatly relax foreign exchange controls, and restore South Africa's slipping credit rating in world markets. Even the sceptics have been surprised by the moderation of the first black governor of the Reserve Bank, Tito Mboweni, while the vastly increased efficiency of the South African Revenue Service has ensured greater government revenues and resulted in lower tax rates. In addition, government attempts to address the basic needs of most impoverished sectors of the population have been reasonably successful, with welfare payments to unemployed and poor families having been increased, resulting in the creation of a more sturdy social safety net. Not even the presence of six members of the South African Communist party in Mbeki's Cabinet, another 60 in the ANC's parliamentary caucus, and two provincial

premiers is cause for concern – virtually without exception they demurely follow the ANC's market-friendly policies without a murmur of socialist protest.

However, at least four distinct problems continue to bedevil the South African economy and these are frequently cited by some emigrants as a rationale for leaving the country.

The first concerns the South African currency. A stable currency tends to boost business confidence and calm the nerves not only of investors but also of wealthier individuals. In South Africa the rand has lost about half its value between 1994 and 1999 (against the British pound it declined from R5 to R10). The white population which make up the bulk of the emigrants has viewed the depreciation of the rand with a degree of concern, not only because it makes its frequent overseas visits prohibitively expensive, but because its South African holdings lose value in foreign terms. This causes anxiety among those who have accumulated wealth in South Africa because much of this wealth can become worthless in international terms if the local currency continues to depreciate (for example if it loses half its value every five years). A worthless currency makes it difficult for emigrants to take along sufficient amounts of capital to comfortably start a new life elsewhere, and for those with high net worth to 'buy' their residences in foreign countries by investing there. R W Johnson wrote how the rand's decline 'has locked middle-aged and older people in a country with a problematic future and away from their children', many of whom are already living overseas.⁶⁴ Although the rand has stabilised in 1999 to approximately R6 to a US\$1, it remains relatively weak, undervalued and overly sensitive to market fluctuations, and has breached the R7 to US\$1 rate by May 2000.



The second problem is a high personal income tax rate and a marginal rate as great as 42%, which is relatively steep when compared to the USA, Australia, New Zealand and Canada (although not so high when compared to some Western European countries such as Sweden). In these countries taxpayers receive sizeable social benefits and services from the state in return for their taxes, for example free healthcare (excluding the USA), inexpensive education, generous pensions and, above all, governments which fulfil their part of the 'social contract', that is, to protect citizens and provide law and order. In other words, while taxes in South Africa are generally higher than in most Western countries, South Africans receive far less in return from their government.

The third issue is high interest rates, with the prime lending rate reaching 23% at one stage in 1998. Although it has declined in 1999, at 15%–16% it still remains


unacceptably high and consumes an extraordinarily large portion of the average household income. Interest rates are as low as 1% to 5% in most developed countries, which provides a huge incentive for a South African to buy property in Sydney for example as opposed to Cape Town, all things being equal.

The fourth issue concerns unemployment and affirmative action. Unemployment, alongside and related to crime, is South Africa's most daunting problem. Millions of mostly unskilled people simply cannot find work, with the unemployment rate almost 40% or close to six million people. The Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) found that only one in 30, or 3,3% of the 250 000 new job-seekers can expect to find work in the formal sector of South Africa's beleaguered job market.⁶⁵ Since 1990 the South African economy has shed more than one million jobs, of which 500 000 have been lost since 1995.⁶⁶ In the latter half of the decade the economically active population grew by 1,4 million and unemployment has increased by close to 2 million. Stephan Mulholland, columnist to the *Sunday Times*, perhaps harshly, commented that millions of those who are unemployed are actually 'anemployed' or unemployable, that is, they have no education and no prospects, and simply turn to crime.⁶⁷ One would like to believe that this is not the case and that many of the unemployed can eventually be equipped with skills, given the commitment and availability of resources, and that the informal economy will also help to soak up a part of the unemployment.

The fight against unemployment is not helped by restrictive labour laws such as the Employment Equity Act, which further discourages companies from employing people. In addition, the militancy of trade unions also scares off investors, and strikes are often accompanied by violence and intimidation. This is a growing trend which recently adversely affected Parmalat, an Italian food company in South Africa. Parmalat invested R1 billion in the South African economy, but was rewarded for its gesture by a strike by the Food and Allied Workers' Union. The workers were offered an above-inflation increase of 8% but demanded absurd wage increases of between 21% and 185%. The strike turned violent and led to shots being fired at delivery trucks, fire-bomb attacks, stone throwing and death threats, all aimed at the company's non-striking workers and its capital assets. The company's managing director was told by workers that they will 'kill him, rape his wife and burn his house'. Matters became so bad that the company's management contacted President Mbeki's Office to intervene and warned that disinvestment from South Africa had become an alternative.⁶⁸ Volkswagen South Africa experienced similar disruption to production and export orders through an illegal strike early in 2000, and also threatened to withdraw from South Africa.

Affirmative action is another obstacle which confronts white job-seekers in South Africa and contributes to the increasing number of emigrants. Affirmative action is defined as a series of temporary measures and policies designed to create equal opportunity within an organisation through the recruitment, selection, training and promotion of competent black people, women and disabled people. Although it is difficult to argue against the rationale behind affirmative action, namely to redress past wrongs and imbalances in the labour market through government intervention, it remains a concept with which many whites have a problem* – they view it as reverse discrimination, aimed solely at whites, which affects their employability, earnings and career prospects. It is estimated that affirmative action and the Employment Equity Act will eventually force 800 000 whites out of the formal economy, to be replaced by blacks⁶⁹. As Adrian Guelke mentions, not only do whites perceive affirmative action as threatening their standards of living, but it has been ‘associated in white minds with perceptions that the efficiency of all manner of services has been declining, with consequent pessimism about the country’s future economic prospects’.⁷⁰ However, on the whole, affirmative action appears to be only a minor emigration issue, as only 10% of prospective emigrants cite it as a reason for wanting to emigrate.

While it is true that young white school-leavers find it increasingly difficult to find work and cannot rely on an automatic job in the civil service, as their parents could under the NP government, only about 4% of whites are unemployed and only 1% of whites live below the breadline. The door that has been opened for young South Africans to work in the UK for two years is helping to temporarily alleviate the youth unemployment rate, especially for those (predominantly whites) fortunate enough to be able to buy airline tickets to London. Some unemployed whites are teachers who have been retrenched or taken packages, and many of them have joined their fellow professionals overseas where their teaching skills are in demand.



With affirmative action being part of life in South Africa, an opportunistic white South African woman, Lynn Rutherford, tried to use it as a reason for demanding political asylum in the USA – she unsuccessfully claimed that she would be discriminated against on grounds of her race if she was forced to return to South Africa.



* For example, 60% of South Africa’s foreign diplomats and more than 65% of the SANDF’s officer corps are white.

4.3 FALLING STANDARDS AND AIDS

Falling standards, mismanagement, incompetence, the Aids pandemic and a growing decline in morality are issues which give South Africa a bad name internationally and make many South Africans desperate about their future. A considerable number of South African emigrants view falling standards and general moral and physical decay as part of their reasons for leaving the country – up to 19% give declining standards of public education and healthcare as major reasons, while 10% cite corruption and an inefficient government and civil service.⁷¹

Housing, education and healthcare in particular appear to provide opportunists and thieves with great scope for enriching themselves and are the areas in which standards are slipping the fastest. While close to three-quarters of a million homes for the poor have been built since 1994, many are substandard and falling apart, while corruption in tendering procedures is rife. Although free healthcare has been extended to sections of the population, public hospitals are generally in shockingly poor conditions because of inadequate funding, poor management and theft. Patients recall horror stories of having to bring their own linen and food to hospitals, of deadly unhygienic conditions, of understaffed facilities and of danger lurking in the form of criminals viewing hospitals as easy prey. In a children's cancer ward in a hospital in Johannesburg thieves stole clothes, toys and Christmas decorations from patients and even robbed a toddler of his toys on his way to chemotherapy. In one of Durban's former top hospitals, the King Edward VIII Hospital, the parents of eight-month-old baby, Ningi Khomo, were horrified when they discovered that a chunk of flesh, a wound of 5 cm by 4 cm, had been bitten out of her foot, apparently by rodents. This allegedly happened to another three babies in the same week in February 2000, while ten nurses were on duty in the paediatric ward.⁷²

With respect to health trends, many South Africans nervously look to Zimbabwe, and check for early warning signals for the falling health standards in South Africa – Zimbabwe's health system is a frightening example of what can happen to a country ruined by corruption and mismanagement. The number of Zimbabweans who died of malaria increased from 100 in 1981 to 2 800 in 1997; deaths from tuberculosis increased from 5 000 in 1986 to 35 000 in 1997; rampant Aids has resulted in the average life expectancy of Zimbabweans falling from 61 years in 1993 to 49 years in 1999.⁷³

However, it is not even necessary to look further north in Africa to experience the absolute horror and the scope of the Aids epidemic. More than 80 000 South Africans died in 1999 because of Aids-related diseases, overshadowing the 25 000 annual

murders. Because of Aids, the number of deaths in KwaZulu-Natal in 1998 exceeded the number of births, resulting in a decline in the province's population for the first time in recorded history. As a result of Aids the average life expectancy of South Africans declined from 65 to 55 years and by 2005 only 13% of South Africans are predicted to reach the age of 40 and over. By mid-2000 4,2 million people in South Africa were infected with HIV/Aids. This represents 10% of the country's population and the highest number anywhere in the world. By 2005 five million South Africans (one in eight) will be HIV-infected.⁷⁴ The figures released by the Institute of Race Relations are even more gloomy – these suggest that 250 000 South Africans will die from Aids this year and six million will be HIV-positive. By 2005 more than 700 000 people will die from Aids-related diseases and by 2015 more than 10 million South Africans would have died from this disease. By 2005 one million South African children will be orphans because of Aids, and it is predicted that most of these will be driven to violent crime through sheer desperation. According to a report titled 'Age and Aids: South Africa's crime time bomb', the juvenile prison population increased from 6 000 to 25 000 in the three years up to 1999.⁷⁵

Apart from limited increases in funding to assist the fight against the disease, the government's otherwise lame response to the Aids crisis was to stage an Aids awareness play costing the taxpayers R13 million. At the same time it refused to fund a programme to provide pregnant mothers with an anti-Aids drug, AZT, which helps to prevent the unborn child from getting the disease. In 1999 a NGO sent out free condoms to thousands of South Africans, but put metal staples through the condoms to adhere them to the accompanying brochure – these were later recalled. To exacerbate matters, early in 2000 Thabo Mbeki caused an international uproar when he suggested that the possibility must be considered that Aids might not be caused by the HIV virus.



Education fares little better. New and supposedly innovative outcomes-based educational programmes which are based on standards of the industrialised world are in the pipeline, but many children in schools in South Africa have not received textbooks for two consecutive years, while teachers' salaries consume virtually 100% of the education budget, leaving little money for equipment and books. In some cases teachers are not properly trained, they are intimidated by school gangs, and generally are underpaid and demoralised. Not only government schools are suffering – state subsidies to private schools have been cut by 65% between 1995 and 1998.⁷⁶

Corruption, self-entitlement and nepotism have become a major part of the problems facing South Africa today, just as they were part of the apartheid regime –

the scandals caused by NP Cabinet Ministers like Connie Mulder, Pietie du Plessis and countless others are still fresh in the mind – except that there is greater transparency and corruption is exposed much more rapidly. Between R21 and R36 billion were lost because of corruption between 1994 and 1998.⁷⁷ The Special Investigating Unit headed by Judge Willem Heath is investigating over 90 000 cases of government corruption and has already recovered R10 billion of state assets. Heath's efficiency and lack of respect for corrupt officials, irrespective of their status, quickly made him some powerful enemies – Finance Minister Trevor Manuel accused him of wanting to be a 'Don Quixote', Justice Minister Penuell Maduna threatened to close his office down or to banish him to the Eastern Cape, and former Justice Minister, Dullah Omar, accused him of 'political bias' against the ANC.* In a similar vein and smacking of arrogance bred out of a too-powerful majority party, is the the refusal of Justice Minister, Penuell Maduna, to apologize, or be censured, for his slander of the Auditor-General, Henri Cluver – this is in spite of the fact the the Public Protector, Selby Baqwa, condemned Maduna for acting improperly and for undermining the Constitution.

Individual examples of corruption are not hard to come by. These include the thousands of 'ghost' civil servants and dead people who are drawing salaries and pensions in the Eastern Cape. One resourceful Eastern Cape family even took the dressed-up body of their recently deceased relative to the post office to draw his pension, pretending that he was alive and just a bit sleepy – a suspicious clerk alerted the police. Another example is ANC MP Steve Mbuyisa, who was found guilty of theft after stealing a cellphone in Parliament in 1999, although MPs like him are earning in excess of R300 000 per year. A typical example of the government's nonchalant attitude to corruption is that of the Director-General of Home Affairs, Albert Mokoena, who was under investigation for using his office to run a professional basketball team and freely handing out passports to foreign players to allow them to play for his team. To exacerbate matters, Minister of Home Affairs Mangosuthu Buthelezi appointed Khulekani Sitole, director of Correctional Services, to investigate the charges against Mokoena. At the time Sithole himself was under investigation for corruption and misconduct for inter alia running a soccer team from his government office, wrongfully giving himself a bonus of over R140 000, spending 200 days outside the country in 1998, and handing out severance packages to 40 officials in his department who did not qualify for these. He was eventually forced




* One of Omar's friends, Alan Boesak, was openly supported by Omar when he was charged with fraud. Boesak, a former ANC leader in the Western Cape, was found guilty of stealing millions of Swedish donor funds meant for poverty-stricken children to build his wife a new recording studio in his house.

out of office and promptly threatened to sue the government for unlawful dismissal. Fidelity Maforah, the chief director in the Department of Welfare (a department which recklessly failed to disburse over R200 million of poverty relief funds in 1999) used her office and working hours to sell Amway products for her own gain⁷⁸.

Then there was the Deputy-Speaker of Parliament, Baleka Mbete, who obtained her driving licence without completing a proper driver's test because she insisted that she was too busy to stand in a queue. In what turned out to be another blow to the government's moral high ground, Ndaweni Mahlangu, premier of South Africa's most corrupt province, Mpumalanga, in an attempt to justify his re-appointment of three discredited and corrupt officials to his government, brazenly declared that it was acceptable for politicians to lie. His exact words were: 'Many politicians deny they did certain things but then later admitted to them. It is accepted and not unusual anywhere in the world ... I personally don't find it to be a very bad thing.'⁷⁹ Jessie Duarte, Gauteng's MEC for Safety and Security, was forced to resign because she drove and crashed a government car without being licensed to drive, and failed to report the accident. As a 'reward' for her behaviour she was appointed as a High Commissioner in Mozambique. In July 2000 the chief executive of South Africa's Civilian Aviation Authority, Trevor Abrahams, was arrested on charges relating to pilot licence fraud.

As an example of how the malaise of dishonesty has permeated South African society, one has to look little further than South Africa's under-14 soccer team's magnificent victory when they claimed the World Cup in 1998 – the only problem was that the team captain was actually an under-19 player who played under a fictitious name. In 1999 a black runner switched places halfway with his identical twin brother in order to cheat his way to a gold medal and a few thousand rands of prize money in the Comrades Marathon. In April 2000 the South African cricket captain, Hansie Cronje, caused the greatest scandal in the country's sporting history by admitting that he acted improperly by accepting money to provide information on cricket matches to Indian bookmakers – he was dismissed as captain and player in the South African side, but the damage to South Africa's sporting reputation and loss of national self-esteem will be felt for years.



Falling standards are not confined to education, healthcare and the public service. Unmistakable signs of decay, degeneration and public disorder permeate South African society, ranging from relatively harmless issues to more serious incidences of neglect. Once-thriving central business districts in Johannesburg, and to a lesser extent Durban, Pretoria and Port Elizabeth, have turned into dangerous, crime-

infested wastelands mostly devoid of office workers, banks and restaurants, and occupied instead by criminals, informal traders, squatters and beggars. Most large companies opted to move to the suburbs, and landlords battle to fill office space, shops and whole buildings. As the CBDs are becoming 'ghost towns', squatters soon fill these spaces illegally, sometimes with their livestock. In addition to the closure of the Johannesburg landmark, the Carlton Hotel, recent 'evacuations' from the downtown area included the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, which displayed its displeasure with the crime situation by relocating to the safer haven of the northern suburbs. Another casualty could be the world-famous Ellispark Rugby Stadium – because the area is regarded as unsafe, declining spectators numbers are forcing the Golden Lions Rugby Union to consider selling the stadium and possibly moving to Midrand. Even Cape Town's CBD, still relatively habitable in the daytime, is being threatened by the same danger, and empty office and retail space is becoming the norm – the local tourism office wanted to leave the CBD for the Waterfront area to escape crime, but reconsidered after public outcry; a major banking group, BoE, is vacating its offices in the CBD after more than a century; South African Airlines former offices in a prime spot in the heart of Cape Town's CBD have been vacant for two years.

Roads lack urgent repairs – the N2 highway through the Transkei has become virtually impassable because of potholes, while cattle and horses walking freely over the N2 outside Cape Town are potentially lethal to motorists. Drivers without licences, a 100 000-strong minibus taxi fleet with total disregard for speed limits and the rules of the road, and poorly maintained vehicles that cause death and destruction on the roads are the norm. Parking in the streets of cities and towns is controlled by self-appointed parking attendants (commonly referred to as parking terrorists), who demand protection money for 'looking after' the parked vehicle – refusal to pay often leads to damaged vehicles, verbal abuse and physical threats. Other examples are the concept of 'African time', a convenient excuse for tardiness, especially by government officials arriving late for meetings; bureaucratic inefficiency, for example the waiting time for a new passport has increased to up to three months, as opposed to a few days; declining municipal services reflected in uncollected refuse piling up in suburbs; electricity and telephone interruptions – thieves openly dig up copper telephone cables, a 'business' worth tens of millions of rand each year. Recently one of the two runways at Cape Town International Airport was rendered virtually useless and flights had to be diverted because the electrical wire which powered the approach lights had been stolen. Slow delivery and theft in the mail service are other examples – most companies use only courier services to ensure that important documents arrive safely and on time.

The signs of a slow decay and decline are omnipresent. In June 2000 the Cape Symphony Orchestra and the State Theatre in Pretoria finally closed down because of the decline of state sponsorship for what is presumably regarded as a 'Eurocentric' cultural activity. Even the dead are not spared: in addition to the overturned tombstones at Heroes Acre in Pretoria, in a scene reminiscent of a horror movie, in 1998 squatters settled in Walmer cemetery in Port Elizabeth and shacks were built on graves, tombstones smashed, coffins exposed and skeletons dug up by scavenging pigs and dogs. In a different sphere, and a further example that embodies the questionable values of the government and the decline in South Africa's international status, Libyan leader Muhamar Ghadaffi was more or less the most important foreign dignitary at the inauguration of President Mbeki in 1999 – as one of South Africa's 'best friends' the leader of this terrorist state was given VIP treatment throughout his visit.

Still, one's views on the issue of falling standards in morality, education, healthcare and the public service depend to a large degree on one's political orientation. While the ANC will acknowledge that there are problems, the organisation tends to blame it on the legacy of apartheid and as a temporary result of the transformation process, and is quick to accuse white critics of being racist and of wanting to perpetuate the old order. On the other hand, there is little doubt that political opportunism tends to cloud the objectivity of the DP, NNP and other opposition parties when exposing government weaknesses in these areas.

Ultimately, however, it is indisputable that there are serious problems in the areas of corruption, healthcare, education and the public service, and that standards have deteriorated dramatically over the past few years. Whether this will continue will depend on the Mbeki government's will and ability to address these problems. Whether falling standards are really sufficient reasons for leaving South Africa is open to debate, but many emigrants point to these declining standards and many fall back on the cliché that South Africa is 'becoming just another African basket-case' and is turning into a 'Third World country'.

They draw unfavourable comparisons, perhaps unjustly, between conditions in South Africa and First World standards in Australia, UK, USA, Canada and elsewhere in the developed world. In this regard the comparisons with popular emigration destinations explain the lure to South Africans of these countries. The year 2000 United Nation's Human Development Index rated 174 countries in terms of their standard of living (measured by GDP per capita), life expectancy and educational attainment. Canada has been rated first for the past seven years (96 out of a possible 100 points), with the USA fourth, New Zealand ninth, the UK fourteenth, and



Australia fifteenth. All these countries received more than 93 points out of a possible 100, while South Africa was rated ninety-eighth with 71 points.⁸⁰

4.4 MBEKI'S 'TWO NATIONS': THE 'RE-RACIALISATION' OF SOUTH AFRICA

Wait till Madiba is gone. We are going to push them back into the sea –
journalist Lulama Luit⁸¹

If a new racism is a reality or becomes a reality, the scenario for South Africa is one of destruction. The polarisation and confrontation between black and white population groups will lead to an unbridgeable mistrust, merciless conflict that develops into violence, a wave of white emigration, the disintegration of stability and an economic desert –
Wimpy de Klerk⁸²

President Thabo Mbeki has argued that South African is a country of two nations, consisting of a black majority characterised by their poverty, and a financially well-off white minority. According to Mbeki there can be no real peace and reconciliation unless the gap between the standards of living of whites and blacks is narrowed. Until such time, Mbeki warns, whites will not be able to sleep well at night, the implication being that the danger of a poverty-driven black-on-white civil war or revolution is a very real one.

For most whites, Mbeki's warning brings back unpleasant memories of the pre-1990 years when the possibility of a bloody civil war between black and white was strong. Threats such as the following one from journalist John Qwelane do not go unnoticed among whites:

While whites may beat their breasts in anger and declare they have given up everything, and 'so far and no further', they might do well to consider that numerous young blacks, in particular, are proposing something even more drastic . . . Now it is being openly said – and it is no idle boast, we might add – that white South Africa can do its damndest and 'we will meet them bullet for bullet' – John Qwelane.⁸³

Other prominent black commentators such as Kaizer Nyatumba and Cyril Madlala have added their voices to those of Mbeki and Qwelane, in particular with regard to demands for speedier redistribution and warnings that a conflagration is awaiting the country should the frustrations of blacks be ignored:

For almost six years now, the masses have been waiting patiently ... Those who have more than their fair share of wealth and the resources of this country should understand why it is not right that the cake has not been distributed equitably. If they do not understand that now, and help the government to implement its corrective action programmes, before long the peasants, the workers and the hungry will lose patience and grab for themselves – Cyril Madlala⁸⁴

Frustration is likely to multiply among the African majority whose political leadership is so desperate to please the white minority that a few years down the line a terrible conflagration may yet erupt – Kaizer Nyatumba⁸⁵

The message to whites is clear – play along and make economic sacrifices, or put up with a racial Armageddon.

The question that occupies many white minds today is what do they still have to do and which sacrifices should they still make to meet the economic demands of millions of their poor black compatriots and the government? And if these sacrifices are not bearable or feasible, do they really see a future for themselves in South Africa if the alternative is a class-based civil war between the 'haves' and the 'have-nots', which will closely resemble a racially based civil war between black and white?



To answer this question one has to analyse the validity of Mbeki's claim that South Africa consists of two nations. It must be stated emphatically that the large numbers of poor whites and wealthy blacks and the assimilation that has occurred in South Africa among races, ethnic groups and cultures refute a simplistic two-nation explanation. It is true that almost 90% of the control of companies on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange is in white hands, but this control rests in a very small number of white hands and not with the white population or 'nation' as a whole.

It can be argued therefore that Mbeki's view tends to be too simplistic in ignoring the relative success of Nelson Mandela and his vision of forging a rainbow nation and a common South African identity. It also gives too little recognition to the fast-growing black middle class and the moderate successes of black empowerment which have created a 'third nation' consisting of well-off blacks and black intellectuals who are probably closer to the 'white nation' in lifestyle and aspirations (if not ideology) than to the poor 'black nation'. For example, the percentage of blacks who fall within the

wealthiest section of the population has increased from 9% to 22% between 1991 and 1999⁸⁶. The black share of total national income increased from 42% in 1991 to 48% in 1996⁸⁷. It can be assumed that it will have increased to over 55% by 2000. By 1996 there were already more blacks than whites in the top 20% income bracket in the 12 largest urban areas – 1,85 m blacks versus 1,65 m whites.⁸⁸

Yet race and class still largely coincide in South Africa, in spite of years of nation building, the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) and GEAR (Growth, Employment and Reconstruction). The average per capita black income is only about one fifth of that of whites, and blacks are still greatly under-represented in most spheres outside politics and the civil service.* The transformation process in South Africa therefore has a long way to go to alter the fundamental imbalance between white wealth and privilege and black poverty and apartheid-induced disadvantages. The ANC is committed, and rightly so, to changing this state of affairs in spite of white resistance.

The ANC's basic goal with transformation is to speed up economic upliftment of the black masses, to ensure greater black control of the economy through black empowerment and affirmative action, and to provide basic services to those in need faster than before. It wants to ensure that blacks are represented on all levels of society in numbers proportional to the demographics of the country. It also includes enforced racial quotas in areas as diverse as the workplace, sports teams and schools. Entry to medical schools at most South African universities is now carefully controlled to ensure that it also reflects the demographic composition of the country. Sports teams, including the provincial and national rugby and cricket teams, are coming under considerable pressure to pick players of colour in all teams irrespective of merit (the so-called merit with bias principle).

While most reasonable whites will not oppose in principle the broader goals of transformation, and view it as a necessary part of making up for 45 years of institutionalised racism and injustice, they are concerned about the method and the timeframe of the process. They are also concerned about the subtle threats made by Thabo Mbeki to the effect that the alternative to transformation and 'dreams deferred' (quoting American poet Langston Hughes) would be a 'racial explosion' and a racial civil war which could erupt within three to five years. Even the great



* But at over \$3 000 per annum the GDP per capita of black South Africans is still considerably more than that of most blacks elsewhere in Africa.

conciliator, Nelson Mandela, caused ripples of anxiety among whites when he denounced 'white privilege' and called for a redistribution of wealth to blacks.

Many whites fear that an over emphasis on transformation and less emphasis on reconciliation and nation building will result in substantial and threatening changes to their lives. Even six years after the 1994 elections and majority rule, some whites still harbour fears of 'apartheid taxes', the confiscation of land, wholesale nationalisation, 'Nürnberg trials' (instead they got the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, a very mild version indeed), altered street and city names and the dismantling of monuments reflecting white history. On the contrary, the ANC has been remarkably restrained in eliminating apartheid and white symbols such as statues, city and street names, but even so, some white residents of the former Transvaal still battle to come to terms with black mayors ruling 'their' towns and others still battle even to pronounce the names of the new provinces of Gauteng and Mpumalanga, while the vast majority of whites still have no idea of the African words of the national anthem, *Nkosi Sikelel' I-Africa*.

The majority of whites and many blacks are not hesitant to criticise disconcerting aspects of the transformation process, and in turn the ANC is quick to denounce such criticism as racist and disloyal. One of South Africa's top businessmen, Johann Rupert, denounced transformation as a 'wonderful' but useless concept which 'nobody wishes to define'.⁸⁹ The DP rejected aspects of transformation as being the equivalent of the 're-racialisation' of South Africa.⁹⁰ Its leader, Tony Leon, also complained that critics of aspects of the process of transformation are being smeared as racists and counter-revolutionaries. The head of the liberal Helen Suzman Foundation, R W Johnson, and office bearers of the liberal Institute of Race Relations, such as Themba Sono, Lawrence Schlemmer and Herman Giliomee, were accused by SACP spokesman Blade Nzimande of being 'reactionaries' and 'threats to transformation'. Even the Archbishop of Cape Town and successor to Desmond Tutu, Njongonkulu Ndungane, was accused by Mandela of being 'disloyal', because he criticised the performance of civil servants and the government's record on crime – Mandela's words were: '[T]hose people who challenge the (government) statistics are those who are not loyal to the government and the country.'⁹¹



These are only a few examples of the phenomenon of re-racialisation that has emerged since 1994 and also the notion that criticism of the government and its alliance partners can be parried effectively with accusations of racism, elitism, disloyalty and Eurocentrism.

The role that 're-racialisation' and an overemphasis on race play in obfuscating decision making in South Africa today can be illustrated by some recent examples. A prominent liberal white judge and one of the greatest jurists in South African legal history, Edwin Cameron, was excluded from a position on the Constitutional Court, apparently because he was white. This led Dennis Davis, a long-time liberal with impeccable credentials and a prominent anti-apartheid judge to protest that race, rather than merit, has become the only criterion in South Africa: 'Cameron is so brilliant and so highly regarded that his rejection sends a clear message to whites that race has indeed become the only factor. That is not the inclusive society that we had hoped for.'⁹² Davis himself had been accused of being a racist few years previously by Barney Pityana (later head of the Human Rights Commission).

A second example in which obsession with race has interfered with common sense was the announcement in 1999 by Minister of Security Steve Tswete that it had become a 'priority' to reduce the percentage of white management in the police force from 72% to 50% before the end of 1999. Tswete's obsession with the racial composition of the police force instead of focusing on crime was ill timed, considering that the crime situation is bordering on anarchy. The question that should be rightly asked, one which forces people to question their future in South Africa, is why should racial balances and equity in the police force be viewed as a priority when the country is bleeding to death because of violent crime?

The third example is disconcerting and potentially more dangerous. This refers to the actions of various newly created bodies resembling the archetypal 'Thought Police', as well as legislation to limit free speech that borders on the absurd. One such organisation is the Human Rights Commission, which was trying to force newspaper editors and other media figures to participate in an Inquiry into Racism in the Media – the flimsy report on which the commission based its decision has been widely discredited and the perception was growing locally and internationally that it could have been a government ploy to use alleged racism in the media to control and curtail press freedom.

To conclude, many whites fear that they are in a no-win situation: transformation as envisioned by the ANC will result in the 'new racism' against which Wimpy de Klerk warned, and too-slow progress of transformation will result in a revolution in which whites will be pitted against millions of desperate blacks. From this perspective, crime is merely a substitute for the 'revolution that never happened', and today's political threats could conceivably progress into tomorrow's full-scale revolution. These whites are not prepared to stay around only to become involved in another racial cauldron – in their opinion Australia, Canada, the UK and elsewhere are much less risky options.


4.5 THE GLOBAL VILLAGE

Just as I'm a South African, I'm also a citizen of the world. A world which is getting ever smaller, ever more attainable. We're no longer isolated, we're bona fide members of the world community, and there's a whole world out there to conquer – Jurgen Gregerson, former acting news editor of the *Independent on Saturday*⁹³

I want him to grow up as a citizen of the world, something to which many young Afrikaners are aspiring. Since the election we are part of the global village – (author Marita van der Vyfer, describing why she and her son chose to live in France)⁹⁴

In the 1990s the increasing process of globalisation meant that the borders of countries became less of a barrier to the free movement of skilled people. The explosion of information technology has made knowledge of career opportunities instantly available through the Internet and even applying for these overseas jobs can now be done through the Internet. The process of globalisation has resulted in people moving all over the world in search of jobs and often staying permanently – South Africa is no exception.

Even Australia, an important immigration destination for the British, South Africans and Chinese, is experiencing outflows of people because of skilled and adventurous people searching elsewhere for opportunities. In 1997–98 Australia had an outflow of 12 800 people to the UK, New Zealand, the USA, Hong Kong and Canada.⁹⁵ Canada has also been suffering from a similar brain drain to the USA for decades. Canadian professionals are attracted to the USA because of higher pay and lower taxation. Between 1986 and 1996 about 39 000 Canadian professional and technical workers emigrated to the USA, costing Canada about C\$11 billion (R44 billion) in lost contributions such as taxes and social welfare, and in money spent on their education. However, unlike South Africa, Canada is a popular emigration destination for skilled and other approved (as opposed to illegal) immigrants – more than ten people immigrated to Canada for every emigrant in the 1990s, while for every skilled emigrant from Canada that went to the USA, four entered Canada from elsewhere.⁹⁶



Thousands of younger South Africans in particular are currently living and working abroad on what is supposed to be a temporary basis – while some will come back after a two-year stint in the UK or elsewhere, others will stay on indefinitely,

depending on whether they find permanent work and/or obtain residency or citizenship in another country, and on unemployment levels and other problems in South Africa. For some, this kind of temporary 'emigration' should be encouraged, because it transfers internationally acquired skills back to South Africa:

A new wave of semi-permanent emigrants who are leaving South Africa to make hats in New York, work in London banks, run rafting operations in Uganda . . . Now these are the emigrants we should be taking notice of and celebrating . . . They are leaving because they see themselves as part of a global village of opportunity – Max Du Preez⁹⁷

In 1997 Britain granted 8 500 working visas to young South Africans under the age of 27. In 1998, 14 000 working visas were issued and about 23 000 would have been issued in 1999 and, considering the increasing trend, probably an even greater number in 2000.⁹⁸ It is estimated that South African youth on working visas probably number 50 000 at any given time. The benefit to South Africa is that when these people come back they bring with them new-found skills, experience and often capital. In addition, for the period that they are outside the country, their absence helps to lower short-term unemployment levels in South Africa.

For thousands of other professional people, transferable skills and job mobility are a crucial part of their career choices and leaving South Africa for better-paid jobs becomes as natural as moving to another local company. In 1998 between 10% and 15% of South African executives left their companies to emigrate.⁹⁹ When comparing the salaries of South African employees with those of their overseas counterparts, especially in IT and managerial positions, it is easy to understand why financial incentives entice them to go abroad – the average salary of a top manager in South Africa is about R1,5 million, compared to R3,25 million to R5 million in the USA.¹⁰⁰ Even taking into account the undervalued local exchange rate, the real pay that most employees take home for similar jobs in the USA implies a considerably higher standard of living for American employees. Apart from higher pay, professionals, especially scientists and researchers, have access to much greater resources in First World countries, where there is also a greater capacity in these economies to absorb them.¹⁰¹



THE EMIGRATION DEBATE


A man who changes his country is like a dog who changes his bark ... not to be trusted – *The drifters* by James Michener¹

We are convinced that real South Africans are being sorted out ... in the process (of emigration) – former president Nelson Mandela²

Leaving your country is in some way a desertion – Winnie Madikizela-Mandela³

If some no longer feel 'secure and free in their person' as a result of various forms of violent criminality don't they have the right to emigrate? – Themba Sono, President of the South African Institute of Race Relations⁴

Under NP rule emigration was viewed as a 'disease' unique to white English-speaking South Africans and was dismissed as being of no great consequence because the number of immigrants virtually always greatly outnumbered (official) emigrants. There was also a perception that Afrikaner hegemony over South Africa would be better off without these emigrant 'traitors', 'chicken runners' and 'liberals'. In the 1970s and 1980s the NP used emigration to question the loyalty of the liberal opposition of the time, the Progressive Federal Party, on the spurious grounds that its English-speaking liberal supporters constituted the bulk of emigrants – hence the joke that PFP was an abbreviation for 'Packing For Perth'. However, many emigrants were white liberals who left because they refused to put up with the authoritarian rule of the NP and because they opposed apartheid. Others emigrated because they feared what they perceived to be the natural outcome of the NP government's intransigent policies, namely a racial conflagration.



In contrast to previous emigration waves, the vast majority of emigrants who leave now do so because of crime and fears for their personal safety, not for political reasons. In a survey conducted by Idasa, two thirds of the 68% of skilled South Africans who have given consideration to emigration indicated a strong desire to help build South Africa, and stressed that they leave under duress because of their fears for their physical safety.⁵ As a result, many emigrants experience conflicting

feelings – relief at being able to escape from violent crime and other problems, but also guilt for what they and others perceive as a dereliction of their duty and disloyalty towards their country, families and friends.

Emigration has always been an emotional issue in South Africa largely because it has always been viewed from a political perspective, rather than as a social or economic phenomenon. As the numbers of emigrants increased and surpassed the numbers of immigrants in the second half of the 1990s, emotions rose to new levels and the opposition to emigration grew fiercer – arguments for and against emigration became even more politicised and personal and took on a racial flavour. This is not surprising as the vast majority of emigrants are white and most whites voted against the ANC in both post-apartheid elections. In the current political climate, the anti-government sentiment of many whites is too easily construed as disloyalty to the country – the perception is that emigrants are disloyal South Africans.

The debate is structured as follows: while one side is questioning the loyalty and patriotism of those who are leaving, the other side points to the socio-political conditions that cause people to leave the country and insists that emigration is a constitutional and human right. The emigration debate was fuelled by Nelson Mandela's comments in 1998 that 'real South Africans are ... not going to run away'. While Mandela received a great deal of support for calling a 'spade a spade', his comments also drew sharp criticism from some South Africans for what they perceived as interference in their democratic right to emigrate, and others demanded that the president address the underlying causes for emigration rather than attack emigrants.

Despite the arguments between those who criticise emigration and those who defend the freedom to emigrate, which are based mostly on abstract emotional terms such as patriotism, racism and anger towards the government, the real issue revolves around the impact that emigration has on the South African economy. In other words, what is the cost to the country in terms of the outflow of skills and capital, especially in the absence of a compensating inflow of skilled immigrants?


5.1 THE IMPACT OF EMIGRATION ON SOUTH AFRICA

President Mandela's response to whites who leave because of the high crime rate is blunt: 'Let them go. It's good riddance.' We disagree. The whites who leave are usually highly educated people. Their departure is a loss to the country – Editorial in *Financial Mail*⁶

Not without good reason, emigration is referred to as a brain drain, for it is normally the people with the highest levels of skills and education that constitute the bulk of emigrants – this is primarily because they find it easier to meet the strict entry requirements of emigration destinations. For this reason emigration costs South Africa very dearly in terms of the loss of skills and knowhow, loss of revenue and the outflow of capital.

The magnitude of the current brain drain and the potential flight of skills is truly shocking. Surveys commissioned by the *Sunday Times* in 1998 and in 1999 concluded that between 71% and 74% of professional people were considering emigrating.⁷ The survey found that almost a similar percentage of skilled blacks also considered leaving the country, although three quarters of these would do so for study purposes, that is, not permanently. The survey was extensive and received 11 000 individual responses from those with professional qualifications and, despite some criticism against its methodology, provided a fairly representative sampling of the opinion of professionals⁸.

A survey conducted among 725 respondents by Idasa found that 68% of skilled people have thought about emigration but that only 20% were prepared to go through with it.⁹ A total of 2% responded that the chances of them emigrating were 'very good' and a further 28% said that the chances were 'good'. The responses of Afrikaans and English-speakers were similar, while only 2% of blacks responded with a 'very good' and 19% said the chances of them emigrating were 'good'. A follow-up survey by the Idasa in 1999 indicated similar numbers, namely that 69% of skilled people had *considered* leaving South Africa and that 28% *had a desire* to leave, but that only 20% were *very likely* to leave¹⁰. A 2000 Business Industry Survey conducted among 3 250 businesses found that 41% of South Africa's business leaders and managers would leave the country if offered a good job overseas.



The findings of these surveys are not surprising, when one considers the findings of a survey conducted 11 years ago in 1989 by Jannie Gagiano, a professor at the University of Stellenbosch. Gagiano's findings indicated that as many as 32% of Afrikaner students and a further 38% of English-speaking white students would emigrate, should an ANC government come to power. Combining the two language groups, the survey suggested that one third of white students at South African universities would leave the country under a black government and that they had already made up their minds in 1989 when PW Botha was still president and an ANC government was a very remote possibility indeed.¹¹ If one considers that today between 35% and 75% of graduates in professions such as doctors, veterinarians, IT

specialists and chartered accountants leave after graduation, it appears Gagliano's figures were not far off the mark, and that the relatively benign nature of ANC rule had done little to halt the desire of educated whites to leave South Africa.

An International Monetary Fund (IMF) report published in 1999 found that 8% of South Africa's total pool of educated professionals have left to settle in the USA.¹² If the USA is the destination of close to 40% of all professionals who have left South Africa (see Table 2.4), it can be assumed that up to 20% of South Africa's educated professionals have left the country in recent years.* A study by Kaplan, Baptiste-Meyer and Mercy Brown of the Development Policy Research Unit of UCT confirmed these estimates – they found that between 12% and 20% of South Africans with tertiary qualifications have left the country.¹³ They also found that 28% of UCT's current doctoral students were living overseas, along with 43% of its contactable (those on alumni lists) medical graduates, 30% of commerce doctorates, 27% of education doctorates and 26% of science doctorates.^{14**} Furthermore, that emigration by professionals was up by 56% for the five-year period between 1994 and 1999 compared to the five years between 1989 and 1994.¹⁵

The higher the skills level and the greater the demand for the skills, the easier it is for a potential emigrant to find work overseas and therefore the greater the emigration in that category. For this reason South Africa is experiencing a tremendous outflow of emigrants in the information technology (IT) sector with about 200 to 260 IT professionals leaving the country each month, according to recruitment house CPL.¹⁶ About 15% of all IT personnel who left their jobs in 1998 did so to emigrate.¹⁷

The Institute of Directors, representing many of South Africa's top businesspeople, lost 3% (45) of its 1 500 members in 1997 because of emigration.¹⁸ This may not sound like much, but added up over a ten-year period South Africa will have lost one third of the driving force in its economy, the top managers, because of emigration. In 1997 and 1998 10% of overall personnel turnover was a result of



* Three African countries account for more than one third of highly-educated emigrants to the USA: Ghana with 26%, South Africa with 8% and Egypt with 2,5%, *Sunday Times*, 1 August 1999.

** To cater for the many skilled South Africans living abroad, UCT's Science and Technology Policy Research Centre and the French Institute for Scientific R&D, founded the South African Network of Skills Abroad (SANSA) with the aim of sourcing the skills and knowledge of expatriates to assist the development of the South African economy. By 1999 it had 1800 members spread over 57 countries and its website is at <http://www.uct.ac.za/org/sansa/>.

emigration, while 6%-10% of middle management and 11% of top management who resigned gave emigration as the reason.¹⁹ Other sources estimate that up to 20% of executives who left their companies in 1998 did so to emigrate.²⁰

Accountants are also in high demand overseas. One recruitment agent complained that it was becoming virtually impossible to find young chartered accountants 'because they are all in London'.²¹ If this sounds like an exaggeration, in 1999, 19% (3 365 CAs) of the members of the Institute of Chartered Accountants were living overseas, with a further 300 joining the exodus each year – one large unnamed auditing firm claimed that it was losing up to 75% of trainee CAs shortly after they qualified.²² In addition, the laws of supply and demand and the scarcity of local CAs have been pushing their salaries to absurd heights and way beyond their relative worth to companies.

Scientists in all spheres of research have also joined the exodus with a considerable degree of enthusiasm. They are in huge demand overseas because of the excellence of South Africa's top universities and the world-class scientists produced by them, as well as the international transferability of scientific knowledge. In 1998 the country's premier veterinary research institute, Onderstepoort, was unable to supply certain veterinary medicines because so many of its personnel had emigrated. In 1996 almost half of graduates at the Department of Veterinary Medicines at the University of Pretoria had either left the country or were planning to do so shortly after graduation.²³ At the World Fisheries Conference in 1997 South African and Australian delegations were very compatible and the camaraderie was reminiscent of an 'Old Boys Club' – this was not surprising as half the Australian delegation consisted of ex-South Africans.²⁴ A recent survey found that 27% of specialist science/technology staff who left their jobs in 1998/1999 gave emigration as the reason.²⁵ The same study found that one-third of specialist engineering and artisans who resigned during this period cited emigration as the reason.



Teachers too find emigration an appealing option, and many leave to find better-paid jobs overseas. Recruitment agencies have been actively recruiting South African teachers for positions in the UK. According to Statistics South Africa, between 50 and 60 teachers are leaving each month and a total of 1 300 had left between 1994 and August 1997, mostly to New Zealand and the UK.

The number of medical graduates and doctors that choose to emigrate is high by any standards. A 1998 survey by Idasa suggests that about 35% of doctors in South Africa will leave the country within the next five years.²⁶ A total of over 500 doctors left

officially in the three years between 1996 and 1998, but as many leave unofficially, and this figure should be between 1 000 and 1 500.²⁷ About 12% of medical students who graduated in 1998 failed to register for compulsory community service in 1999 – since new doctors cannot practise in South Africa without doing community service, it is quite certain that this percentage, about 140 in total, have left the country. Professor Max Price, dean of Wits Medical School, estimated that about 35% of his medical students emigrate after graduation.²⁸ This figure could even be higher, according to the South African Journal of Science – this body claimed that 45% (about 2 000 professionals) of medical students graduating at Wits Medical School over the past 35 years have left South Africa.²⁹ By the end of 1999 about 600 South African doctors were registered in New Zealand.³⁰ Since New Zealand is the destination of choice of about 10% of South African emigrants, the total number of doctors that have left South Africa could be well in the excess of 6 000. In the province of Saskatchewan in Canada there were 218 registered South African doctors in 1996, accounting for about 14% of the province's medical practitioners. By 1995 there were 1 129 South African general practitioners and specialists in Canada, constituting about 2% of all medical professionals in the country.³¹

Dentists are not immune to the emigration bug either. The South African Dental Association claims that 2 000 of the 4 200 dentists registered in South Africa were also registered in the UK (apparently a common safety net for South African medical practitioners), and that at least 800 of them were already working there.³² Other sources suggest that by 1999 about 3 000 South African dentists lived and worked in the UK.³³ The discrepancy between these two figures might be because many South African dentists live permanently in the UK and have presumably allowed their South African registration to lapse. In 1999 more than half of the 220 South Africans who qualified as dentists left the country for a variety of reasons, according to Melmut Heyd of the South African Dental Association.³⁴

South African nurses are also in great demand overseas, and many leave the country as a result of poor pay and stressful working conditions. As a result, the outflow of nurses, particularly to the UK and Saudi Arabia, reached such high proportions that former president Nelson Mandela tried to persuade the British government to halt the recruitment of South African nurses in the UK – his efforts did not appear to be hugely successful, as more than 600 South African nurses applied for registration in the UK in 1998.³⁵

The extraordinarily high crime rate and the accompanying brain drain and skills shortage were identified by the American Chamber of Commerce in South Africa as

the principal reasons behind the slow rate of foreign investments in South Africa. In more quantifiable terms, PE Corporate Services calculated the cost of emigration and the loss of skills at about R2,5 billion a year.³⁶ It is estimated that each graduate emigrant would have contributed R7,4 million to the economy in his or her lifetime. Economist Azar Jammine claims that the departure of every skilled emigrant results in the loss of ten unskilled jobs.³⁷ Therefore, using Jammine's reasoning, it can be said that if at least half of the estimated 20 000–30 000 people that leave each year are skilled or highly skilled, about 100 000–150 000 unskilled jobs are lost each year. According to Dawie Roodt, an economist with PLJ Financial Services, the taxes paid by a family who earn about R300 000 per year are used by the government to support 12 other poor families with healthcare, education and social assistance – the loss of this revenue because of that family emigrating means that government has to find money elsewhere to support these families.³⁸

A study by Thys Fourie and Reynold Joubert suggests that emigration has already cost South Africa R8,4 billion in the form of loss of income tax and a further R285 billion in the form of the loss of potential contributions to the country's GNP. In 1997 alone the estimated 11 000 emigrants with university education (earning on average R200 000) resulted in the loss of R800 million in income tax and over R2 billion in the loss of potential contributions to the GNP. The authors claim that between 1994 and 1997 South Africa's GNP suffered a loss of 1,55% because emigrants with university degrees left the country.³⁹ These figures become even worse if one adds the emigrants without degrees but with other income-generating skills such as artisans, farmers and nurses.



A study by the Development Policy Research Unit of UCT found that emigration lowered South Africa's GDP by 0,37% each year (slightly less than the estimate of Fourie and Joubert above, but it refers to GDP). Considering that South Africa's economy had shown minimal growth of less than 1% over the past few years, an additional shrinkage of a third of a percentage point has serious consequences. The study also found that almost R68 billion of investment in 'human capital' (education, training and experience) was lost to the economy because of emigration in 1997 alone, and a further R2,5 billion per annum was lost because of the turnover of skilled personnel due to emigration.⁴⁰

In addition to the loss of potential tax revenue and job creation potential, emigrants cost South Africa millions of rands in terms of the cost of their education. Skilled emigrants are educated and trained in South Africa with taxpayers' money and, for example, it costs about R600 000 to train a doctor. An editorial by Daniel Ncayiyana in the South African Medical Journal argued that the 600 South African doctors that

have settled in New Zealand amounted to a direct aid transfer of R600 million from South Africa to New Zealand.^{41*} Should these doctors leave the country before they actually work and pay taxes, some argue that they have not fulfilled their moral obligations to the country which paid for their studies.

However, the converse is also true. South Africa gains skills from immigrants and it is irrefutable that for a long time officially South Africa had a net gain of skilled people because of migrants. These people came to South Africa with their degrees, skills and capital to the great benefit of the country – referred to as the ‘brain gain’. For this very reason it is so difficult to understand or justify the bureaucratic bungling of the Department of Home Affairs when issuing work and residency permits to foreign skilled workers.

While the decline in immigration in the 1990s was partly the result of the unstable political situation, violence and crime, it was also the result of the Department of Home Affairs’ absurdly stringent immigration policies and restrictions on work and residency visas. While South Africa has an urgent need for professionals in most categories, official policies have led to a decline in the number of professionals such as doctors, managers and engineers entering the country over the past five years: between 1993 and 1998 the number of professional immigrants declined by 74%, from 1 171 in 1993 to 307 in 1998.⁴²

Rather than try to counter the outflow of skilled emigrants with an increased inflow of skilled immigrants, the government appears to be doing exactly the opposite – legislation and rules by bureaucrats in the Department of Home Affairs are making it difficult for bona fide immigrants to enter the country.** Prospective immigrants find they sometimes have to leave collateral and overcome tortuous regulations and that the application fee has increased from zero to R7 700 and to R11 000 in 1999. By 1998 the average waiting period for a foreign academic to obtain a work permit had increased from less than two months to close to a year, according to Helen Zille,




* Considering that the training cost for a doctor is close to R600 000, the actual loss in favour of New Zealand would be less, in other words, R360 million. However, considering that only about 10% of South African emigrant doctors go to New Zealand, the total monetary loss of due to South African doctors emigrating from South Africa, amounts to about R3,6 billion.

** According to Hennie Meyer of the Department of Home Affairs, South Africa does not encourage immigration and would only allow a skilled immigrant into the country if nobody in South Africa cannot be trained to do the job that an immigrant is trained to do.

MEC in the Western Cape Legislature.⁴³ In one case of bureaucratic madness, a highly skilled British citizen, Esmee Sargeant, working in South Africa legally, was deported in January 1999 when her work permit was withdrawn apparently without just cause and contrary to government regulations. Sargeant was working as a financial manager in a medical centre in a black suburb, Alexandria. She was treated like a criminal and thrown in the back of a police van, before being put on the next plane back to the UK.

In an article titled 'Economic suicide in one easy step', Adrienne Roberts of the *Financial Mail* explained the sheer stupidity behind the attempts by Home Affairs officials to keep foreign skills out of South Africa by delaying the processing of permits or by simply refusing applications on flimsy grounds.⁴⁴ Even foreign companies opening subsidiaries here are battling with the department to bring their skilled staff with them – Roberts describe this bureaucratic obstruction as akin to 'deliberate sabotage' which is costing South Africa dearly in lost opportunities in foreign investment and in the inability to replace the emigration exodus with skilled immigrants. Ironically incident happened while between four and eight million illegal unskilled aliens from Africa live and work here almost with impunity.

As a result of the constant pressure from employers, the government was considering easing the immigration policy by allowing skilled immigrants on shorter-term job assignments to enter the country on a more easily obtainable business visa. By the end of 1999 it appeared that the Minister of Home Affairs, Mangosuthu Buthelezi, finally realised that his department's incompetence had cost the country dearly in terms of skilled immigrants who gave up trying to get visas and investors opting to go elsewhere because they cannot bring skilled employees into South Africa. Buthelezi, prompted by Mbeki, finally promised to address the issue, and in February 2000 a White Paper on immigration was released. This document suggested the creation of an immigration service, the issuing of flexible residence permits for some businesses and short-term residence permits for tourists, potential investors and some traders.⁴⁵ However, the new approach still appears to be inadequate, for it fails to recognise the need to actively encourage an influx of badly needed skills and places too much discretionary power in the hands of notoriously over-zealous bureaucrats.



5.2 THE EMOTIONAL CAMPAIGN AGAINST EMIGRATION

Criticism voiced against emigration in South Africa can be divided into three broad categories which span the ideological spectrum and coincide at certain junctures.

The first is the ANC's view (shared by many others to the left and the right of the spectrum) that emigrants are unpatriotic, disloyal and cowardly – ironically, the ANC uses phrases similar to those used by the former ruling NP, except that the 'chicken run' is now described by some as the 'chicken marathon'. The second is the view of the ANC and those to its left that emigrants are racists who are leaving the country simply because they cannot tolerate living under a black government. Third, from an Afrikaner nationalist and religious angle emigrants are weakening the Afrikaner nation or the 'white' racial group by numerically and proportionally reducing their numbers in South Africa and are acting against God's wishes.

An appeal to patriotism: 'Real South Africans won't emigrate'

We who have stayed ridicule those on the chicken run. We condemn their convenient escape from the realities of a country in transition. We detest their desire to be South African on the day the rugby, cricket or soccer team comes to town – sports journalist Mark Keohane⁴⁶

In 1996 Nelson Mandela, on a visit to France, made a passionate plea to South African expatriates to return home – he confidently predicted that expatriates would return once they saw that his government had ensured stability. This was a recurrent theme of the Mandela presidency: 'Many of them are going to come back as they see that their fears were baseless and their concerns are being addressed.'⁴⁷

At the same time he was not averse to criticising emigrants. In September 1998, perhaps stung because so few of the one million-plus expatriates were prepared to accept his repeated invitations to return, he derided emigrants as being unpatriotic and not 'real' South Africans, and suggested that their departure was 'good riddance': 'Let them go. In that process we are convinced that real South Africans are being sorted out. The real South Africans are those who are saying "This is our country."⁴⁸ Mandela also argued that the fear of crime was a 'mainly white preoccupation' which was 'fermented by a white-owned press' and that crime was no reason to emigrate.

His comments drew strong criticism from across the political spectrum and, perhaps as a result, he later acknowledged that crime was indeed a 'very serious problem' and one of the factors fuelling emigration.⁴⁹ In May 1999 Mandela again referred to the 'duty that whites had to serve South Africa' and suggested that those who leave the country have no 'loyalty and no patriotism'.⁵⁰ He was echoed by the then deputy president, Thabo Mbeki, who said that those who constantly threatened to emigrate should just go ahead and do it: 'My only response is that it is probably better that they leave.'⁵¹ Mbeki's comments were clearly aimed at those whites whom he regarded as

intransigent, not only because the vast majority of emigrants are white, but also because he mentioned emigrants in the same breath as those 'South Africans who did not want to see transformation'. The natural assumption was that whites critical of his government and those who emigrate are the same people.

The use of patriotism, or supposed lack of it, as a litmus test of the patriotism of emigrants has been widely supported by ANC supporters and others alike:

Good citizens will not emigrate – Khudu Mbeba⁵²

The President is correct in his statement that real and true South Africans, who have the interests of the country at heart, will not allow themselves to become chicken-runners and rats leaving the South African ship which they perceive to be sinking – T Gubaha⁵³

It even struck a chord among some whites who presumably are not ANC supporters, but feel that emigrants, as a rule, cannot possibly be patriotic. Their view is clearly evident from the numerous letters and articles in local newspapers:

I am a middle-aged, white, Afrikaans-speaking Nationalist mother of three and a South African patriot ... I concluded that they [emigrants] were losers, people without whom South Africa could only be better off – L Veldtman⁵⁴

I have always been angered by what inevitably does seem like an unwillingness to stay and make this place work. The post-1994 emigrants are the ones that stir my patriotic gut like a witch's cauldron – Max du Preez⁴⁹

Often the undertone is faintly threatening: '[W]e have the skills and capital and if we don't like the way the game is being played, we will take it all and go and play somewhere else ...' Mandela is right: whites are consummate whiners and many lack any real commitment to South Africa ... The shallowness of white commitment is reflected in the queues of applicants to consult emigration experts – William Saunders-Meyer⁵⁶



Even foreigners and immigrants to South Africa sometimes self-righteously assume the authority to attack emigrants as being 'disloyal to South Africa', in spite of being migrants themselves, as the following comment from Mike Thorne illustrates:

I am an Australian emigrant who has immigrated to Cape Town . . . Who is leaving? Mainly young white people with children . . . Anybody, and in particular, young, white people, leaving or attempting to leave South Africa is betraying a country that gave whites a lot more than it gave its blacks. Now, when it is their turn to give something back, they want to duck their responsibility, do not want to pay their dues to their country – immigrant Mike Thorne⁵⁷

Others use the term patriotism in a more positive way in an attempt to reassure emigrants that they will be much better off staying in South Africa – they point to the country's outstanding natural scenery, the beaches and climate, the political achievements since 1994, the rainbow nation and cultural diversity, and often fall back on the cliché of 'braaivleis, sunny skies and rugby':

For those white South Africans playing with the parachute chord: don't jump! Stay for the wide open African spaces and the most magnanimous president in the world – Bradley Bordiss⁵⁸

However, we would urge all South Africans toying with the idea of emigrating to factor into their deliberations a sense of historical perspective. Less than three years ago . . . predictions of gloom and doom abounded. Some alarmists even took to hoarding bully beef and baked beans in their cellars and pantries. [However] many South Africans who sold up and left the country lived to regret it – Editorial in the *Cape Times*⁵⁹

Other critics emphasise the aspect of 'guilt' in their definition of patriotism and in their criticism of people leaving – their argument is that emigrants should feel guilty for living off the fat of the land, enjoying the fruit of taxpayers' money in the form of subsidised education, and then emigrating when things get difficult. It is interesting to note that both blacks and whites, including Afrikaners, hold this point of view:

They owe it to South Africa not to emigrate because it was taxpayers' money that made it possible for them to qualify as doctors – P Swart⁶⁰

Graduates should not leave the country. They obtained their degrees because of the sacrifices and tax contributions of their fellow-South Africans – John Hlophe, Judge-President of the Western Cape⁶¹

These cowards [emigrants] . . . should be called on to pay reparations to the disadvantaged masses – T Gubaha⁶²


Please go on to explain why you have chosen to leave this beautiful country when it needs you the most ... If you and all others who have left had decided to stay and give a little back, maybe you could have made the difference – D Jubber⁶³

[Those who leave] are rats who fattened themselves on the indigenous masses – anonymous⁶⁴

Those who are leaving the country are the people who benefited from the notorious apartheid government under which they were so well protected – M Vuko⁶⁵

South Africa will be well rid of these people who acquired their skills and qualifications at the expense of the indigenous masses. The sooner they leave the sooner the real transformation can begin – N Ndeker⁶⁶

Another category of critics of emigration presumptuously choose to attack the messengers who carry the bad news about emigration and who expose the hard facts behind emigration. One such example is Anna Christensen, who, in her review of the (Booker) award-winning novel *Disgrace* by J M Coetzee, wrote that she was sorry that Coetzee had won this prestigious award, because (she claimed) he conveyed the wrong message about social conditions in South Africa. Christensen argued: 'We don't need Coetzee to tell us that ... South Africa is a violent society' and claimed that the book will encourage emigration: 'For any white South African still straddling the fence on the issue of emigration, it is a must-read; the proverbial straw that will break his will and send him hobbling off to the Australian embassy for emigration forms.'⁶⁷ Similarly, journalist Max du Preez not only attacked emigrants for being 'unethical', but also heaped scorn upon the authors of articles on emigration. According to Du Preez, these authors are guilty of fear-mongering and of using the statistics behind emigration to scare the 'soft underbelly of (the wealthy whites in) Saxonwold and Constantia'.⁶⁸



Condemnation: 'Emigrants are racists'

The ANC and those on its left support a view that emigrants are leaving the country because they are not comfortable living under a black-dominated government, and inter alia, that emigrants must be racist. This view was shared by Nelson Mandela, who suggested that emigrants left the country 'because they were not prepared to reconcile themselves to the new dispensation'. Certain political commentators such

as William Saunderson-Meyer demurely follow this line: 'Whites also adhere to the openly racist position that a South Africa led by the ANC will inevitably sink into failure and disaster.'⁶⁹

A senior journalist for Independent Newspapers, Paddy Harper, and others virulently concur:

They [emigrants] are, quite frankly, scared [and incapable] of living without the many layers of unearned protection and privilege ... they cannot stomach the reality that their days of dominating every facet of life in South Africa are over, that they are not the chosen race ... [it] is a sickening cocktail of racism, laziness and cowardice – Paddy Harper^{70*}

[White emigrants are] fed-up ... with the insecurities of no longer holding the trump card in the new order – journalist Charlotte Bauer⁷¹

No. It's pure and simple self-interest. They stayed in the old SA because they benefited from these unjust laws. Now they have lost that privileged position and that's it for them: 'Let's go' – R Jones⁷²

For some South Africans, the need to give up some of their privileges, to accept that they cannot continue to get a disproportionate share of this government cake, is simply too much to bear ... Some simply pack up and go – Former Australian High Commissioner to South Africa, Ian Porter⁷³

Is there any factual basis for the contention that emigrants are racist by nature or by virtue of their choice or that they are more racist than any other segment of the population? Unless the fear of crime can be equated with racism, the answer is decidedly 'no'. A large portion of emigrants continually express their desire to return to South Africa and to make a contribution to its prosperity, but insist that life-threatening crime prevents them from doing so. A typical comment is:

Initially we were very excited over our arrival in Canada, but we miss our family and South Africa very much. I have the impression that 90% of South Africans here are considering eventually returning to South Africa,



* An indignant reader, Bernie Slater, responded: 'What passport are you on, Paddy, me old lad?', referring to the fact that Harper was originally from Ireland and probably had his European Union passport safely tucked away while trying to be holier-than-thou.

should conditions stabilise. However, having just read about another cruel murder in the hometown, it is obvious that we have a long wait before this happens – Gerhard Malherbe, Alberta⁷⁴

That is not to deny that a sizeable percentage of emigrants do display contempt for and a hatred of the society that they have left behind. This type of emigrant is likely to hold the opinion that black South Africans are not capable or civilised enough to govern the country and that South Africa will inevitably go the same way as ‘the rest of Africa’. They also hint that they feel more comfortable in foreign countries where whites form a majority of the population and where the English language is the national language, so that they ‘at least can understand what is said on television’.

Notwithstanding, the percentage of racists among the emigrant community would probably not be much higher than the percentage of whites that harbour racist sentiments and stay put in South Africa. It is difficult to verify this contention as no such poll exists, but the general sentiment of emigrants appears to be one of a benign sense of ‘boredom’ with the relative homogeneity of for example England or New Zealand – accompanied by a sense of longing for the multitude of races, cultures and lifestyles of South Africa – rather than expressions of racial prejudice. Furthermore, criticism levelled by emigrants and locals at decaying social conditions and the direction of the government cannot per se be construed as racism, contrary to what the ANC says.



Objections by Afrikaner nationalists and the DRC

As it did under Nationalist rule up to 1994, the sentiment still exists that emigrants are committing ‘treason’ against the Afrikaner *volk* and that they weaken the strength of the white population group as a whole. The argument is that emigration reduces the numbers of Afrikaners and consequently will adversely affect the survival of the Afrikaans language and culture. Others hold the view that Afrikaners relinquish their right to be called Afrikaners once they live overseas and that the Afrikaans language cannot survive outside South Africa. Among those adhering to this view are the following (author’s italics):

What bothers me is the fact that they [emigrants] view it as an achievement to emigrate – they have forsaken themselves and *their language* – S Lombaard⁷⁵

You can’t just run away from your country’s problems ... you should remain here and help to solve the problems if you emigrate you desert

your own people [Afrikaners] and you contribute to the decline of their language which is already under threat – P Swart⁷⁶

The children of Afrikaner emigrants quickly forget how to speak Afrikaans and without their language they cannot be Afrikaners ... An Afrikaner who emigrates therefore weakens and impoverishes the Afrikaner nation – Anonymous⁷⁷

Slightly less chauvinistic but in a similar vein was the objection to emigration raised by the Dutch Reformed Church (DRC) in 1998. A DRC Commission took a stance against emigration by declaring that emigrants are forsaking their 'duty and calling' as Christians and that the Church was obliged to speak out and deter emigration. It also expressed its concern over the 'negative' attitude of many of its members towards the new dispensation as reflected in the 'large numbers of whites leaving the country'.

To be able to evaluate the DRC's condemnation of emigrants objectively, it is important to look at the history of the Church. Although the present altruistic and patriotic motives of the DRC on this issue cannot be questioned per se, the moral foundation from which it launches attacks on emigrants should be put into perspective, with reference to the role of the Church in the apartheid era.

All three Afrikaans Reformed churches were actively involved before and after 1948 in the formulation of apartheid ideology and provision for the NP of scriptural justification for racial segregation and white domination. From this perspective, the DRC's blanket condemnation of emigrants appears very similar to the former NP's habit of classifying anyone who disagreed with its ideology as disloyal to the Afrikaner cause. In addition, the Church's use of religion to criticise emigrants is in principle not so different from its historical use of the Bible to justify apartheid.

The DRC's view led to widespread reaction and opposing responses. Those who agreed with the DRC's stance held the following view:

Too many people who are now running away are forsaking their call as Afrikaners and as Christians and they create the impression that they do not care what happens to those left behind – A van der Merwe⁷⁸

However, others strongly resented the DRC's interference in the emigration issue:

I regard the opinion of the DRC as extremely arrogant ... This is not a subject in which the Church must interfere – C Liebenberg⁷⁹

I cannot believe that a small group of people [the DRC] in South Africa would decide what the calling of others should be . . . My calling is to find a safe environment for my children. If I did not do everything in my power to do so, I would have forsaken my calling – former SABC radio and television presenter Norma Odendaal, who emigrated to New Zealand in 1997⁸⁰

By early 2000 the three Afrikaans Reformed Churches appeared to have accepted the inevitability of the Afrikaner exodus and were considering assisting emigrants by establishing congregations in Australia to be headed by ministers from South Africa.⁸¹

5.3 THE CONTRARY VIEW: REAL SOUTH AFRICANS ARE FREE TO EMIGRATE

Do you owe any loyalty to a country where your life is worth nothing? – Anonymous⁸²

Apologists for today's South Africa are reduced to citing braaivleis and blue skies as a compelling reason to stay . . . Patriotism is surely the last desperate refuge of any government – R Lockwood⁸³

People are seldom openly in favour of emigration – by definition it is not something which one can strongly argue for (although some argue strongly against it), but there are powerful arguments for emigrants being freely allowed to leave their country of birth without being morally judged, prejudiced against or financially penalised by the state. One such argument is based on emigration as a basic human and constitutional right, another on emigration as a just response to unbearable social, economical or political conditions, and another that South Africans have always been a nation of migrants.



‘Blame the government’

There comes a time where civilised men and women turn their backs on barbarism and if they have the option, they leave the madhouse. In South Africa this time has almost come – Gavin Bell, former Southern African Correspondent of *The Times* (UK)*



* Bell was commenting with great bitterness on the murder of his friend and local photojournalist, John Rubython.



Mandela would do well to remember that [the current wave of emigrants] are the people who stayed on when South Africa went through its transition to democracy . . . they stayed on believing that the incoming government would be the antithesis of the old regime. What did they get? Violence on an unprecedented scale, racial discrimination in the workplace and collapsing social infrastructures – R Lockwood⁸⁴

The strongest argument in favour of allowing emigrants freedom of movement without placing undue moral, legal or other constraints on them is that the government is unable or unwilling to fulfil its responsibility to protect its citizens from crime and social disorder, and that it has allowed conditions in the country to deteriorate to such an extent that it created strong push forces that drive people out of South Africa. The premise is that emigration is merely a symptom of a deeper malaise over the deteriorating socio-economic and political problems that threaten the wellbeing of the country and its citizens, and as such, emigrants are acting rationally. Therefore, if blame should be apportioned, it should be directed at the causes of emigration, and not at emigrants themselves – causes which include rampant crime, corruption, affirmative action and the other issues discussed in the


previous chapter. The leader of the Official Opposition, Tony Leon, and others concur:

The government should address the causes of emigration ... Mandela makes a big mistake if he thinks that real South Africans will not leave the country ... the truth is that thousands of highly skilled people have already emigrated and many more from all racial groups will follow if the government cannot defeat crime – DP leader, Tony Leon⁸⁵

And he [Mandela] has chosen to use their decision to leave as a litmus test of their patriotism. To what end? It does not serve any useful purpose to deny ... that the conditions which cause people to leave the country are real and compelling – editorial, *Cape Argus*⁸⁶

There is a growing number of people of all races who believes that even now, after that special year of 1994, South Africa is not a country where justice, peace and prosperity rule – and they too are leaving – C Smith⁸⁷

Emigrants and other disgruntled South Africans who are fed up with crime and deteriorating standards and morals take particularly strong exception to the accusation by Nelson Mandela that they are not 'real South Africans'. On the contrary, they regard themselves as just as patriotic as any other South African and insist that their criticism of the government and their decision to exercise their constitutional right to leave the country do not imply that they are second-class citizens. Some draw convincing comparisons between their ties with South Africa and the loyalty of the Jewish Diaspora towards the state of Israel. In addition, the argument goes, no-one has the right to unilaterally define patriotism and dismiss those as unpatriotic who do not fall within this definition.



Mandela's comments drew sharp criticism from across the spectrum, including editorials in business newspapers and newspapers normally sympathetic to the government, the South African Institute of Race Relations and ordinary people of all races:

I would like to suggest that what this country really needs is a real president – R McGregor⁸⁸

No, Mr President, it's not those running in fear that aren't 'real South Africans', it's the ones chasing behind them with guns and knives! – R Arenson⁸⁹

President Mandela should quit while his reputation is still intact . . . It is a desperate man who resorts to cheap psychological tactics to try and keep his country's intellectual capital at home – A Strates⁹⁰

To add insult to injury, people of all colours who want to leave South Africa to avoid being murdered, robbed, hijacked or raped are accused of being unpatriotic. We are all sick of fat-cat government officials, who have phalanxes of bodyguards, assuring the average man in the street that all is well and that they should not be so 'unpatriotic' as to leave South Africa – R Khumalo⁹¹

But to suggest that citizens in a free country are not real citizens, are not patriots, by the simple device of their decision to shop for a new home in another country, is not only to betray authoritarian intolerance, but also to misconstrue the meaning of our constitutional democracy – Themba Sono, President of the South African Institute of Race Relations⁹²

Emigrants are not cowards . . . They are rational people who believe they and their children will be better off, and certainly safer, elsewhere; they are mobile because they are skilled, educated and employable. For too many useful, productive South Africans emigration has become not the cowardly option, but the sensible one – editorial, *Business Day*⁹³

A basic human right protected by the constitution

Surely if anyone feels it is in his or her interest and that of their family to emigrate, that is a matter of free choice – Stephen Mulholland⁹⁴

We are dealing here with people's lives. If they perceive that their safety and long-term prospects are better served by living elsewhere then they have not only the right to so arrange their affairs, but also an obligation to do so – Stephen Mulholland⁹⁵

Emigration is regarded as a basic human right recognised by most countries. In South Africa the right of emigrants to leave the country is enshrined in the Constitution. According to clause 21 of the Constitution's Bill of Rights all citizens have the right to leave the country without impediments, except of course for the financial constraints in the form of exchange controls: 'Everyone has the right to freedom of movement.' 'Everyone has the right to leave the Republic.' This is an unquestionable right that

applies to all emigrants, but even so, it does not deter politicians and others from demanding that the emigration regulations should be changed.

Governments the world over habitually feel obliged to interfere in the legal and natural flow of people across borders. Two such examples are the Soviet Union and China, which did not generally allow their citizens to emigrate in the past. Nazi Germany also made it difficult for Jews to leave the country in the 1930s, and this pattern has been followed by authoritarian governments ever since. F W de Klerk, Minister of Education in the 1980s, threatened to prevent emigrants from leaving the country unless they first repaid their study subsidies from the state. De Klerk never made good his threat, but the idea of making emigrants pay for their education is still alive. In 1998 the PAC suggested that a 'departure tax' be levied on all emigrants, while the president of the Medical Research Council, Malegapuru Makgoba called on Parliament to draft laws that will ensure that skills, knowledge and research which were funded by the government do not leave South Africa without the country having benefited in some way for its contribution. The ANC transport minister of KwaZulu-Natal, S'bu Ndebele, also called for legislation to curb emigration: '... South Africa continues to lose the crème de la crème of our skilled workers through emigration. I think some legislative mechanism should be made to reverse this exodus ...'.⁹⁶



Taking into consideration that South Africa had received more immigrants than emigrants (official figures) over the past few decades, the country has therefore benefited more than it lost, in terms of gaining skilled people. For this reason, the demands of the PAC and Makgoba are shortsighted and miss the point completely, namely that migration is a two-way stream – for most of the post-1945 era many more skilled people entered the country than left, and logically South Africa should be paying foreign governments for the overall brain gain.

'Our ancestors were also emigrants'

Some emigrants justify their decision to depart by pointing out that white South Africans are in South Africa because their ancestors migrated here from Europe, often because of repression, like the French Huguenots. It is therefore not unusual, the argument goes, for them to emigrate if they feel under threat. This line of argument ties up with the idea that the migration of people has been an ongoing process in human history and that it is especially relevant as the world becomes a global village. This line of reasoning goes as follows:

Have they forgotten that our forefathers had emigrated to South Africa? – D Smuts⁹⁷

It cannot be argued that early emigrants such as the Huguenots and Voortrekkers left their people in the lurch . . . why view today's emigrants in a poor light? – Anonymous⁹⁸

I believe it is only people with great bravery who will emigrate, just like the Voortrekkers when they left the Cape – C van Vuuren⁹⁹

People always have been migrants. How many people in South Africa, the Americas, Australia and New Zealand are not descendants of emigrants who came to these countries over the past centuries? – M Smith¹⁰⁰

We live in a global village where it is natural for people to settle in countries other than their own – C Jacobs¹⁰¹

Qualified and skilled people, including Afrikaners, have all the choices available to them. Why begrudge them this? – C Gerke¹⁰²

To conclude, the tens of thousands of South African who are emigrating each year constitute a loss of people, skills and capital which South Africa can hardly afford. This causes real and understandable concern among many South Africans, and together with the subjective and emotional view that emigrants are not loyal and patriotic South Africans, has led to growing public resentment and the virtual disowning of emigrants in official circles. On the other side, most emigrants regard their decision to emigrate not as a reflection of their patriotism or lack of it, but rather as a reflection of unacceptable socio-economic and political conditions in the country, the blame for which they place squarely on the shoulders of the government.



6 SOUTH AFRICANS ABROAD – THE DIASPORA


Our country is wherever we are well off – Cicero

The weather, it emerges, is a serious consideration. South African (emigrants) are a fussy lot who want first-world sophistication and third-world sunshine – journalist Charlotte Bauer¹

Well, run to Auckland or Canberra or Saskatoon or Hopeville if you want to be bored to death – Max du Preez²

As soon as you arrive at your destination join the local South African club – then integrate as soon as possible into your new environment and immediately leave the South African club – advice from a South African emigrant³

The process whereby an emigrant acquires the cultural characteristics of the host nation and is absorbed into it is referred to as acculturation. It is a one-way process whereby a host culture absorbs another, and acculturation is different from the concept of assimilation, a two-way process by which homogeneity is achieved through the exchange of cultural characteristics.⁴ South African emigrants, like emigrants all over the world, have the option of adopting and immersing themselves totally into the customs and culture of the host country as quickly as possible, or alternatively to try to retain their South African culture and identity for as long as possible and to make this part of the culture of their host countries.



While most emigrants will probably follow the golden middle way, this chapter will show that many emigrants choose the latter option, that is, a slow process of assimilation. This is evident from the vigorous attempts by such emigrants to maintain a variety of cultural links with South Africa and with fellow emigrants in their host countries. This is particularly true of first-generation emigrants and Afrikaners, and it manifests itself in the multitude of expatriate social clubs, stores that sell South African foods, attempts to get Afrikaans into the schools of

host countries, the founding of churches that cater for Afrikaans emigrants, and continued loyalty to touring South African sports teams – the proud wearing of South African colours at, for instance, a Springbok vs All Black rugby game in Auckland is an example of a very visible manifestation of this concept.*

Flowing out of this is the tendency of some South African emigrants overseas to stick together in certain suburbs and to give these areas their own unique culture. These suburbs include St Ives in Sydney, Thornhill in Toronto and La Jolla in San Diego. This is of course a general emigration phenomenon found all over world and is evident in most large cities in North America, such as Chinatown in Toronto, Vancouver, San Francisco, New York and elsewhere, and 'little Italy' or 'little Greece' in many North American or Australian cities.

There is also a less visible, but equally persistent and probably more powerful emotional attachment to a South African identity – this attachment remains with many emigrants for much longer. For a sizeable section of expatriates, South Africa remains 'home' for a very long time, and a considerable part of their time and energy is spent in trying to recreate a 'Little South Africa' for themselves in their new country. For many emigrants the excitement of 'being overseas', and adopting a new culture and lifestyle is accompanied by a profound sense of loss, characterised not only by broken families and absent friends, but indeed by the loss of a unique sense of 'South Africanness' and, in some cases, an Afrikaner culture. Throughout this chapter the loss of identity and the longing for things South African form a recurrent theme, for example, as expressed by these emigrants:

My family has recently adopted NZ citizenship ... However, I can never forget my roots, and miss family and friends I had in SA – Stan Silberbauer in Auckland⁵

My wife and three daughters have adapted well but I have this compelling urge to remain South African – emigrant Colin Dedricks in Canada⁶

Have been here for four years. We like it here but miss the old lingo ... We miss shared humour more than anything – C Mellor, California⁷



* South African expatriates participated unofficially in the 1999 general election, by making use of a virtual poll run by an internet service provider <http://iafrica.com>. Not surprisingly, the result of this virtual election was heavily in favour of the DP (58%), followed by the NNP (13,6%) – the ANC trailed far behind at 4% of the vote.

You can't believe how much I miss the spontaneity of Africans – Richard Lister, Australia⁸

We ex-South Africans may be very happy here, but we all collect Africana, buy mieliepap to make pap en wors and watch the rugby! – Pam Nordon, in Sydney⁹

We miss the fun and sun of the home country, in fact Marlene gets a tear in her eye every time she sees a thorn tree on TV ... Thank goodness Baxters has Snoek, biltong, boeries, Mrs Ball's chutney and Pronutro or we'd have starved – Brian Peters, in Toronto¹⁰

I love Australia and its people and I'm happy to be an Australian, but you never get Africa out of your system – Gloria Jackson in Perth¹¹

Have been living in Southern California for three years and think it's a really great place ... I still miss South Africa, its culture and its people – I guess that Africa just gets into your blood – Tania Odes, California¹²

The latest wave of emigrants, that is, the post-1994 group, includes greater numbers of Afrikaners and many more family-sponsored emigrants such as the parents and grandparents of younger emigrants. Among Afrikaners and the older generation the attachment to South Africa is even stronger and their sense of identity and belonging to South Africa and Africa remain intact for much longer – they are the first ones to point out that 'Africa never leaves your blood' and proudly mention that the 'Van Wyks', 'Van der Merwes' or 'Le Rouxs' have been living in South Africa for 300 years. One of the distinguishing characteristics of South African emigrants is the use of the Afrikaans language as a mark of identification, irrespective of whether it is their home language or whether they can barely speak it. It is almost like an 'in joke', and for many it constitutes a badge of identification as prominent as a South African flag stuck on the back of a car.



South African emigrants overwhelmingly settle in five countries, all Western, English-speaking and part of the industrialised world. In the discerning eyes of many emigrants, the only real differences between these countries, apart from entry requirements and job opportunities, relate to culture and climate. These five destinations of choice are the UK, the USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, and those emigrants who are lucky enough to have a choice will often pick a country or even a city where the climate or lifestyle most closely resembles that of South

Africa. South African emigrants particularly prefer Australia for its sunny climate, rather than Canada and the UK, and prefer the UK, Australia and New Zealand for the cultural similarities in sport (rugby and cricket). Other emigrants feel that Australia and New Zealand are 'backwaters' and too isolated and opt for the UK and North America. Many prefer the UK for sentimental and family reasons (especially the 800 000-odd British passport holders). Other South Africans of dual nationality opt for their 'home countries' or countries to which they have some direct or even distant ethnic or cultural affiliation. For example many Jews emigrate to Israel, and thousands of first- or second- generation South African-based Portuguese and Greeks emigrate to corresponding European destinations.

About 5% of emigrants find that they miss South Africa and their friends and family so much that they eventually return. However, among the remaining 95% of emigrants who do not return to South Africa are tens of thousands who were driven out of their beloved country by crime, violence and fear, and who ultimately had to make a hard choice between emigration and living as a virtual prisoner of crime in their country of birth.

Although they tend to be 'homesick', South African emigrants are among the most successful groups of people in their adopted countries. One reason is that emigrants are allowed into other countries primarily because of their skills – South Africa's most educated and skilled people are in higher demand than those without such skills. As a category, these emigrants will be among the more successful members of any society, whether it is in Australia or South Africa or somewhere else. In general, South African emigrants tend to find jobs without too much trouble or they start successful businesses. They generally enjoy a higher standard of living than the local average but find that they have to work harder. On the whole they are accepted by locals in spite of minor cultural differences. They are largely content and happy with their decision to leave South Africa and most do not want to return permanently, but they miss South Africa, their friends and families.¹³

With more than one million South Africans living outside South Africa, the growth of the Internet has created a valuable tool, not only to facilitate interaction among South Africans in a particular country, city or across the world, but also to create a direct link between emigrants and the South African motherland. Not only can they read South African newspapers daily, but they are able to communicate with friends and family in South Africa by e-mail at a low cost and almost instantaneously. The Internet has also become the simplest way to draw together ex-South Africans in any overseas country or city and to disseminate newsletters and organise gatherings. One such website is 'South Africans World-Wide' (<http://www.saw.co.za>), which contains

the e-mail addresses of South Africans living outside South Africa and has a comprehensive database of information pertinent to South Africans living abroad. Among the thousands of other sites are 'Homesick South Africans' (<http://www.arrowweb.com/aris/rsa>) and the Boerewors Express, an electronic newsletter which facilitates interaction among South Africans living abroad.

This chapter then focuses on the South African diaspora and in particular, on the lifestyles, experiences and impressions of the estimated more than one million South African emigrants dispersed throughout the world. South African emigrants are just one small component of the worldwide diaspora of ethnic and cultural communities, but the issues and challenges that face different emigrant groups in their adopted countries are basically the same. Among the many issues relating to South African diaspora are the following:

- Why have emigrants chosen a particular country, province and city as their new home?
- How have they adapted to their new environments?
- In which economic spheres are they active and how successful are they?
- What do they miss the most about South Africa?
- What are their likes and dislikes in their adopted countries?
- How strong are their ties to the South African motherland?
- How strong are the social ties among South African expatriates?

A note of explanation – earlier in this chapter it was stated that more than 80% of South Africa's emigrants go to the top five emigration destinations. Therefore, if the estimate that more than one million people have left South Africa since 1945 is correct, at least 800 000 will be living in these five countries. However, the estimated numbers of South Africans in these countries, according to the findings in this chapter, add up to about 600 000 people. The discrepancy can be explained in quite logical terms: South Africans who have been living abroad since 1945, and even emigrants who arrived as recently as the 1980s, would probably not view themselves as South African any more and would therefore not appear as South African in the census statistics of the various countries. In addition, many others live and work illegally in these countries and will obviously not appear in any official statistics – they enter on tourist visas and then simply 'disappear'.



AUSTRALIA

South Africans are drawn to Australia for many reasons, not least because it offers all the comforts of home – outdoor living, a suburban

temperament and cold beer – *without the blacks* – journalist, Charlotte Bauer¹⁴

You can pack for Perth but you will never be an Aussie – Howard Donaldson¹⁵

Emigrating here isn't for sissies – anonymous South African immigrant in Australia¹⁶

Ek was bang in Suid-Afrika (I was scared in South Africa)
Die violence het my begin pla (the violence began to bother me)
So I packed for Perth and I moved to Australia
I took Buksie and my wife Sandra
And we went to live Down Under
Where I watched footy and put a prawn on the barbie, mate
Leon Schuster, from the CD *Gautvol in Paradise**

According to a 1997 Australian census more than 65 000 South Africans were living in Australia by the end of 1997 and the figure could have risen to more than 70 000 by the end of 1999.¹⁷ It might even be closer to 100 000 as it is possible that the many South Africans who have been living in Australia since the 1970s and 1980s would not have identified themselves and particularly their children as South Africans in the 1997 Australian census. South Africans make up almost 0,5% of Australia's population or, to put it differently, about one in every 213 people walking in a street in Sydney would be a South African emigrant. In 1997–98 South Africa (jointly with China) was the third-largest source of immigrants to Australia, (6% or roughly 3 000 per annum per country), with only New Zealand (19%) and the UK (12%) contributing more immigrants to Australia.

South Africans live predominantly in New South Wales (50%, or about 35 000 people), followed by Victoria (20%, or more than 18 000), Western Australia (about 15 000) and Queensland (about 10 000). A South African emigrant in Perth claimed that about 45 000 South Africans were living in the city, but this is probably an overestimation.¹⁸



* Comedian, film- and music producer, Leon Schuster, later said he would consider emigration if the crime situation did not improve and that he would have been gone by now if he was 12 years younger, because 'you have to think of your children in these times of lawlessness'. Schuster's views are ironic considering the lyrics on his CD that living with crime in South Africa is still 'better than living Down Under'.

Throughout Australia the South African presence is being felt in suburbs, schools, businesses and social clubs. Roughly 70% of the pupils of the St Ives Jewish school are from South Africa.¹⁹ Bondi Beach in Sydney has several South African franchises, among which are Nando's, Sweets from Heaven, Spur and Mi-vami, a pattern which is repeated in malls all over Australia. The Sydney suburb, St Ives, has a high concentration of South Africans and is popularly referred to as St Ivesfontein.

South African immigrants in Australia have considerably higher standards of living than Australians, with a average income of A\$105 000 compared to the average Australian income of A\$38 000. About 26% of the South African immigrants had master's degrees, MBAs or PhDs, compared to the Australian average of 1%.²⁰ A total of 29% of these immigrants were professionals in the legal, medical and accounting fields. Of the remainder a large number are involved in manufacturing, property development, business services and especially the retail trade – half the executives of Australia's largest retail outlet, Meyers, are South Africans.²¹

During the 12-month period ending June 1995 South African emigrants entering Australia on a business visa made up 20% (441) of all business emigrants to Australia, second only to those from Hong Kong. Although this percentage declined to 8% in 1996, South African business immigrants created between 8% and 20% of the 7 700 new jobs which were created by immigrants in Australia, and were responsible for approximately 1,2 billion rand's worth of exports by Australia between 1994 and 1998.



That so many South Africans choose Australia as their new home is indicative of the similarities in lifestyle, climate, physical aspects such as open spaces, plentiful beaches and to some extent culture. One emigrant described his surprise at finding that Australians did not all fall into the stereotyped image of the uncultured ruffians that he expected: 'People think Australians are uncouth and uneducated but that's absolute nonsense. Professional people swear a lot less, drink less and tend to be a lot more sophisticated and cosmopolitan than South Africans.'²² Others agree: 'Australians are far less aggressive than South Africans, much more diplomatic and not nearly as materialistic.'²³

South African emigrants quickly learn to appreciate the different natural beauty of Australia: 'I missed [South African nature] a terrific amount at first but after a while you start appreciating the isolation and deserts of Australia.'²⁴ Another emigrant chose Australia because she wanted to be in the same hemisphere as her family who remained in South Africa: 'At least we will be under the same southern skies.'²⁵

One distinct difference that most South African emigrants initially have difficulty getting used to is the egalitarian nature of Australian society – the vast majority of Australians, including educated and skilled professional people, live a comfortable middle-class existence with only a small band in the really high income bracket and few poor people. Some South African emigrants are unwilling or unable to assimilate into a society that they regard as grey and bland – displaying their status symbols and wealth, they are painfully conspicuous in the streets and shopping malls of Australia, as described by a fellow emigrant:

Seeing expats in shopping centres in an upmarket Sydney suburb makes you want to cringe . . . you can see them from a mile away . . . many of them are loud, arrogant and bedecked with jewels. They stick together. It's as if they never left South Africa.²⁶

South Africans also have to get used to the idea that a similar job to one in South Africa will imply a relative drop in pay and status in Australia. 'It does not matter if you are a doctor, minister or ordinary worker, everyone is equal,' according to Brian Bath, former Transvaal cricketer and now managing director of the Western Australian Mint.²⁷ According to South African immigrant Adam Dabrowski, engineers, for example, do not have the same status in Australia as they do in South Africa: 'I definitely took a knock, status-wise and financially. I would be earning 30% more in South Africa.'²⁸ South African businessmen also find that they have to work harder to remain competitive with their Australian counterparts:

It's a hard country this, particularly if you are starting a new business. The first year was very tough. Operating costs, overheads and expenditure are high here, and one has to be very tough. Australians might come across as laid-back, but they are shrewd and the average Australian works harder than a South African.²⁹


The privileged lifestyle which many white South Africans grew up with, including servants, pools in many backyards and two cars per family, is less common in Australia. The former Australian High Commissioner in South Africa, Ian Porter, warned emigrants that it is most unlikely that their 'high expectations' can be met in Australia:

I have heard of people talk about going to Australia as if they can continue to live the sort of privileged life there to which they became accustomed during apartheid. They should know that the sort of privilege they have in mind simply does not exist. If they go to Australia

they will find that they need to pay three to four times as much for a similar house, two to three times more for similar private education, three times as much for a restaurant meal . . . Chances are that they will also be like the vast majority of Australians for whom a BMW or Mercedes is out of the question and, unless very wealthy, they will have to wash the dishes, look after the kids and mow the lawn themselves.³⁰

Porter, perhaps not unintentionally, misses the point completely – most emigrants are leaving South Africa because of crime and personal safety, and not all of them are necessarily wealthy or have enjoyed the ‘privileges’ that he refers to. After all, how many young emigrants drove luxury German cars and had domestic servants and gardeners in South Africa? Furthermore, Porter’s claim that houses and private education cost three to four times more in Australia is only true if measured in rand terms – in fact, if South African emigrants earn Australian dollars, they will find that it is less expensive to live in Australia than in South Africa and that they will enjoy a higher standard of living on average.

While South African immigrants to Australia miss their families and friends and find it hard to overcome the longing for Africa, they thrive in a society that espouses an outdoor lifestyle and is obsessed with sport, while the low incidence of violent crime comes as a revelation to shell-shocked South Africans. This perception of personal safety is shared to various degrees by many of the South Africans in Australia and crops up in most accounts of the difference in lifestyle between the two countries.



There was no chance for a peaceful life in South Africa. Today I am living in peace and quiet – Walter Meyer, who imports tents from South Africa, in Perth³¹

The respect people have for institutions; the way people live their social contract in a willing way; the lack of huge political issues; the excellent manners of the public service workers – and the fact that I am leading a safe, peaceful, balanced life – Mark Stanbridge, former Natal University SRC President, in Sydney³²

The Australians who we have met so far are friendly, maintain a good standard of living and are much less concerned about personal safety than South Africans – Wiets and Juanita Marais, owners of a home-based hardware store in Sydney³³

The best thing I did was to go back to South Africa two years ago to see my mother. And I thought: now I know why I had left. I was so unused to all the alarms and locking. What I like about Sydney is that I feel safe. I can go walking at night on Balmoral Beach and I'll be fine. I don't have to worry about being carjacked – Cynthia Walley, former South African magazine editor, in Sydney³⁴

I didn't realise until I'd left how the climate of fear had traumatised my children ... Because they were no longer surrounded (in Perth) by security they felt scared and insecure ... Every time we hear of gruesome murders back in South Africa it just reinforces our view that we made the right decision – Patricia Passetti, immigrant from Johannesburg, now with the Perth Police Department³⁵

I was feeling more and more like a stranger in my own country ... I have four small children and it was getting increasingly difficult to see a future for them in South Africa ... Perth looked like a place that cared for its old people. I saw them sitting in trains going places and they weren't worried or nervous – Charles Kretzmann, in Perth³⁶

It's certainly not paradise – there's good and bad everywhere – but the main thing is safety for the kids – Graig Abrahams, in Sydney³⁷

We were looking for somewhere where we could duplicate the South African lifestyle as closely as possible ... Perth seemed to meet the criteria. If bland and boring means not having your house broken into, not having your car stolen, not being held up at gunpoint, not being raped, attacked and mugged, then (Perth) is bland and boring – and I love it – Colin Touyz, in Perth³⁸

The quality of life in Perth is very good – low crime, old people are looked after, good health care – Mike Thai, owner of Cape to Cairo specialising in South African foodstuffs, in Perth³⁹


A number of emigrants from South Africa are less satisfied with the life in Australia and point out that the country also has problems of its own. Among these are former South African cricketer Peter Carlstein, who claims that he would return to South Africa if 'a solution could be found for the problems of crime, unemployment and squatters'.⁴⁰ Immigrant Gary Crisp prefers the excitement of living in Europe to life in Perth, and complains about social problems in Australia: 'There are downsides of

course. There's a high juvenile suicide rate. And teenagers get into drugs and break into homes to steal money. The problem with kids here is that life is perhaps too easy.'⁴¹ Immigrant Janet Cook of Adelaide concurs: 'Australia certainly has many problems of its own. The work ethic is completely gone – kids are earning more on the dole than they would on a job. I think the education system is also lacking.'⁴² Emigrant Graig Abrahams of Sydney has a problem with the Australian people. 'On the whole Australia is a nice place, although I'm finding it hard to mix with Australians.'⁴³ Often older emigrants battle more than their children to adapt to their host country, but it becomes difficult to just pack up and leave Australia for that very reason. Stephen Mullholand commented that in his experience the 'odd SA emigrant would confide that he or she missed home and would happily return, but for the fact that the children now thought, spoke and acted like the Australians they have become'.⁴⁴

A frequent complaint among South African immigrants to Australia is about the 'lack of issues' and the absence of the unique 'challenges' and 'spirit' of Africa:

The only real problem we have living here is that there are no problems – unidentified South African immigrant interviewed by Dennis Beckett on SABC television, 1997

I just haven't found the same kind of soul here that you find in Africa. It's very easy to be here, but there is a blandness – Trish Murphy in Sydney⁴⁵



NEW ZEALAND

South Africans appear to be model immigrants ... Instant New Zealanders – just add water and mix – Iain Macleod, immigration consultant, in North and South⁴⁶

South Africans are rapidly becoming part of the New Zealand culture – and they make an impression – sports journalist, Mark Keohane⁴⁷

Until 1992 emigration to New Zealand proved to be difficult for South Africans because of strict entry requirements – it was difficult even to get a tourist visa as a result of New Zealand's strong opposition to apartheid and the absence of a New Zealand diplomatic office in South Africa. As a result, only about 1 400 South Africans managed to enter New Zealand as emigrants between 1986 and 1992. In 1992 only 400 South African emigrated to New Zealand, but this increased to 2 700

in 1993 and to 4 000 in 1994.⁴⁸ Since then the number of South African emigrants to New Zealand has remained steady at an estimated 3 000 per annum.

By 1995 it was estimated that approximately 6 000 South Africans were living in New Zealand, but the 1996 New Zealand census indicated that the number was 11 300, of whom 5 100 were Afrikaans-speaking.⁴⁹ With at least 3 000 more emigrants entering New Zealand from South Africa each year, a conservative estimate of the total number of South African living in New Zealand by the end of 1999 would be above 20 000. This estimate is backed up in a study by the Masey University of New Zealand, which claimed that there were at least 20 000 South African emigrants by 1998.⁵⁰

However, both of these figures could be an underestimation as many South Africans go to New Zealand as tourists for an 'LSD' visit 'Look, see and decide', (or, as the cynics call it, 'Look, see and deposit') and then formally apply for residency after being in the country as tourists for a while. Because South Africans have not required a visa to enter New Zealand since 1997, this has made it easier for them to enter and remain in New Zealand for longer periods and without actually being counted as residents or emigrants.


When one considers that New Zealand has a population of only 3,5 million, its intake of South African emigrants per capita is the largest of any of the top five emigration destinations. At current levels South African emigration represents about 12% of all immigration into New Zealand.⁵¹ After Britons, South Africans had become the second largest source of immigrants to New Zealand by 1998 in the 'general' category of immigrants, the route followed by most immigrants. By 1999 South Africans had become the third largest source of all immigrants to New Zealand, after China and Britain.

South African emigrants tend to settle in the North Island, and more specifically in the greater Auckland area, especially in the eastern suburbs. More than 16 000 South Africans live in Auckland (12 000 in North shore and 6 000 in Manukau). Many of the recent flood of Afrikaner emigrants live in the North Shore suburbs of Brown's Bay, Torbay and Howick in Manukau. Traffic congestion and a scarcity of jobs seems to force many further south to places such as Hamilton, Rotorua, Tauranga, Wellington and Christchurch.

South Africans do exceedingly well in the business world and the professions of New Zealand and their earning capacity is well above the national average. In part this may be because New Zealand is the only one of the top five emigration destinations

with an economy smaller than South Africa and, as such, might be a less daunting prospect for South African entrepreneurs than for example the USA. The average household income of South African emigrants is N\$50 000 compared with the New Zealand average of N\$30 000.⁵² South Africans have achieved some major successes in the New Zealand business world and elsewhere, among them James Boonzaier (Group MD of Tower Corporation Holdings in Auckland), George Deeb (Chairman of SANZ Charitable Trust and barrister and solicitor in Takapuna, North Shore), Terence Delaney (Executive Chairman of Warehouse Stationary), Stuart Fish (MD of Tower Retirement Investment in Wellington), Tony Glass (CEO of Ernest Adams Ltd in Auckland), Errol Haarhoff (Head of School of Agriculture at the University of Auckland), Lester Levy (MD of Calan Corporate Services and Chairman of Comunicado), Hugo Venter (CEO of Bendon in Auckland), Chris Parker (MD of BDM Grange Cosmetics in Auckland), Anthony Ratcliffe (former CEO of National Mutual and director of ACC), Derik Steyn (Intensive unit director of Taranaki Hospital), Nicky van der Walt (Professor of International Business, Massey University) and Gregory Fortuin (Director of Superannuation Services in Wellington).⁵³

Many South Africans choose to establish their own businesses, some of which cater for the tastes of South African immigrants. One such company is owned by Annie Vorster and is called 'Zebra Zu', a mail-order concern offering South African foodstuffs such as Ouma Ruskies, *rooibos* tea, All Gold tomato sauce, Jelly Tots, etc. An Internet 'Yellow Pages' of South African-owned businesses and professional services includes Newmarket Auto Repairs Ltd (Auto Repairs); The Biltong Man (biltong); Bramax (boerewors); Stephanie Figg (clinical psychologist); David Osie Dental Centre (dentist); Winnie Koppers (desktop publishing); Dr Stephen Kruger (gynaecologist); Dr Leonard Breger, Dr Michele Foster (medical doctors); Tina Osie (speech & language therapist); Anton de Waal (website design).



Apart from informal business networks and 'Yellow Pages', there is a vast network of immigrant support organisations for South Africans in New Zealand, run mostly by other South African immigrants. According to emigrants Janet and Bruce Metelerkamp, the network of South Africans in New Zealand is 'pretty good as far as helping with contracts, accommodation, basic "refugee pack" furniture before your stuff arrives and networking for a job are concerned.'⁵⁴

One such support organisation is the SANZ Charitable Trust, a 5 000-strong immigration support organisation aiding South African immigrants to New Zealand. It has its own website at <http://sanztrust.org.nz/trust.html> or telephone 09-486 4442), and apart from organising beach braais on the first Sunday in February, the

Trust helps South African immigrants to adapt to their new environment. It puts newcomers in touch with well-established South African expatriates who serve as mentors and role models. According to Coenie de Villiers, the Trust draws largely English-speaking South Africans as members, and he knew of no Afrikaners who belonged to SANZ.⁵⁵ Another organisation which helps new South African immigrants is the non-profit Soft Landings at <http://www.softlandings.co.nz>. It publishes a useful A-Z guide for newcomers to New Zealand, dealing with issues crucial to emigrants, such as *arrival*: 'it is comfortable to be greeted by a familiar face at the airport, so try to arrange this if possible'; *appliances*; *budget*: 'a family of four should be able to live fairly comfortably on \$3 000–\$4 000 a month'; *knowledge*: 'be aware that things can work very differently in New Zealand – try to gain an understanding of the local practices as soon as possible after arrival'; *lifestyle*: 'be prepared for a change in lifestyle. New Zealanders are generally less extravagant and flashy than many South Africans ... full time maids and housekeepers are rare'; *objectivity*: 'try not to compare things to the way they are in South Africa, but accept rather the way they are in New Zealand'.

New Zealand has a small population of three and a half million, and apart from Auckland it has a 'small-town' and rural atmosphere which makes many South Africans feel at home instantly. For this very reason some of the sophisticated urbanites from Cape Town and Johannesburg may view the country as relatively unsophisticated and a bit of a backwater (as they may regard Pietermaritzburg or Bloemfontein). Yet all emigrants appreciate New Zealand's highly developed infrastructure, its industrialised economy and First World standards, and the high quality of its education and healthcare.


Similarities to South Africa in lifestyle, sport and language make it relatively easy for South Africans to adapt, while most are easily won over by the country's natural beauty – snow-covered mountains, green valleys, white sandy beaches and moderate climate, although the South Island can be wet and very cold. In addition, the high levels of personal safety and the low incidence of violent crime are a major boon to crime-wary South Africans. According to Rakes and Sangeeta Singh, emigrants from Durban, New Zealand was 'paradise' in so far as they could walk the streets or go to the park at night with their child without fear of attack'.⁵⁶ Others agree:

It's a whole different lifestyle here. One starts to lose one's paranoias after a while. Our kids can walk around safely at anytime – it's a great relief – emigrant Martin Ralph⁵⁷

I want my children to be able to play in the street. We just can't relax (in South Africa). We'll be able to do that in Auckland – prospective emigrant, Howard Phillips⁵⁸

It became impossible to live with the violence and crime in South Africa. You have to consider your children's futures as well. While I miss the South African countryside and my own people, we have made a good life for ourselves here in New Zealand – Anonymous⁵⁹

With Afrikaners making up almost half of South African emigrants to New Zealand (45% in 1996 and growing), their language and culture have become a distinct part of life in this island country. Afrikaner emigrants to New Zealand tend to stick together closer than their English-speaking counterparts. The reason for this is obviously their language, religion and, as a journalist mentioned, 'their love for dried coriander spice, the ingredient that constitutes the essence of boerewors and biltong'.⁶⁰ The Afrikaans language appears to be thriving in New Zealand and Afrikaners try to maintain and promote their language wherever possible with great commitment.⁶¹ Websites devoted to Afrikaans and Afrikaners, with their origin in New Zealand, can be found on the Internet, one of which is at <http://members.xoom.com/afrikaanse> – run by Magda Schoeman. Afrikaners have also founded their own Afrikaans church in Auckland – it is headed by Gawie Cloete and has close to 300 members. In 1999 the Afrikaans Club, with its 300 members, attempted to persuade education authorities to introduce Afrikaans as a subject at primary schools in the greater Auckland area. However, because of a backlash by several South African emigrants who were hostile to the idea, the club and its chairman, Francois Schoeman, put their plans on hold. The many hostile letters from fellow South African emigrants addressed to Schoeman included references to the 'arrogance and racism' of Afrikaner emigrants, while Ria Aucamp suggested that it would be sufficient for Schoeman to converse in Afrikaans with his children, teach them *Volkspeler*, and feed them 'boerewors' and 'pap'.⁶²



Some Afrikaners claim that the hardest thing they had to do in their new homeland was to take the oath of loyalty to the Queen of Britain when they became New Zealand citizens (it is the same scenario in Australia and Canada where the Queen is also the head of state) – as emigrant Leoni Schmid says: 'When you swear the oath to the Queen, a part of you is born, but a part of you also dies'.⁶³

In the nature of its status as a country of emigration, New Zealanders generally are quite comfortable with emigrants and, in particular, the wave of South Africans

entering their country. Like the New Zealanders themselves, South African emigrants are mostly fluent in English, hard-working, hold similar values and love rugby and cricket. As one emigrant couple claim: 'Everyone here is very accepting of us as immigrants and usually comment 'That's great!' or 'Welcome to NZ''.⁶⁴ New Zealanders appear to be tolerant of the distinctive mannerisms and habits of South Africans and view them as 'direct and forceful people who dress in faintly old-fashioned attire, write quaint English, exude a Calvinistic uprightness and an air of disciplined humourlessness'.⁶⁵ New Zealanders often refer to South African emigrants as 'Jaapiers', presumably because of their use of word 'Ja' in lieu of 'Yes'.

However, not all New Zealanders are equally welcoming – the violent anti-apartheid protests which tore New Zealand society apart during the Springbok Rugby Tour in 1981 still bring back bad memories for some New Zealanders. There is also a perception that South African emigrants may be importing racism to a country that already has a brittle relationship with its Maori population. In 1994 a New Zealander, Dick Cuthbert, led a campaign called SWAT (Stop White South Africans), which was initially a protest against a South African emigrant who had a racist history. However, it quickly became a broader anti-immigration protest targeting all South African emigrants.* The SWAT campaign was based on the assumption that all South African immigrants are racist: 'If they really are non-racists, why are they leaving as South Africa changes to a non-racial society?'⁶⁶ Cuthbert's self-righteous and ludicrous views conveniently ignored crime as the real reason that South Africans are emigrating, but fortunately few New Zealanders share his views.

Finally, many South Africans go to New Zealand only to settle later in Australia. As it is more difficult to obtain a visa to emigrate to Australia than to New Zealand, many South Africans use entry to New Zealand as a backdoor route into Australia. This is possible because New Zealanders can live and work in Australia without residence permits.

CANADA

There is a transparent recognizableness to Canada and South Africa that makes each other's citizens feel at home in them – Canadian journalist Michael Valpy

The local butcher made the spicy South African sausage especially for the residents of Doringkop (Thornhill in Toronto). Well, I thought, had I




* Cuthbert was formerly a leader of an organisation called HART (Halt all racist Tours) which tried to prevent the 1981 Springbok rugby tour from proceeding.

really travelled so far to sit around a barbecue in 2 m of snow with a miserable bunch of ex-South Africans talking longingly about the things they miss? Apart from the obvious, like Marie biscuits and Mrs Ball's Chutney, there were some interesting thoughts, including 'the red African earth'. A young woman said: 'What I really miss is my house in Constantia and my maid' – journalist Ken Daniels recalls his impressions of the expatriate community in Canada⁶⁷

In spite of the widely held perception among sun-obsessed South Africans that Canada is an icy-cold, snow-filled, neglected cousin of the United States, the country is becoming an increasingly popular destination with South African emigrants. This is largely because of its immigrant-friendly policies and its reputation as the best country in the world in which to live, an accolade which Canada received for the seventh time in a row in 2000. The United Nation's Human Development Index selected Canada as the number one country out of 174 in terms of standard of living (measured by GDP per capita), life expectancy and educational attainment. It is also viewed by some emigrants as a gateway to the USA, as certain Canadian professionals can work freely in the USA.

A Canadian census showed that by 1991 a total of 24 000 South Africans were living in Canada. By 1995 this figure had increased to over 30 000, according to the Canadian High Commission in Pretoria.⁶⁸ Considering that the annual number of emigrants from South Africa to Canada is close to 2 000, a more accurate estimate in 1999 would be above 40 000, and could be more, as one recent estimate put the number of South Africans in Vancouver alone at 50 000.⁶⁹



South Africans live mostly in Toronto and Vancouver. In Toronto they tend to congregate in the city's northern and western suburbs such as Oakville and Thornhill, while increasing numbers are also settling in the suburbs and neighbouring towns as far east as Pickering and Oshawa, and to the south towards the Niagara peninsula. A growing number of South Africans settle in Calgary because of the job opportunities created by a booming Alberta economy and lower house prices. Many South African doctors settle temporarily in small towns in the sparsely populated and cold northern parts of Manitoba, Saskatchewan (218 South African doctors) and Alberta where there is a shortage of doctors and the high remuneration is supposed to compensate for the isolation and bitter cold. Fewer South Africans choose the province of Quebec mainly because of the language barrier, as French is the official language of the province.

British Columbia appears to hold a particularly strong attraction for South Africans opting for Canada, especially those originating from Cape Town. The relatively milder climate of Vancouver Island and its 'English-flavoured' capital, Victoria, with the mildest climate in Canada, ensure that many South African emigrants settle there. The province's largest city, Vancouver, is the most popular destination for South Africans in Canada. Although its soggy climate compares poorly with the Mediterranean warmth of Cape Town, the cities share scenic beauty in the form of stunning mountains, long beaches, a great outdoor lifestyle, a laid-back approach to life and a sense of splendid isolation from the rest of the country. The northern shores of Vancouver, in particular the suburbs of North and West Vancouver, are popular among South African immigrants and their proximity to the sea and the mountains (and the high rainfall) is reminiscent of the Newlands and Rondebosch areas of Cape Town. The popularity of Vancouver and its environs is illustrated by theses comments from members of the large expatriate South African community:

I have been living in Vancouver for two years now. I enjoy a quality of life which I did not know existed. The people are wonderful and I have had no problem to adapt – Jonathan Bezuidenhout, Vancouver.⁷⁰

Except for the rain, we enjoy BC life ... safe! – Leon & Emmarentia Barnard, Burnaby⁷¹

[I feel] relief because of the peace and tranquillity afforded my children in BC – Steven Wright, Vancouver⁷²

I live in Steveston, BC, where life is very laid-back and wonderful – Sid Schneider, Steveston⁷³

As with other emigration destinations, South African immigrants in Canada do very well for themselves financially and career-wise. They are among the top income earners and are mostly professional people or business people in their thirties, with young children.⁷⁴ The obvious reason for their above-average success is that, like emigrants to all destinations, the people with most skills and/or capital are allowed into Canada because of highly-selective points system. There appears to be a preponderance of South Africans in the legal, medical, managerial and entrepreneurial spheres of the Canadian economy.

The Soft Landings' support guide for newcomers to Canada provides evidence of the entrepreneurial nature of many South African emigrants. Jim Pattison runs an automotive leasing company in Toronto; Susan Trenkel, formerly from Henley-on-

Klip, owns her own bed and breakfast called 'Tree Tops' in North Vancouver; Nick and Dolores Thompson-Wood, formerly from Johannesburg, operate a 39-room bed and breakfast in Toronto; Charles Burden does videotape conversions in Kelowna; Shelley and Geoff Berkow run their own Playball franchise in Vancouver; Anita and Les Rudolph, formerly from Benoni, run an Academy of Learning franchise in Vancouver; Tricia Norman operates an employment agency called 'Select Placement Services'; Eddie Katz, formerly from Johannesburg, runs an auditing, accounting and tax consultancy firm in Toronto. Other examples from the South African Canadian Business Directory are Pam and Alan Skinner (estate agents), Dirk Odendaal (CA), Paul Maritz (electrical contractor), Daniel Gouws (physician), Colin Swanepoel (furniture), Marpole Meat Supply (biltong and boerewors) and Annale Snyman (in charge of a newsletter called *The Protea Club*). A major success story is that of John Klass and Russell Jacobs, who own their own packaging supply business, Arctic Packaging Industries, based in Ontario with 50 employees and occupying 60 000 square feet of business space.⁷⁵ Another successful emigrant is Carl Handley, formerly a senior manager with the Small Business Development Corporation in Johannesburg (now Business Partners), who bought two filling stations/convenience shops from Shell in North Vancouver with borrowed capital – Handley and his wife, Karen, successfully transformed both franchises and vastly increased turnover and profits within two years.

For the South African emigrant, Canada has many pros and cons, but its First World level of development, sophistication and social order are big plus points. South African emigrants in Canada quickly have to learn to cope with living in the second-coldest and second-largest country in the world (second to Russia each time), with long icy winters, vast distances between some urban areas, driving on the right-hand side of the road, getting to grips with sports such as ice hockey, baseball, American football, basketball, and generally learning how to cope with the North American way of doing things. However, in addition, they will quickly appreciate the excellent and virtually free healthcare and education, efficient postal service, low levels of crime, and bureaucratic efficiency and honesty.



Comments by South African expatriates about life in Canada almost always refer to the low levels of crime, the scenic splendour, the warmth of the people and the sense of stability that is an undeniable part of living in an industrialised and highly civilised society:

We are experiencing the joys of a clean country with such majestic natural beauty, such an incredibly high level of service, a stable economy

... and last but not least, we are enjoying sleeping with our back doors open at night. The Canadian nation must have the friendliest people with the best sense of humour and we have made many, many new friends – Elze Hugo⁷⁶

Been in Calgary for 10 years now – love it ... We are happy here – Irene and Rik Boezaard, Calgary⁷⁷

Although I deeply miss SA, I think moving to Canada was the best thing we ever did – E Eckbo⁷⁸

I enjoy Canada and it is a wonderful place in which to live – Anrike Botha, Brampton⁷⁹

After two years in Canada we are really getting to love this place – Phil Hatting, Aurora⁸⁰

We have had a tough time settling in and getting established in Canada but have never regretted coming – Gerry Pieters, Oakville⁸¹

Audrey and I arrived in Canada in Feb 1997, and haven't regretted the move for one second. This is a wonderful country with great, great people. – Jacques & Audrey van Dyk, Oakville.⁸²

A survey by *SA Family Practice* dealing with South African doctors in the Canadian province of Saskatchewan is particularly enlightening. between 83% and 100% of these doctors indicated that their children adjusted very well in local schools, that their South African medical training served as an excellent basis for their jobs in Canada, that they have enjoyed their current practice situation, that they adjusted well to life in Canada and that the sacrifices made in emigrating were worthwhile given the gains. Only 7% said they will return to South Africa eventually.⁸³

As in other emigration destinations, South African immigrants in Canada have organised themselves in a myriad clubs and organisations, with websites, newsletters and even the odd business directory circulated regularly. One of these is the South African Society of BC, with its own website, which is used to exchange information and facilitate social get-togethers, at http://www.proteaclub.vancouver.bc.ca*



* The SA Society of BC for example organises expatriate touch-rugby games in Vancouver on Sunday afternoons inform expatriates of televised international rugby matches at the Vancouver Rowing Club.


Another is the South African Canadian Business Directory, which appeared for the first time in 1997 and contains the names of hundreds of South African-owned businesses and professionals.

This well-organised South African network facilitates social interaction among people who share memories, a common culture and speak the same language (in the case of Afrikaners) or at least share a South African dialect. While it can be a mistake for emigrants to remain too attached to expatriate groups and friends (they risk missing out on making Canadian friends and assimilating into Canadian culture), maintaining close links with fellow-expatriates provides a sense of security and identity and gives South African emigrants a sense of community in an alien environment.

UNITED STATES

At the check-out counter of a supermarket in Virginia the woman sales clerk told me I must be a South African when I paid the equivalent of about R18 for a bottle of Marmite. 'How do you know,' I demanded. I was not, after all, wearing a safari suit with a comb in my sock. 'Nobody else eats this stuff,' she said – journalist Neil Lurssen, on a visit to the USA.⁸⁴

America has always been a popular emigration destination for South Africans, along with millions of other emigrants. Considerable numbers of South African Jews settled in San Diego and the rest of California in the 1970s and 1980s, while many members of the ANC and anti-apartheid activists ended up in the USA in the 1980s. With the advent of the information technology revolution in the 1990s, thousands of South Africans with IT qualifications were lured by huge salary packages to California and elsewhere on the Pacific Coast, while some of South Africa's top talent in the movie industry, such as Charlize Theron, arrived in Hollywood. Many South African investment bankers, lawyers and accountants have settled in the financial hub of New York, while a few hundred other South Africans move to the USA each year courtesy of the Green Card lottery.



By 1990 more than 35 000 South Africans were living permanently in the US according to a 1990 USA census.⁸⁵ The continuing and growing flow of emigrants since then would have ensured that by 1999 this number increased to between 70 000 and 125 000.* The most popular states for South African emigrants are



* Cliff Matheson, editor of the South African newsletter in the USA, Juluka, is in possession of the addresses of at least 40 000 South African expatriates in North America, *Die Burger*, 15 April 1998.

California, Florida, Texas, Washington DC and Georgia, but all things being equal, they tend to prefer the warmer climates of the sunbelt states, especially California, Georgia and Florida – the Sunshine State is the home of at least 25 000 South Africans.^{86*}

Large numbers of South African emigrants congregate in Atlanta, Georgia, where an estimated 4 000 families (roughly 16 000 to 20 000 people) have settled. In Atlanta expatriates have founded the South African Club with a membership of over 750 – its president is Henrietta Botha. They have even created their own South African business directory called 'Helpmekaar' (help each other), containing the names of South African doctors, brokers, estate agents, travel agents, accountants, locksmiths and many others. The expatriate community in Atlanta holds regular get-togethers attracting up to 1 000 people, where they play rugby, have braais and socialise. One of the more successful South Africans in Atlanta is Stephan Botes, who founded his own R400 million computer consulting firm with about 360 employees. Botes claims that over the past 15 years he has brought more than 1 000 computer technicians from South Africa over to Atlanta to work for him. Among the other South Africans in Atlanta are Liesel Wild, a former Dutch Reformed Church candidate minister, Chris Dillion who sells South African wines, Douw van der Walt who does landscaping, Ben Cilliers who does paving and builds retaining walls, the Anthony family who own a South African restaurant called 10 Degrees South Bistro and Bar, and Clifford Hodson who runs a South African food store called Cape Food and Beverage.⁸⁷

In Washington DC South Africans have founded an organisation called EINA (Expatriates In North America), and they celebrate American holidays such as Thanksgiving with boerewors, melktert and the more traditional American turkey. While South African ambassador over there, Franklin Sonn also made an effort to act as a conduit between the expatriates and the embassy.⁸⁸

A South African-oriented website in Boston lists the names of 300 emigrants in the greater Boston area in the state of Massachusetts.** The site is to be found at <http://www.amaboston.com/index.html> and its purpose is to 'connect' South Africans



* The CEO of a company called eWorldNetworks, former South African Clayton Johnson, recently suggested that more than one million South Africans were living in the USA (*Financial Mail*, 7 April 2000). This clearly is an exaggerated estimate, considering that the worldwide South African diaspora consists of between one and one and a half million people, but it is surprising that a respected financial magazine such as *Financial Mail* would publish such claims without verifying their accuracy.


** Of the 300 South Africans in the Boston area listed on this website, 24% are Afrikaners.

living in that area. It consists of a list of businesses offering South African goods or services, with information on events, news, sports, humour, and other links that are related both to Boston and South Africa.

Even the colder climates of the Mid-Western United States and the Great Lakes area attract some South Africans. In Chicago, South African expatriates have their own social club and website at <http://people.ce.mediaone.net/mafojani/index.htm>. They jovially describe themselves as:

... an informal group (Boertjies & Souties) of South Africans living in the Northwestern Suburbs of Chicago that socialize together. We would like to meet more ex-South Africans and PARTY together as much as possible, as summer is only 3 months long (if you're lucky). In winter we will carry on with red wine in front of a log fire. We can even braai in the snow.

As South Africans settled in the USA in larger numbers, their habits, tastes and cultural oddities followed them and are slowly becoming part of the American culture, an occurrence that led journalist Neil Larsson to comment: 'You are never far from tamatie bredie and Mrs Ball's in America.'⁸⁹ It appears that Americans are also developing a taste for South African food, as is evident by numerous restaurants offering South African fare – a South African vegetarian restaurant in San Francisco, called Joubert's, was described in glowing terms by an American food critic: 'Open the door to Joubert's and be instantly swept away to another world ... a taste of South Africa.'⁹⁰



Apart from South African restaurants and corporate presences such as Sol Kerzner and Gold Fields, hundreds of South African businesses can be found all over the USA, among them AA Biltong (Charlotte, North Carolina), Action Africa (Tucson, Arizona), Biltong Box (Dallas, Texas), Biltong Ranch (San Clemente, California), Cape Food & Beverage (Atlanta, Georgia), Cape Wine Selections (New York), Furniture Out of Africa (California), Protea Diamonds (Arlington, Virginia) RSA Wines (Pennsylvania), Setsoto Designs of Boston (Newton Highlands, Massachusetts), Springbok Pub (Fort Worth, Texas) and Witkrans Safaris (Tucson, Arizona).

BRITAIN

The latest tribe to colonise London likes lager, raw meat and rugby ... Whereas the Australians are merely fanatical about rugby, South Africans ... are completely obsessed with it. Whereas the Australians' national dish is more or less anything with chips, South Africans eat raw, dried meat

(biltong) and furthermore, enjoy doing so. They also like Ouma rusks, biscuits which come in very handy when trekking through the veld. They never become stale because they already are stale – journalist Andrew Martin commenting on the South African invasion of the British capital.⁹¹

The UK has always been a popular destination for South African exiles and emigrants, but more importantly at least 800 000 South Africans have British passports and probably many more can lay claim to British citizenship. This means that there is a virtual free flow of close to one million dual citizens/residents between South Africa and the UK. President Thabo Mbeki and ANC stalwart Siphosiso Pityana were among the tens of thousands of members of the ANC who spent some years there in exile while the NP was in power, and ironically they were joined by approximately 10 000 young white men fleeing conscription. Nowadays, the UK, and London in particular, is flooded with South African emigrants and refugees of another kind and they are motivated by other reasons:


London is teeming with ex-South Africans who have given up on the country and would rather battle with Britain's lousy weather and sky-high prices than continue the struggle back home – David Lascelles, co-director of the UK-based Centre for the Study of Financial Innovation⁹²

By 1995 it was estimated that the UK was home to 120 000 South Africans.⁹³ Because of growing emigration, this number would have increased substantially by 1999 and the number of South Africans in London is now conservatively estimated at over 300 000. This figure excludes the approximately 50 000 South Africans younger than 27 who are on two-year 'work and travel' Commonwealth visas. This number almost equals the combined numbers of Australian and New Zealanders in the city.⁹⁴ The South African High Commissioner in the UK, Cheryl Carolus, estimates the number of South Africans in the UK at 350 000, while other sources suggest that it could be more than 500 000.⁹⁵

Over the years many well-known South Africans have made Britain their home and contributed greatly to British society, especially in the apartheid era. Among these were Laurens van der Post, zoologist Lord Zuckerman, cricketers Basil D'Oliveira, Alan Lamb and Robin Smith, actors Janet Suzman, Nigel Hawthorne and Antony Sher, businessmen such as Sir Michael Edwardes, Sir Mark Weinberg and Alister Morton, High Court judge Sir Johan Steyn, Sydney Lipworth – a chairman of the Mergers and Monopolies Commission, Sir Raymond Hoffenberg, former president of the Royal College of Physicians, Nobel Chemistry Laureate Sir Aaron Klug and many others.⁹⁶

Those South Africans who settle permanently in the UK tend to be highly skilled and do well in the business world and in other professions. In 1995 the third most common university qualification in London's financial district and on the boards of the London Stock Exchange's top hundred companies, after degrees from Oxford and Cambridge, was from the University of the Witwatersrand.⁹⁷ Other emigrants use their entrepreneurial skills to open franchises such as chicken-based Nando's and a range of small businesses, including restaurants specialising in South African food, such as the Springbok Café in London. This restaurant is owned by Pete and Chantelle Gottgens from Cape Town and serves delicacies such as ostrich and springbok fillet, a variety of Cape/Dutch/Malay food and South African wines.

South African doctors, dentists and nurses and other paramedics are highly thought of and in high demand in the UK, with the British nursing profession in particular skimming off the cream of the South African crop. Dentists also flock to the UK – in 1998 over 200 emigrated to the UK, which was the largest group of dentists from another country, according to the British General Dental Council.⁹⁸ By early 1999 at least 2 000 South African dentists were registered both in South Africa and the UK, but some estimates put the number of South African dentists practising in the UK at 3 000.⁹⁹ South African dentists are earning at least £4 000 per month in the UK and many are working for large corporate dental firms such as Dr James Hull and Associates, which recruited 107 from South Africa in the first half of 1999 alone.¹⁰⁰ Although highly regarded for their skills, their professional reputation was slightly dented when five of them were caught defrauding the National Health system.



Teachers from South Africa are also in great demand in the UK, with recruitment agencies actively involved in luring thousands away from South Africa. This is particularly attractive option for teachers retrenched by the government or seeking better opportunities. A typical teacher could be earning more than £11 000 or about R112 000 per year in the UK.¹⁰¹

The opening up of the UK to South Africans after 1994 resulted in thousands going there on two-year working-travelling visas, with more than 14 000 leaving in 1998 alone.* Many of them do not return when their permit expires. As one of these adventurers, Allan Phillips, explained succinctly: 'I prefer the way of life here. It is an easy place to get a job and a reasonable salary. It is not good back home.'¹⁰² Many



* In 1996 British Home Office figures showed that 238 000 South Africans entered the UK however these were mostly tourists and business visitors.

of these temporary visitors reside in Earl's Court and Swiss Cottage and congregate at designated pubs such as the Castle Tavern in Shepherd's Bush, the Sports Café in the Haymarket and the Riverside Blues Bar onboard HMS President on Victoria Embankment on the Thames.

On the whole, South African emigrants and those with temporary work permits fit relatively easily into British society. Apart from the vagaries of the weather, South Africans feel at home and fit in easily because of cultural similarities such as language, sport, driving habits and historical ties. Britons recognise South Africans by their love for lager, biltong, rugby, cricket and their distinctive accent described as 'Seth African'. This apparently places them in the same broad category as their southern hemispheric cousins, the Australians and New Zealanders, and therefore they are regarded as acceptable, if slightly odd.

Nonetheless, the South African invasion sometimes stretches British hospitality to the limits. For example, the Adams family from Port Elizabeth were hounded out of their house in Gateshead in north-east England by neighbourhood thugs who did not like their accents.¹⁰³ In Scotland newcomers from South Africa talk of a 'Tartan Curtain' to describe an inhospitable 'wall of Scottishness' that tends to exclude emigrants from certain spheres of Scottish life and society: 'Simple factors such as accent and customs can mitigate fairly heavily against new arrivals,' according to a recent emigrant, Iain McDonald. On the whole, however, according to McDonald, Scots remain tolerant of newcomers and 'along with the haggis, shortbread, tartan, bagpipes and whisky, they are becoming more willing to sell burritos, burgers and boerewors'.¹⁰⁴


Afrikaans-speaking South Africans in the UK have founded their own Afrikaans 'Protestant' church with more than 1 000 members throughout the country. In addition, an Afrikaans literary café was founded early in 2000, with the goal of promoting the Afrikaans language and culture in the UK. Apart from the frequent social events organised throughout London and elsewhere by South Africans for South Africans, certain local publications serve as a source of news and information for South African expatriates. The *SA Times*, with a circulation of over 62 000 is published weekly and caters for South African expatriates and British tourists to South Africa – its news content is slightly dated, but its South African sports scores are useful for those who have been away from South Africa for a while, while it also serves as a guide to tourists and emigrants from Britain who want to go to South Africa. For more up-to-date news and live contacts, South Africans in the UK are much better off visiting the Internet – here they can read most South African newspapers and magazines live and get in touch with fellow expatriates in the UK.

ELSEWHERE

In spite of language, cultural and climatic differences, quite a number of South Africans choose the Middle East as a work or emigration destination. For instance, about 2 000 South Africans are living in the United Arab Emirates and there are sufficient numbers of South Africans in Dubai to enable them to have a social club, while the few hundred South Africans in Bahrain have their own website at <http://www.homestead.com/Gulfing/index.html>. They arrange frequent social gatherings such as an indoor cricket tournament, a 'ladies morning', an 'Oktoberfest', a beach braai and an annual SA golf day.

Israel is another popular destination, because of the mobility of the large South African Jewish community. About 18 000 South Africans were living in Israel by 1995, but significantly, this figure represents only about half of the 45 000 Jews who are estimated to have left South Africa – presumably many others prefer to not to move from one country fraught with risk to another, and find Australia or the US more attractive options.

A considerable number of South African emigrants are leaving for other African countries, although they often came to South Africa from these countries in the first place and are merely returning to their roots. Namibia is the main African destination and it has become the sixth-largest emigration destination for South African residents, many who are dual citizens anyway. Even Mozambique, one of the world's poorest countries, has attracted a number of South African emigrants – these are mostly people in the tourism industry who want to develop the country's enormous tourism potential, especially in the region south of Maputu, but they also include some farmers who are interested in making a living on the fertile Mozambiquan soil. In 1996, 15 farming families went to live in the north-western region and most made a success of their farms. Although five returned later, a further 17 farmers are strongly considering going to Mozambique.¹⁰⁵ A few hundred South Africans have made their homes in Gaborone, capital of Botswana. Attracted by a booming economy and low crime rates, many South African families have settled in a suburb called Phakalane (nicknamed 'Little Sandton'), and enjoy a middle-class lifestyle where they play bridge, and frequent casinos and game lodges.¹⁰⁶



Portugal is the European destination of choice for many South Africans. This is partly because thousands of Portuguese residents in South Africa who have dual citizenship moved to Portugal because of crime and related issues. However, many non-Portuguese South Africans also settle in Portugal – it used to be possible

for South Africans to 'buy' residency in Portugal by investing a considerable amount of money in the country. South Africans choose Portugal because of the sunny climate, beaches, and because it is a gateway to the European Union. In addition the rand exchange rate is not as poor against the Portuguese escudo as it is elsewhere in Western Europe. South Africans tend to congregate outside Lisbon near places such as Estoril and Cascais, as well as in the southern province of the Algarve. One emigrant who ended up in the Algarve is Alan Frank from Springs, who moved to Quarteira and owns his own butchery which specialises in boerewors and biltong and had a turnover of almost R5 million in 1998. Frank reports that the Portuguese do not really like these African delicacies, but expatriate South Africans are eager buyers.¹⁰⁷ While most emigrants adapt quickly by learning the local language and customs, others comment on how isolated they feel in Portugal:

We were born in SA and have now been living in Portugal for four years. We are terribly homesick and miss many of the little things that we took for granted back home. We make our own boeries, my wife's rusks don't quite taste like Ouma's – Alberto Capela¹⁰⁸

Elsewhere in Europe, Switzerland and Germany both have sizeable South African expatriate communities, with about 2 000 living in Switzerland. As in the UK, South Africans in Europe complain that the climate is cold and there are so few South African residents, making it difficult to form clubs and to arrange social gatherings. Of course, they also miss everything identified with South Africa, typical examples being:

I am a homesick South African living just outside of Zurich. I dream of the good-old-days constantly and live from one holiday in Umhlanga Rocks to the next – Leigh-Anne Coonan in Switzerland¹⁰⁹

Been in Denmark since 1976 and miss Cape Town, braais, Castle Lager and biltong – Michael Stilborg in Copenhagen¹¹⁰

I came to Germany in 1988 . . . and I must say I do miss the South African humour, sunshine and of course the beautiful outdoors – Dieter Pistol in Berlin¹¹¹

Does anyone know of a shop (in or near Brussels) where I can buy South African food stuffs, specifically Chocolate Pronutro! – Gordon Roy in Brussels¹¹²

Despite its size, relative proximity and temperate climate, only about 400 South Africans live on the entire continent of South America, of whom about 120 live in Paraguay.¹¹³ A few Afrikaner families emigrated to Patagonia in Argentina in the late-1800s and early 1900s. They founded small communities in the agricultural region of the Pampas, where they still live today and some are still able to speak Afrikaans.

About 30 South African families have emigrated to Paraguay in the past two decades following an invitation by former president Alfredo Stroessner in 1978. Stroessner, a close friend of the NP regime, wanted South African farmers to settle in remote and harsh regions of his country to help develop it. The South Africans, mostly Afrikaners, settled predominantly in an area called Caaguazu in eastern Paraguay. Some continued farming in their new countries, with various degrees of success, while others opened stores and a small hotel. They even founded an Afrikaans Protestant Church. Among the Afrikaner emigrants are Johan Strauss, owner of a cheap hotel (he failed to get into Canada), Heinie Zietsman, an unsuccessful store owner and now a dairy farmer, and Johan Spannenberg, a furniture exporter. Most of these emigrants have learned some Spanish and the local Indian language. They thrive on the peace, tranquillity and low crime rates, and even if telephones don't always work, they are content in a country described by some as the 'poor man's option'¹¹⁴

To conclude this chapter, it is worthwhile reviewing the experiences and sentiments of the South African diaspora in the context of the experiences of other diasporas. Robert Cohen lists nine common features of such diasporas¹¹⁵:



- *'Dispersal from an original homeland, often traumatically, to two or more foreign regions* – the million-plus South African diaspora are spread over predominantly five countries and most recent emigrants give crime and violence as the reason for their emigrating.
- *Leaving 'a homeland in search of work'* – certainly many South African emigrants leave the country in search for jobs or better paying jobs, and often because of affirmative action.
- *'A collective memory and myth about the homeland'* – from this chapter is evident that most emigrants share such a collective memory of South Africa.
- *'An idealization of the putative ancestral home and a collective commitment to its maintenance, restoration, safety and prosperity'* – South African emigrants frequently express their glowing views of how good certain aspects of life were


in South Africa and many professionals have offered their services to assist the South African economy through for example the South African network of Skills Abroad (SANSA), which has 1800 emigrant members.

- *'A strong ethnic group consciousness sustained over a long time and based on a sense of distinctiveness'* – this is probably more applicable with regard to Afrikaner emigrants, who now constitute close to half of white emigrants – their language, culture and religious ties tend to bind them together as a group more so than English-speaking emigrants, but even so, the myriad South African social clubs overseas transcend such language divisions.
- *'A troubled relationship with host societies suggesting a lack of acceptance'* – this is not really applicable to South African emigrants, who tend to adapt relatively quickly to the cultures of the host countries because of the familiarity of language, values and sporting traditions, especially in Australasia and the UK.
- *'A sense of empathy and solidarity with co-ethnic members in other countries of settlement'* – the growing influence of the Internet as a communication medium, to a degree, assists to draw elements of the South African diaspora in different countries together.
- *'The possibility of a distinctive yet creative life in host countries'* – there is strong evidence that many members of the South African diaspora continue to live a 'distinctive' way of life by clustering in certain neighbourhoods, frequenting shops which sell imported South African foods and other items, and by organising social clubs. At the same time they contribute to the cultures and economies of their host countries through for example ethnic cuisine and culture, and by dispersing South African-honed professional skills and values in the host countries.

7 CONCLUSION

In this book the author examined emigration and immigration as universal phenomena and part of the global flow of people that has been an ongoing process since humankind began moving across continents and, later, political borders. Today millions are moving between countries in search of better jobs, higher standards of living or to escape from war and other threats to their personal security. South Africa is part of this global phenomenon and experiences its own in- and outflows of people, but the problem for South Africa is that the country is experiencing a net loss of skilled emigrants and a massive inflow of poor, unskilled and illegal immigrants.

The author addressed the issues central to emigration in a holistic way and with reference to the broader debilitating problems of South African society. It was contended that emigration in South Africa cannot be explained in isolation, but only in conjunction with, or as a reflection of, the socio-economic and political issues of the time, whether these be apartheid and political uncertainty in the 1980s or crime, unemployment, poverty, affirmative action, racial quotas and declining standards in the 1990s. For this reason criticism of emigration and attempts to limit it through legislation or financial controls will only be addressing one of the symptoms rather than the causes of the fundamental problems of South Africa today.



Together with unemployment and Aids, the most pressing challenge facing the country is violent crime, which in turn is linked to socio-economic problems such as poverty and a culture of brutality which has turned the country into one of the most dangerous places in the world. This is the single most important reason that South Africans are leaving the country in droves, although emigration in itself is accompanied by a high level of psychological stress, physical upheaval and sacrifices. Unlike the thousands of their counterparts in Canada and Australia who emigrate in search of better salaries and lower taxes, South African emigrants are motivated primarily by their quest for personal safety and a more secure future for their children. Other issues, such as falling standards in education, healthcare and public service, are viewed as less compelling reasons to leave the country.

Emigration in South Africa is largely a preoccupation of whites, particularly the more educated and skilled whites. This results in a brain drain of major proportions and


costs the country billions of rand in lost tax revenue, capital outflows, the loss of knowledge, experience and job creation skills and, on another level, results in a loss of part of the rainbow nation's culture and soul. In chapter 2 the spotlight fell on the phenomenon that most emigrants leave the country unofficially without notifying the authorities. This results in an underestimation of the number of emigrants by between one half and two thirds. Although official statistics suggest that close to 10 000 emigrants left South Africa in 1998, in reality this figure is between 20 000 and 30 000. In total, more than one million people have left South Africa since 1945, but emigration has not yet taken on the form of the mass exodus of whites that has occurred in other parts of Africa or in countries which suffered under civil war or genocide. This does not mean it cannot happen, should the wave of violent crime continue unabated or become a full-scale violent revolution between the 'have' and 'have-not' categories, or as Thabo Mbeki argues, between the 'rich white' and 'poor black' nations of South Africa.

Another issue was whether emigration in the South African context can justifiably be criticised on moral grounds and whether the concepts of racism, patriotism and loyalty can be used as measures with which to judge emigrants. While no one can deny that emigration is costing the country dearly in terms of the outflow of capital and skills, emigration is a constitutionally protected right and is a response to existing social problems such as violent crime. It can therefore be argued that criticism directed at emigrants should be redirected at the root causes of emigration and the government's inability to combat these. While South Africa may be defined as a country at war with itself, with 25 000 violent deaths each year, the harsh terminology used currently in South Africa to condemn emigrants as unworthy citizens is unproductive. Many emigrants counter these virulent emotional anti-emigration sentiments with equally harsh condemnation of the government's disregard for the safety of its citizens.

The book concluded with a look at the diaspora of over one million South Africans living abroad. It was evident from the research that many South African emigrants view their departure as a final step and have little intention of ever returning, except perhaps for the odd holiday. These are mostly the emigrants who will assimilate faster and more easily into the local culture and become an indistinguishable part of the culture of the country to which they have chosen to emigrate. For them and their children, South Africa soon becomes but a distant and often bittersweet memory. However, for many other emigrants South Africa will always remain 'home'. They tend to cling tenaciously to their culture and traditions and, for Afrikaners, their language. As a result 'Little South Africas' are being formed all over the world and are becoming part of the suburban life of many larger cities – these small South African

enclaves are in essence very similar to countless other ethnic suburbs, and soon places like 'Doringkop' and 'St Ivesfontein' will become as established as 'Little Italy', 'Little Greece', 'Little Portugal' and 'Chinatown' in cities such as Toronto, London, Sydney and Auckland.

The white exodus, once a trickle, has turned into a steady stream and has the potential to become a flood. The departure of these emigrants has made and is making South Africa poorer in every conceivable way and the onus is on the South African government to urgently address the fundamental problems that are forcing emigrants out of the country, and are driving those who cannot or do not want to leave, into a state of despair. Flippant comments such as 'it's best if they go' simply will not suffice, not when emigration, its root causes and its consequences so negatively affect the lives of all South Africans and, ultimately, together with unemployment and Aids, endanger the survival of the South African state in the twenty-first century.




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


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


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


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
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
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